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Introduction
This PhD thesis comprises three research papers that contribute to the literature on market
efficiency. All papers cover some aspects of the arbitrage process. The first paper, titled “A
Name That Rings a Bell: Spillover Effects in Companies with Similar Names”, documents
irrational spillover effects in equity markets due to similarities in company names. It shows
that investors’ confusion of company names is a source of uninformed demand shocks that
drive prices away from their fundamental levels. These price deviations are the first aspect
of the arbitrage process. The second paper, titled “Do Short Sellers Exploit Stock Mispricing
Smartly?”, demonstrates that market participants who engage in short selling identify and
exploit market anomalies and, as a result, contribute to market efficiency. Thus, this paper
shows that arbitrageurs are able to identify stock misvaluations and, at least partially, push
the prices back to their fundamental levels, which is the second aspect of the arbitrage process.
Finally, in the third paper, titled “Surprise in Short Interest”, I construct a new measure of
informed short selling and find that information contained in this measure is not fully priced by
market participants.1 The results imply that limits to arbitrage, at least partially, hinder other
investors from following short-sellers’ positions that are associated with abnormal returns. This
type of market friction prevent prices from converging to their fair values over extended period
of time. Thus, the last paper highlights market frictions as an important third aspect of the
arbitrage process. I summarize all three papers in more details below.
Summary of “A Name That Rings a Bell: Spillover Effects in Companies with
Similar Names”
In the first paper, I demonstrate that retail investors exhibit behavioral biases and confuse stocks
with similar company names. In particular, they accidently trade similarly named peer stocks
instead of intended focal stocks. As the result of these trades, the stock prices of peer companies
experience price pressure and comove with those of the focal stocks.
First, I consider attention spillover effects after the substantial value-relevant events (earnings
announcements and 8-K filings) over the period of 1996 - 2015. Attention is measured as views of
company Wikipedia pages (e.g., Focke, Ruenzi, and Ungeheuer, 2018) and searches of company
tickers from Google (e.g., Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2011) as proxies for retail investors attention,
and downloads of SEC filings from EDGAR (e.g., Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock, 2015) as a
proxy for institutional investors attention. After controlling for other factors on the event days
1This paper is a joint work with Esad Smajlbegovic.
1
INTRODUCTION
of focal stocks, peer stocks experience abnormal attention as measured by Wikipedia page views
but not Google search volume or Edgar downloads. This increase in attention is associated with
an increase in trading volume. The results are consistent with the spillovers of retail investors
attention and trading to peer companies.
To distinguish between fundamentals-based and mispricing-based explanations of these spillovers,
I consider the reaction of peer stock prices around these events. I expect some substantial price
reaction in peer stock prices to events in focal companies only in case of significant events. Given
a price reaction for peer stocks on an event date, fundamentals-driven explanation predicts per-
sistent price change as the result of the event. In contrast, if the price reaction is the result
of mispricing, the price should revert back to its initial level. Consistent with the mipricing-
based explanation, I show a strong price reversal pattern for peer stocks after the event date for
the strongest 5 percent focal stock events, measured by the 3-days cumulative abnormal return
(CAR) around the event. The stock price reaction is statistically and economically much weaker
for all other events.
In the next step, I hypothesize that the documented price pressure should result in the
excessive return comovement for companies with similar names. I test this hypothesis using a
longer time period from 1972 to 2016. I show that prices of stocks with similar company names
comove excessively after controlling for other known sources of comovement. In general, it is
challenging to control for all possible sources of the excess comovement. To show that it is the
firm names that drive the documented excess comovement, I run a quasi-natural experiment
using a sample of corporate name changes. Following Green and Jame (2013), I focus on
rebranding-driven name changes without confounding corporate events. These name changes are
not associated with changes in companies’ business strategies and therefore can be considered
as quasi-exogenous (Wu, 2010). I show that the excess comovement happens for the same
companies in those months when their names are similar but not in the months when they are
not. To address the existing critique in the comovement literature (Chen, Singal, and Whitelaw,
2016), I control for nonsynchronous trading and estimate comovement before and after the name-
changing events in separate regressions. Finally, I compare the results to the control group that
is matched by stock characteristics, in particular, past stock momentum returns.
The time-series and cross-sectional tests show that the excess comovement is predominantly
present on days when stocks experience large price movements and days with high levels of
trading. Moreover, the comovement is more pronounced for younger stocks with larger retail
investor ownership and with higher limits of arbitrage. These results are consistent with the
price-pressure interpretation of the observed excess comovement.
This paper contributes to the literature on the behavioral biases of retail investors (e.g.,
Odean, 1998; Barber and Odean, 2000), on the sources of stock return comovement (e.g., Bar-
beris, Shleifer, and Wurgler, 2005; Pirinsky and Wang, 2006; Green and Hwang, 2009; Boyer,
2011; Grullon, Underwood, and Weston, 2014; Kumar, Page, and Spalt, 2016; Chen, Singal,
and Whitelaw, 2016), on the effect of investor attention in the financial markets (e.g., Gervais,
Kaniel, and Mingelgrin, 2001; Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2011; Kumar, Ruenzi, and Ungeheuer,
2016), and spillovers of investor attention (e.g., Rashes, 2001; Drake, Jennings, et al., 2016;
2
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Leung et al., 2016). All in all, I identify a behavioral bias that drives irrational demand shocks
and results in significant deviations of stock prices from their fundamental levels.
Summary of “Do Short Sellers Exploit Stock Mispricing Smartly?”
In this paper, I examine whether short sellers profit from mispricing opportunities in the stock
market. Using Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) mispricing score as a proxy for stock level
mispricing, and the ratio of shares shorted to shares outstanding as a measure of short positions,
I document novel results. First, I find a strong monotonic relation between abnormal short
interest and the mispricing score: The more overpriced a stock according to the mispricing score
the larger its short interest ratio. Moreover, the most underpriced stocks are associated with
abnormally low short interest, meaning that short sellers avoid entering short positions in these
stocks. Second, I show that the difference in the short interest between the most overpriced
and the most underpriced stocks increases dramatically after periods of high sentiment. This
result means that arbitrageurs allocate more capital to the mispricing based strategies when
the profitability of these strategies is higher. Third, motivated by the fact that idiosyncratic
volatility (IVOL) is a common proxy for arbitrage risk that deters arbitrageurs (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997; Pontiff, 2006; Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2015; Drechsler and Drechsler, 2016), I
test the relationship between this proxy and the short interest ratio. Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan
(2015) show significant anomaly returns for stocks with high mispricing score in the months
following months of high idiosyncratic volatility. Consistent with arbitrageurs’ stock picking
skill, the short interest ratio increases by 0.11 p.p. for a one standard deviation increase in
IVOL for these stocks. In an alternative setting of the Regulation SHO, Chu, Hirshleifer, and
Ma (2016) show a decrease in anomaly returns associated with the mispricing score for randomly
chosen pilot stocks that were exempted from short sale tests. Consistent with arbitrageurs’
ability to identify mispriced stocks, I show a decrease of 2.86 p.p in exposure to these stocks
relative to control stocks. The difference is not observed pre- and post-pilot program and is
driven by the short leg of the anomaly.
Finally, to test whether short sellers’ activity leads to more efficient markets, I reconsider the
relation of spread in short interest between the short and the long leg of the composite mispricing
anomaly to future corresponding strategy returns. I find a significantly negative relationship
between these variables prior to 2008. This result is consistent with the interpretation of Hanson
and Sunderam (2014) that the rise of arbitrage capital is associated with a decline in arbitrage
profits. On the other hand, I document a positive relationship after 2008. This strong change
in the relationship manifests a structural break in the behavior of short sellers. This positive
relationship means higher strategy returns for a higher level of short interest spread and is
consistent with the spread reflecting arbitrageurs’ expectations of future strategy profitability.
This paper contributes to the literature on the role of arbitrageurs and institutional investors
in stock market anomalies (DeVault, Sias, and Starks, 2016; Akbas, Armstrong, et al., 2015;
Edelen, Ince, and Kadlec, 2016; Jiao, Massa, and Zhang, 2016), their effect on market efficiency
(Hanson and Sunderam, 2014; McLean and Pontiff, 2016), general predictive power of short
interest (Desai et al., 2002; Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan, 2010; Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009;
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Hwang and Liu, 2014; Wu and Zhang, 2014; Drechsler and Drechsler, 2016), and the literature
on limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Pontiff, 2006; Drechsler and Drechsler, 2016;
Chu, Hirshleifer, and Ma, 2016; Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2012). All in all, this study provides
evidence for ”smart” arbitrageurs, and thus corroborates the predictions of theoretical models
and the results of empirical papers.
Summary of “Surprise in Short Interest”
This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion on the informational efficiency of capital mar-
kets. We propose a new measure of informed short selling. The idea for this measure is based on
our observation of two features in the distribution of the short interest ratio, the ratio of shares
shorted to shares outstanding. First, the level of the short interest ratio is highly persistent
over time and differs dramatically across companies. Second, the short interest ratio of some
companies exhibits a larger time-series variation than of other companies. These differences in
distributional properties may arise because certain stocks are mainly used for market making
and hedging while other stocks are primarily targeted by arbitrageurs (Desai et al., 2002; Di-
ether, Lee, and Werner, 2009). In this paper, we account for these differences by calculating the
standardized unexpected short interest ratio (SUSIR), or simply surprise in short interest. For
stock i and month t, it is defined as:
SUSIRi,t =
SRi,t − SRi,t−1,t−12
σSRi,t−1,t−12
,
where SRi,t−1,t−12 is the twelve months moving window of short interest ratio and σSRi,t−1,t−12 is
the volatility of short interest ratio over the same period.
Using surprise in short interest as a proxy for informed short selling, we provide several
new insights. First, we show that the information from short-interest reports is not instantly
incorporated into stock prices after public announcements. Stocks with top (bottom) 30 percent
surprises in short interest experience a strong price drift of around -0.25% (+0.27%) within 30
days of the dissemination. Second, we construct a measure that is updated on a monthly basis
to capture this price drift. A portfolio strategy that involves buying stocks with the 10 percent
lowest surprise in short interest (unexpectedly high short covering) and sells stocks with the 10
percent highest surprise in short interest (unexpectedly high short selling) yields a statistically
significant risk-adjusted return of around 4 to 6 percent p.a. over the next month. The effect
is present on both the long and short side of the portfolio. The predictive ability of SUSIR is
not captured by standard risk factors, mispricing-related anomalies, or other proxies of informed
short selling and short-selling impediments.
Evidence suggests that our measure identifies market mispricing that stems from biased
beliefs of market participants and persists due to limits to arbitrage, such as illiquidity and id-
iosyncratic volatility. Thus, the surprise in short interest represents a mispricing-related anomaly
that is not identified in the prior literature.
This paper contributes to the literature on the predictive power of short interest (e.g., Desai
et al., 2002; Cohen, Diether, and Malloy, 2007; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008; Diether, Lee,
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and Werner, 2009; Hirshleifer, Teoh, and Yu, 2011; Akbas, Boehmer, et al., 2013), on market
efficiency (e.g., Ball and Brown, 1968; Jones and Litzenberger, 1970; Bernard and Thomas,
1990; Mendenhall, 2004; Senchack and Starks, 1993), on the existence and source of capital
asset pricing anomalies (Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2012; Engelberg, Mclean, and Pontiff, 2018;
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2015; Stambaugh and Yuan, 2017; McLean and Pontiff, 2016) and
the literature on limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Pontiff, 2006; Drechsler and
Drechsler, 2016; Chu, Hirshleifer, and Ma, 2016; Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2012). Overall,
our results suggest that the market does not efficiently price the information from short-sale
reports.
5

Chapter 1
A Name That Rings a Bell: Spillover
Effects in Stocks with Similar
Company Names
1.1 Introduction
Investors exhibit behavioral biases and make suboptimal investment decisions (Thaler, 2016).
These biases result in unintended effects in the financial markets, such as mispricing of attention-
grabbing stocks (Barber and Odean, 2008; Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2011; Kumar, Ruenzi, and
Ungeheuer, 2016; Ben-Rephael et al., 2018), underreaction to accounting information (Hirsh-
leifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2009; Dellavigna and Pollet, 2009), sentiment-driven return comovement
(Kumar and Lee, 2006) and fund window dressing (Solomon, Soltes, and Sosyura, 2014).
In this paper, I study spillover effects resulting from investors’ confusion of similarly named
companies. Anecdotal evidence is a 122 percent price jump of Snap Interactive stock after Snap
Inc., an owner of a multimedia messaging app Snapchat, filed for its initial public offering in
February 2017. Snap Interactive is a publicly traded company that does not have any direct or
indirect links to Snap Inc. except for the similarity in the names. In fact, the CEO of Snap
Interactive had foreseen possible confusion and tried to stop the peer company from changing
its original name ”Snapchat” to ”Snap Inc.”. In the end, the name change took place a few
months before the IPO announcement.1
In this study, I focus on publicly traded firms. I construct a sample of similarly named
US firms over 1996 - 2015 and document novel attention and return spillover effects between
them. Following the literature, I use Google search volume of company tickers (Da, Engelberg,
1One more example is a 70 percent premium over its net asset value of a closed-end fund with a ticker ”CUBA”
right after the United States announced re-initiation of its diplomatic and potentially economic relations with
Cuba (Thaler, 2016). Historically, the CUBA fund traded at a 10 percent discount to NAV. The fund did not
invest in Cuba or profited from the announced changes in relations with this country. Finally, there is an example
from the book publishing industry. A new attention-grabbing book titled “Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White
House” devoted to the first year of Donald Trump’s presidency was published in early January 2018. Surprisingly,
another historical book titled “Fire and Fury: The Allied Bombing of Germany, 1942 - 1945” also unexpectedly
reached the rank of bestseller the same days. Published in 2008, this book differed only by a subtitle but had
nothing to do with the politics of the American president.
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and Gao, 2011) and Wikipedia views of company pages (Focke, Ruenzi, and Ungeheuer, 2018;
Hillert and Ungeheuer, 2016) as proxies for retail investor attention and EDGAR downloads of
company filings (Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock, 2015) as a proxy for institutional investor
attention. Moreover, I use company earnings announcements and 8-K filings as events that
attract investor attention. I show that high attention to one company experiencing an event
is associated with abnormally high attention to a similarly named peer. The effect is not
explained by economic or geographical links. The surge in attention is associated with an
increase in trading and price changes. The increase in Wikipedia page views and trading volume
are around 1.37% and 1.90% relative to their average values, respectively. The effect is more
than two times stronger for the top half of the most similar names and for the top quarter
of the strongest events in terms of the announcing firm CAR(−1, 1). Consistent with no new
fundamental information for peer companies, I find no statistically significant change in EDGAR
filings downloads for these companies. The return reaction of peer stocks is statistically and
economically significant 0.39% on the announcement day for the most extreme 2.5% events and
reverts after forty to sixty days after the event. The reversal pattern is a piece of evidence in
favor of a price pressure driven mispricing due to investor confusion. The reaction and reversal
are more pronounced for positive news than for negative news. This asymmetry is consistent
with a higher propensity to buy attention-grabbing stocks than to sell them (Barber and Odean,
2008) and a difficulty to arbitrage away mispricing in overpriced securities relative to underpriced
ones (Miller, 1977; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987; Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2015; Engelberg,
Reed, and Ringgenberg, 2018).
An important implication of spillover effects is excess returns comovement in stocks of com-
panies with similar names. To show the causal effect of similar names on this comovement, I use
corporate name changes over 1980-2008 from Green and Jame (2013) that are not confounded
with any other corporate events. I find statistically and economically stronger comovement for
the same pair of companies when the names are similar than when the names are dissimilar.
The difference in comovement is on average 0.032 that is statistically significant at 5% signifi-
cance level. Importantly, the effect is driven by the name changes that are not associated with
changes in companies’ fundamentals. To rule out spurious correlation, I control for nonsyn-
chronous trading, estimate comovement before and after the name-changing events in separate
regressions and, finally, compare the results to a control group of companies that are matched to
the companies from the peer group by stock characteristics, in particular, past stock momentum
returns. The change in comovement for the matched group is statistically insignificant and has
an opposite sign.
I measure economic significance and test the robustness of excess comovement using an
extended sample period from 1972 to 2016. I control for a number of characteristics that could
explain the effect, such as size, book-to-market, momentum, short-term reversal, transaction
costs (Boyer, 2011), price (Green and Hwang, 2009), industries (Kallberg and Pasquariello, 2008)
and headquarters location (Pirinsky and Wang, 2006). To measure the economic magnitude I
compare the comovement measure based on raw excess returns to the comovement measure that
accounts for observable stock characteristics. The estimated excess comovement due to similar
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names is between 6.45% and 13.33% of the total comovement. In absolute terms, these values
correspond to excess comovement between 0.0120 and 0.0248, which are economically meaningful
values. I run a number of further robustness check to show that the excess comovement is not
driven by the similarity of tickers (Rashes, 2001), economic links (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008),
alternative industry definition (Hoberg and Phillips, 2010), alphabetical bias (Jacobs, 2016) and
S&P 500 index participation (Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler, 2005). An additional analysis
compares the magnitude of excess comovement in the cross-section of stocks. In particular, I
show that return comovement is stronger for stocks experiencing high trading volume and large
absolute returns. Moreover, the effect is stronger for stocks with higher limits to arbitrage as
proxied by residual institutional ownership, idiosyncratic volatility and different measures of
liquidity. Thus, the results of this analysis are consistent with the price pressure channel of the
documented excess comovement.
This paper contributes to the literature on the sources of stock return comovement (e.g.,
Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler, 2005; Pirinsky and Wang, 2006; Kumar and Lee, 2006; Kallberg
and Pasquariello, 2008; Green and Hwang, 2009; Boyer, 2011; Kumar, Page, and Spalt, 2013;
Grullon, Underwood, and Weston, 2014; Muslu, Rebello, and Xu, 2014; Kumar, Ruenzi, and
Ungeheuer, 2016; Chen, Singal, and Whitelaw, 2016; Hameed and Xie, 2018). Moreover, this
paper contributes to the literature on the relevance of company names in the context of financial
markets (e.g., Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau, 2001; Head, Smith, and Wilson, 2009; Wu, 2010;
Green and Jame, 2013). In particular, it reveals asset pricing irregularities due to similarity
in company names. Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on the effects of investor
attention on financial markets (e.g., Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin, 2001; Da, Engelberg,
and Gao, 2011; Ungeheuer, 2017; Ben-Rephael et al., 2018) and, in particular, on the effect of
spillovers in investor attention (e.g., Rashes, 2001; Drake, Jennings, et al., 2016; Leung et al.,
2016).
Papers by Leung et al. (2016), Rashes (2001) and Drake, Jennings, et al. (2016) are the
most closely related to this study. Leung et al. (2016) use Yahoo! Finance co-searches to reveal
collective investor attention to different subsets of stocks. The authors find that co-searched
stocks comove together. My study shows a potential source of excess attention and return
comovement. In a case study, Rashes (2001) documents excess return comovement for two
particular securities with similar tickers (MCI and MCIC) and attributes this comovement to
confusion among investors. The focus of my study is on company names in the full cross-section
of stocks. In fact, I show that the effect in my paper is not driven by the similarity in tickers and
therefore is a new phenomenon. Drake, Jennings, et al. (2016) document attention and return
spillovers due to related fundamentals for companies in the same industries. In contrast, I show
that return comovement between companies with similar names is due to mispricing and is not
explained by industry relations.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, I introduce a name matching algorithm,
compare the matched stocks to the stocks from the full sample and describe data sources. In
Section 1.3, I show spillover effects for attention, trading and returns. In Section 1.4, I define
a measure of return comovement and show that it changes as the result of changes in company
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names. Next, I quantify the economic magnitude of excess comovement and test robustness of
the effect. I conclude in Section 1.5.
1.2 Data
1.2.1 Data sources
In this study, I combine data from different sources. The company names and equity market
data on the stock level are obtained from CRSP, whereas the accounting and S&P 500 index
constituents data come from Compustat. Fama and French (1997) classification of 48 industries
is based on SIC codes from CRSP. The most recent headquarters states of the companies are
from Compustat. Historical headquarters states over the period of 1996-2010 are from the head-
ers of 10-K filings at EDGAR and were graciously made available online by Bill McDonald. The
8-K events announcements dates are from EDGAR. The data on earnings announcements and
analyst coverage are from IBES. The Hoberg and Phillips (2010) text-based industry classifica-
tion based on products’ description in 10-K filings are downloaded from the authors’ website.
I obtain the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure (γPS) and the Gibbs estimate of
trading costs (cGibbs) over the period of 1926 - 2009 from Hasbrouck (2009). The Amihud (2002)
illiquidity ratio is calculated following the original study using one year of daily data. I obtain
the Corwin and Schultz (2012) spread, the bid-ask spread estimator calculated using daily high
and low prices (hlspread), directly from the authors. The residual institutional ownership (rio)
is calculated as a residual in the cross-sectional regression of the logit-transformed institutional
ownership ratio on log size and log size squared following Nagel (2005). Idiosyncratic volatility
(ivola) is the standard deviation of residuals over the past month in the daily regression of
excess return on Fama and French (1993) three factors, as in Ang et al. (2006). Various asset
pricing factors are obtained either from the corresponding authors’ websites or calculated based
on publicly available data. The mispricing score (misp) is from Robert Stambaugh’s website. In
the robustness tests, I control for the supplier-customer links used in Cohen and Frazzini (2008).
The data over the period of 1980-2005 are downloaded from Andrea Frazzini’s website. Green
and Jame (2013) name changes data set is kindly provided by the authors. Attention mea-
sures used in the study over the period of 2008-2015 are Wikipedia page views (wiki), Google
search volume (gsv) and EDGAR filings requests (edgar). Wikipedia page views of firms with
common stocks in CRSP’s NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ universe used in Ungeheuer (2017)
and Hillert and Ungeheuer (2016) are graciously provided by the authors. The Google search
volume is downloaded from Google Trends and calculated following Da, Engelberg, and Gao
(2011). EDGAR filings requests are calculated following Ryans (2018) and are downloaded from
the author’s website. Other standard control variables, such as log size, the log book-to-market
ratio, momentum and short-term reversal, are defined as it is common in the literature. A more
detailed description of variables is given in the Appendix in Table A1.1.
The sample period of this study is from December 1972 to December 2016. The starting
date of the sample period is determined by the date when NASDAQ stocks were added to
CRSP. Before this date, I obtain a smaller number of matched firms. I limit my analyses to
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AMEX/NYSE/NASDAQ stocks with share codes 10 and 11. To ensure that my results are
economically meaningful and not driven by penny stocks, I drop stocks with prices below 5$ and
stocks with market capitalization below the 5th NYSE percentile the most recent month. The
sample period with earnings announcements and 8-K filings is constrained to 1996-2015. The
limited availability of attention measures leads to an even shorter period from 2008 to 2015.
1.2.2 Name matching algorithm
I prepare data from CRSP for name matching. First, I change all names to the upper case.
Second, I drop all words that reflect the legal entities of the firms (e.g., ”CORP”, ”INC”,
”GROUP”, HLDG”,”LLC”). Third, I drop ”NEW” that reflects a change of the name and drop
the headquarters state of the firm (e.g., ”DEL”, ”NY”) that are usually the last words in the
CRSP name. Finally, if the name contains an abbreviation, I add spaces between the letters of
the abbreviation.
The matching procedure consists of the following steps. At the end of each year, I consider
the cross-section of companies’ names. I identify key words in the names and supplementary
words. The supplementary words are the words that are common to many companies and often
designate the type of services or products that these companies produce (e.g., ”SOLUTIONS”,
”AIRLINES”, ”PARTNERS”, ”STORES”, ”TECHNOLOGIES”) or its geographical operations
(”WORLDWIDE”, ”AMERICAN”, ”INTERNATIONAL”). Where possible, I account for pos-
sible different spellings, typos and abbreviations. I compare company names using the key words
only and using their full names (key words together with the supplementary words). I turn these
names into the sets of bigrams (e.g. ”EMCORE” becomes [”EM”,”MC”,”CO”,”OR”,”RE”]
and EMCOR becomes [”EM”,”MC”,”CO”,”OR”] ). The measure of similarity of two names
is the Jaccard distance between two corresponding sets of bigrams, which is the number of
common bigrams in two sets over the geometric mean of bigram counts in these sets (e.g.,
Similarity{”EMCORE”,”EMCOR”} = 4/√4 · 5 = 0.8944). This way, I calculate similarity
using key words only, SimilarityKey, and similarity using all words, SimilarityAll. I impose a
stricter similarity criteria for SimilarityKey (> 0.6) than for SimilarityAll (> 0.5) to ensure sig-
nificant similarity in key words. For each year, I identify pairs of companies that are mutually the
most similar to each other according to SimilarityTotal = 1/2(SimilarityKey + SimilarityAll).
Thus, each company has only maximum one matched peer in a given year. Finally, because
some financial firms have complicated structure and have many related firms with closely re-
lated names, I exclude pairs that contain financial firms (based on the Fama and French 48
industry classification) from my analysis.
1.2.3 Stock characteristics of companies with matched names
Table 1.1 gives examples of resulting pairs matched at the end of 2015. In particular, it demon-
strates company names that are the most similar according to the total similarity score (Panel
A), weakly similar that marginally make it in the final sample of mutually similar companies
(Panel B) and dissimilar companies that marginally do not make it to the final sample (Panel
C).
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[Table 1.1 about here.]
Table 1.2 describes companies in the final sample of mutually similar firms over the period
of 1972-2016. Panel A presents summary statistics for stock characteristics. Panel B compares
characteristics of these stocks to all traded stocks. This table provides some insights into the
matched stocks. First, around 20% of all stocks have peers with similar names. The companies
with similarly named peers are on average larger, older, less volatile and have better analyst
coverage. On the other hand, these stocks are less liquid and their trading is associated with
higher transaction costs. The average value of sameIND dummy indicates that the peers are
more frequently coming from the same industry than for an average firm. This observation is not
fully explained by the fact that these stocks are concentrated in industries with a larger share
of firms. The peers are also more probably to come from the same headquarters states. These
results indicate a close relation between matched firms in terms of industries and geography.
Therefore, I control for this relatedness in my further analysis.
[Table 1.2 about here.]
1.3 Attention and return spillovers
I start my empirical analysis by testing the relationship between abnormal investor attention in
stocks with similar names around 8-K events and earnings announcements. These events have
accurate announcement dates and represent attention-grabbing news.
1.3.1 Summary statistics of events dummies and attention proxies
Table 1.3 describes event dummies over the period of 1996-2015 and measures of abnormal
attention for the period of 2008-2015. It covers all firms in the CRSP universe.
[Table 1.3 about here.]
Panel A displays the mean, standard deviation, 1st, 10th, 50th, 90th and 99th percentiles
of variables. Abnormal attention is defined as attention on a given day minus the average
attention for the same weekday over the past 10 weeks divided by this average attention over
the past 10 weeks, following Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock (2012) and Da, Engelberg, and
Gao (2011). This measure can be interpreted as a percentage increase in today’s attention
relative to the average attention on the same day of the week over the past 10 weeks. Abnormal
turnover, aturn, reflects both investor attention (Barber and Odean, 2008) and trading activity.
CAR(−1, 1), a 3-day abnormal return reaction around the event, serves as a measure of investor
surprise. The event dummies eventDfocal, eventDpeer, eventDind and eventDstate are defined
as either earnings announcements or 8-K fillings of focal firms, peer firms, any firms in the
same industries and any firms in the same headquarters states, respectively. The averages of
measures of abnormal attention are slightly above zero due to skewness in their distributions.
Event dummies show that considered events on average happen on around 5% of trading days
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for focal and peer stocks, and around 90% days for any stocks in the same industries and the
same headquarters states.
Panel B provides Spearman correlations between all variables. Aedgar, a proxy for institu-
tional attention, is strongly correlated with abnormal trading, aturn, with a correlation coeffi-
cient of 0.14. Moreover, aedgar is much higher on firm’s own news days (correlation of 0.16),
but also higher on the event days of firms from the same industry or the same headquarter state
(both correlation coefficients are 0.02). Its correlation coefficient with eventDpeer is 0.01. awiki,
which proxies for retail investor attention, exhibit a similar but weaker pattern. Its correlation
coefficients with aturn, eventDfocal, eventpeer, eventDind and eventDstate are 0.10, 0.05, 0.01,
0.02 and 0.02, respectively. Agsv, an alternative proxy of retail investor attention, is strongly
related to aturn and agsv with correlation coefficients of 0.06 and 0.04, respectively, weaker to
aedgar and eventDfocal with correlation coefficients of 0.03 and 0.02, respectively, and almost
not related to the other event dummies. All in all, the descriptive analysis shows the relation of
investor attention to market events but does not reveal any strong changes in attention due to
events in similarly named peer companies. Controlling for potentially confounding variables in
a multivariate setting could be necessary to identify the effect.
1.3.2 Attention spillovers
To estimate the spillovers of investor attention, I regress abnormal attention measures of stock
j at date t on the event dummies in the following regression:
attentionfocaljt = am + ad + ai + as + peerDjt + b
focal · eventDfocaljt + bind · eventDindjt
+ bstate · eventDstatejt + bpeer · eventDpeerjt + bcontrols ′jt · controlsjt + jt,
(1.1)
where am, ad, ai, as are year-month, day of the week, industry, headquarters state fixed effects,
and eventDfocal, eventDpeer, eventDind, eventDstate are event dummies of focal firms, peer
firms, the same industry firms and the same headquarters state firms, respectively. Controlsjt
is the vector of controls that contains log size, log book-to-market, momentum, short-term
reversal, momentum, mispricing score, idiosyncratic volatility, institutional ownership and log
analyst coverage.2 Around 20% of all firms have similarly named peers. In order to keep a
representative sample without affecting the inference of the coefficient on eventDpeer, I introduce
a peer dummy, peerD, that is equal to one if a company has a similarly named peer and zero
otherwise, and assume eventDpeerD to be zero for all stocks without peers. By using this
approach, I follow closely Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) and McLean, Pontiff, and Watanabe
(2009), who make adjustments for the missing book-to-market ratios in their analyses. The
coefficient on eventDpeer is the coefficient of our main interest. It reflects the change in abnormal
attention given an event in a firm with a similar name. If positive and significant, this coefficient
reflects an increase in attention on days when peer firms experience events after controlling for the
other drivers of investor attention. I account for possible heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
by clustering standard errors by firm and date following Petersen (2009).
2I also run a specification without fixed effects and controls. The results are quantitatively similar and are
presented in Table A1.4
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[Table 1.4 about here.]
Table 1.4 shows estimation results for awiki, agsv, aedgar and aturn. The first two are
proxies for retail investor attention. Aedgar is a proxy for institutional investor attention and
aturn is a measure of abnormal trading. Consistent with the literature, company’s own events
attract both institutional and retail investor attention. The coefficients on eventDfocal are all
economically and highly statistically significant. The largest coefficient is for abnormal EDGAR
filing requests, which is equal to 0.6658 with the t-statistic of 89.66. This coefficient reflects
on average a 67% increase in filings request compared to the average on the same day of the
week over the past 10 weeks. The coefficient on the aturn is comparable and is equal to 0.5327.
The coefficients on awiki and agsv are 0.0917 and 0.0839, respectively. The effect of the same
industry and the same headquarters states events are around 5 to 10 times weaker than for the
firm own events.3 But all coefficients remain economically and statistically significant. There
is a large difference in coefficients on eventDpeer. The coefficients are insignificant for agsv
and aedgar but are both economically and statistically significant for awiki and aturn, with the
values (t-statistics) of 0.0137 (4.18) and 0.0190 (3.48), respectively. These results show that retail
investors pay more attention to focal companies, as proxied by Wikipedia page views, on the
event days of similarly named companies. This increase in attention is associated with an increase
in trading volume.4 The insignificant changes in EDGAR filings requests are consistent with
no reaction from institutional investors and the absence of additional fundamental information
from peer companies’ events. Google search volume is based on the search queries of company
tickers, not names. Given that similar names do not imply similar tickers, the insignificant result
for agsv is an evidence that it is company names that play an important role in documented
attention spillovers.5 All in all, I find evidence in favor of spillovers of retail investor attention.
In the next step, I test whether the spillover effects are stronger for more similarly named
firms. To test this hypothesis, I first define a dummy variable HsimilarD that is equal to 1 for
the most similar 50% pairs in the sample of name matched firms and zero otherwise. I introduce
this dummy and its interaction with the eventDpeer to the regression. The coefficient on the
interaction term reflects additional abnormal attention on the event date of peer firms for more
similar pairs.
[Table 1.5 about here.]
The estimation results are reported in Table 1.5. Consistent with the hypothesis, the spillover
3By default, I use Fama-French 48 industries. I test the robustness of these results by using the Hoberg and
Phillips (2010) industries definition based on product descriptions in 10-K filings.
4I also run regressions for 8-K filings and earnings announcements separately. The estimation results reveal that
the spillover effects are significant for both types of events but up to twice stronger for earnings announcements.
The statistical significance decreases for both types of events. These results are presented in Table A1.5 and
Table A1.6 of the appendix.
5A possible caveat of this interpretation is a less accurate measurement of agsv due to noise in the data that
might result in the insignificant outcome. One possible source of such noise comes from the fact that Google
replaces the search volume with zero when it is below an uncertain threshold, which is time- and firm-varying.
Another source of noise could be that the search volume is not an accurate number but an estimate from a
random subsample. See Fink and Johann (2014) for more details. As a result, R2 in the regression with agsv as
a dependent variable is much lower compared to the regressions with the other measures. Thus, for my analysis,
awiki is a better proxy for retail investor attention than agsv.
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effects for awiki and aturn are more than two times stronger for highly similar firms. These
results support the definition of the similarity measure introduced in this paper. There is no
significant interaction effect for agsv and aedgar.
Next, I test whether attention spillovers are more prevalent for peer events that are associ-
ated with larger surprises as proxied by larger price movements. For this, I define a Hpeer retD
dummy that is equal to one for the peer firms events that are in the top quarter of the absolute
CAR(−1, 1) returns and zero otherwise. I add its interaction with eventDpeer to the base-
line Regression (1.1). The coefficient on this interaction term reflects the additional attention
spillovers if the news in peer firms are especially important.
[Table 1.6 about here.]
The estimation results are reported in Table 1.6. The attention spillovers for awiki and
aturn are two and a half times stronger for events with larger surprises. There are no significant
effects for agsv and aedgar on these days. Thus, consistent with larger surprises attracting more
retail investor attention, attention spillovers are stronger for stocks with events associated with
larger absolute cumulative abnormal returns.
1.3.3 Return spillovers
In this subsection, I test whether spillovers of investor attention and trading affect stock prices.
Barber and Odean (2008) and Ungeheuer (2017) document that stocks experiencing the most
extreme returns attract the largest share of investor attention. Moreover, Kumar, Ruenzi,
and Ungeheuer (2016) show that this abnormal attention has implications for stock prices.
Motivated by these studies and by the results of the previous subsection, I focus on the events
associated with the most extreme stock returns. In particular, I use earnings announcements
and 8-K fillings of peer stocks with the most extreme 2.5% CAR(-1, 1) from 1996 to 2015 as
events. I keep only pairs from different industries and headquarters states to make sure that
the return reaction is not driven by simple observable geographical or economic closeness of
firms. I calculate cumulative abnormal returns of focal and peer stocks after the event following
Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009):
CAR(−1, T )i =
T∏
k=−1
(1 +Rik)−
T∏
k=−1
(1 +Rpk), (1.2)
where Rpk is the return of of the matching size-BM portfolio on day k relative to the announce-
ment date.
If documented attention spillovers are strong enough to have an impact on stock prices,
three different reaction patterns are possible. First, in the case the similarity measure captures
companies that are related in their fundamentals, then a shock to the value of a peer company
should result in a persistent change in the value of the related focal company. This pattern is
consistent with economic links between firms documented by Cohen and Frazzini (2008), Menzly
and Ozbas (2010), Mu¨ller (2017) and Smajlbegovic (2018). Second, in the case the attention
spillovers result in the attention driven overpricing described in Kumar, Ruenzi, and Ungeheuer
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(2016), the price of a focal stock should experience a short-term increase and a long-term decrease
irrespective of the direction of the initial shock. Finally, the attention spillovers might result in
price pressure due to investor confusion. In this case, a shock to a peer company should result
in a temporary mispricing and a subsequent reversal for the focal company in the same direction
as for the peer company. This way, the reaction should depend on the direction of the shock.
[Figure 1.1 about here.]
I start testing these hypotheses by considering the reaction of peer stocks to their own
extreme events. Figure 1.1 depicts the cumulative abnormal returns of peer stocks experiencing
extreme events starting at the event date with holding periods of up to 60 days. As far as the
definition of the extreme event is based on the firm’s CAR(−1, 1), it is not surprising that the
initial reaction yields a large spread of close to 60% between the extremely positive and the
extremely negative shocks on the announcement date. If any, the post-event drift is weak and
there are no signs of significant price reversal. These results are consistent with well-functioning
efficient markets when new significant value-relevant information is quickly incorporated in the
prices of the announcing firms.
[Figure 1.2 about here.]
The price reaction of focal companies to significant events of the peer companies is presented
on Figure 1.2. This reaction is economically and statistically significant. The positive shock is
associated with a price appreciation of 0.432% after one day and of 0.664% after five days. Both
numbers are significant at 1% significance level. Afterwards, there is a gradual price reversal
until 40-60 days after the event date. A symmetric but weaker pattern arises for significant
negative shocks. A significant price reaction around the announcement of -0.348% with the
t-statistics of -2.17 becomes statistically insignificant -0.320% five days after the announcement
and reverts fully 60 days after the announcement. The spread between significant positive and
significant negative shocks reaches up to 1% five days after the event and decrease to 0.122%
after 60 days.6 Moreover, the effect should be stronger for positive shocks that is consistent with
the ease of buying unknown stocks compared to selling or short selling (Barber and Odean, 2008)
and the difficulty to correct overpricing compared to underpricing (Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan,
2015). Thus, the results are consistent with the price pressure driven temporary mispricing due
to investor confusion of company names.
[Figure 1.3 about here.]
For comparison, Figure 1.3 presents the results for all other events, i.e. events that are
not associated with top 2.5% CAR(−1, 1). Although significant at 5% level, the spread at the
announcement of 10 basis points is almost 8 times weaker than the spread around the significant
events and driven mostly by positive shocks. This spread becomes essentially zero after 10 days.
6In Figure A1.1 and Figure A1.2 of the appendix, I show separate results for earnings announcements and
8-K filings. Results from both figures present similar patterns with the difference that extreme negative earnings
announcements to peer stocks are not associated with significant negative returns in focal stocks.
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This result confirms that focusing on the most extreme events is the key to identifying significant
attention-driven price pressure.
Thus, these findings support the price pressure driven return spillovers between companies
with similar names. The temporary mispricing is prevalent for events associated with large
price reactions, stronger for positive shocks and reverses after 40 to 60 trading days. All in all,
I contribute to the literature by showing that name similarity is a new important channel of
attention spillovers that results in trading spillovers and subsequently return spillovers.
1.4 Return comovement
According to results of the previous section, abnormal returns of similarly named stocks are
highly correlated on the days of attention-grabbing events. In the absence of events, abnormal
returns of these stocks do not exhibit any clear correlation pattern. Thus, in aggregate, return
spillovers might result in excess comovement of the respective stocks. In this section, I test this
prediction.
1.4.1 Measuring comovement
To measure return comovement, I first calculate returns adjusted for Davis, Fama, and French
(2000) four factors. These factors represent important sources of covariation in stock returns.
For each stock and date, I first estimate factors’ exposures over one year using the most recent
daily returns by running the following regression:
Rτ − rfτ = a+ bmktrf ·mktrfτ + bsmb · smbt + bhml · hmlτ + bumd · umdτ + τ (1.3)
Daily alpha on the next trading day, Alphafocalit , is the difference between the stock return in
excess of the risk free rate and the predicted return, calculated as the factor returns on day t
multiplied by the estimated factors’ exposure coefficients, b, from Equation (1.3) estimated over
the most recent 252 days.7
Return comovement is measured as the sum of coefficients from the following pooled regres-
sion:
Alphafocalit =
3∑
k=−3
bpeerk ·Alphapeerit+k + it, (1.4)
where Alphafocalit is a residual of a focal stock and Alpha
peer
it is a residual of the corresponding
peer stock. The measure of comovement bpeer =
∑3
k=−3 b
peer
k accounts for the non-synchronicity
in trades.
7This methodology is equivalent to the one employed in Amihud and Goyenko (2013) to calculate return
residuals as a measure of fund performance. Anto´n and Polk (2014) also calculate residuals from Davis, Fama,
and French (2000) four-factor model to calculate comovement of stock returns. In contrast to our approach, the
authors estimate these residuals in-sample using one month of daily data and calculate comovement for each stock
pair every month.
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1.4.2 Name changes and changes in comovement
I test whether company names are associated with excess return correlation. If the similarity in
names results in excess comovement, then stock returns of chosen companies at a fixed point of
time should on average experience higher comovement if company names are similar compared
to the case if these names are dissimilar. It is not possible to observe both cases simultaneously.
But it is possible to measure changes in comovement around events associated with corporate
name changes. I use name changes from Green and Jame (2013) over the period 1980-2008 as
a quasi-natural experiment.8 Importantly, I focus on the name changes that are not associated
with corporate events and changes in company strategy. Thus, changes in return comovement
are unlikely to be driven by fundamentals.
Overall, I identify 547 name changing events that involve stocks with similarly named peers
and are not associated with any other corporate events. I follow Green and Jame (2013) and
classify these events into three categories: broad focus, narrow focus, and rebranding. 177 broad
focus name changes are motivated by an expansion of business (e.g., Apple Computers→ Apple).
96 narrow focus name changes are motivated by narrowing focus on a particular business line
(e.g., Epix Medical → Epix Pharmaceutical). The most important type of name changes for
this study is rebranding because these name changes are not associated with fundamental shifts
in business strategy (e.g., Kaufman and Broad Home Corporation→ KB Home). There are 274
such events in our sample.
An alternative classification of events is based on whether the stocks are similar before or
after the name change. 230 focal stocks are leaving comovement with similarly named peer, 235
are entering comovement and 82 are changing from one peer firm to another. Thus, leaving firms
are similar to the peers in terms of their names before the name changes, but dissimilar after the
name changes. Entering focal firms are dissimilar to the peers in terms of their names before the
name changes but become similar after the name changes. The focal firm that is changing peers
is similar to one peer before the name change and become similar to a different one after the
event. I decompose each such event into two events: a focal company leaving comovement with
one peer and the same company entering comovement with the other peer. Figure 1.4 illustrates
name changes and the corresponding changes in comovement.
[Figure 1.4 about here.]
Chen, Singal, and Whitelaw (2016) criticize the existing comovement literature. In addition
to the usage of univariate regressions and non-synchronicity robust (Dimson (1979) corrected)
coefficients, the authors emphasize the importance of comparing results to a sample of firms
matched on stock characteristics, in particular, return momentum. I follow authors’ recommen-
dations and construct a sample of matched firms that are similar to peer firms in terms of size,
book-to-market, industry and momentum, but have different names. In particular, for each peer
firm in the sample of firms with name changes, I choose a group of stocks from the same size
and BM quintiles and Fama-French 5 industry. The final control firm is the firm that is the
closest to the peer firm in terms of momentum.
8I thank the authors for providing the data.
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[Table 1.7 about here.]
I present the difference between similarly named peer stocks and stocks matched on char-
acteristics in Table 1.7. The stocks are very close in almost all characteristics, except for insti-
tutional ownership, analyst coverage and idiosyncratic volatility. Matched stocks have average
institutional ownership of 31% compared to 24% for similarly named peers and have 4.2 analysts
compared to 1.8 for similarly named peers. The differences are statistically significant at any
reasonable significance level. The difference in idiosyncratic volatility is 0.004 and is significant
at 10% significance level.
To estimate return comovement of involved stocks, I incorporate suggestions of Chen, Singal,
and Whitelaw (2016) and run separate pooled panel regressions for the cases when firm names
are similar and when they are dissimilar:
Alphafocalit =
3∑
k=−3
bpeer, similark ·Alphapeer, similarit+k + it
Alphafocalit =
3∑
k=−3
bpeer, nonsimilark ·Alphapeer, nonsimilarit+k + it
(1.5)
I limit the estimation window to two years before and two year after the name change. Addi-
tionally, I skip two months right before and two months right after the event to make sure that
a possible reaction in prices around the event does not influence the estimation results. Finally,
the name changing events with less than 100 observations either before or after the event are
not included. ∆b =
∑3
k=−3 b
peer, similar
k −
∑3
k=−3 b
peer, nonsimilar
k is the difference in comovement
between two periods. I run these regressions for similarly named peers and matched firms and
compare the results.
[Table 1.8 about here.]
The estimation results are presented in Table 1.8. For all events together, the average co-
movement between stocks decreases from 0.050 when the stocks have similar names to 0.018
when the stock names are dissimilar. The difference of 0.032 is statistically significant at 5%
significance level. Splitting by type of name changing event reveals that the results are het-
erogeneous. In particular, the results are especially strong and significant for rebranding and
narrow focus events. The differences in the comovement coefficients are 0.041 and 0044 with
the p-values of 0.055 and 0.098, respectively. The change in comovement for broad focus name
changes has an opposite sign and insignificant. The changes in the comovement coefficients for
the matched group confirm that the results are not associated with observable stock characteris-
tics. In particular, the change in comovement is insignificant -0.009 for the pooled analysis. The
changes in comovement coefficients for rebranding, narrow focus and broad focus name changes
are -0.016, -0.020 and 0.029, respectively. All changes are statistically insignificant.
Table 1.8 presents the results for an alternative classification. In particular, in the case of
leaving comovement, the comovement coefficients between focal and peer stocks decreases from
0.046 before the event to 0.34 after the event. The change of 0.12 is consistent with the change
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in comovement but is statistically insignificant. This result could be explained by the idea that
it takes longer for market participants to forget the previous names even after the name change
of the company is announced. In contrast, in the case of name changes that result in stocks’
entering comovement due to name similarities, the comovement coefficient increases from zero
to 0.054 after the event, the result significant at 1% significance level. This result is consistent
with the idea that it is easier to confuse firms with new unknown names. For comparison, the
results for the stocks in the group matched to peers on stock characteristics, the changes in the
comovement coefficients have opposite signs and are not significant.
All in all, given that rebranding motivated name changes could be considered as quasi-
exogenous to company’s strategy and fundamentals, my results serve as evidence in favor of
a significant relation between company names and stock return comovement. Spillovers of at-
tention, trading and returns documented in this study favor behavioral explanation of this
comovement.
1.4.3 Return comovement - economic significance and alternative explana-
tions
In this section, I analyze the economic significance of return comovement and the robustness of
this effect. The literature documents different causes of return comovement. To measure stock
return comovement after accounting for these sources, I run a number of panel regressions with
fixed effects at a daily frequency. The baseline version of the regression is:
Alphafocalit = at +
3∑
k=−3
bpeerk ·Alphapeerit+k +
3∑
k=−3
bcontrols ′k · controlsit+k + it,
where Alphafocalit is a stock’s residual from Davis, Fama, and French (2000) four factor model on
day t with factors exposures estimated using 1 year of the most recent daily data, Alphapeerit is
the Alphait of the peer stock, at is the time fixed effect. Controlsit+k is a vector of controls that
consists of equally-weighted returns on the price, size, book-to-market, momentum, short-term
reversal decile portfolios and Fama-French 48 industry portfolio. Extended controls additionally
include equally-weighted returns on the transaction costs decile portfolio and headquarters state
portfolio. The sample period for the analysis with extended controls is limited to 1996 to
2010 due to data availability. By including these control variables, I account for price driven
comovement (Green and Hwang, 2009), style-related comovement (Boyer, 2011), geography
driven comovement (Pirinsky and Wang, 2006) and industry driven comovement (Kallberg and
Pasquariello, 2008; Menzly and Ozbas, 2010). The measure of comovement bpeer =
∑3
k=−3 b
peer
k
accounts for the non-synchronicity of trades. Standard errors are clustered by focal stock and
day.
For this analysis, I keep only stocks that have similarly named peers. Moreover, I keep only
one observation per each pair because, otherwise, the regression overestimates the significance
of coefficients. To increase the number of observations, I extend the sample period back to 1972,
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when NASDAQ enters the CRSP sample.9
[Table 1.10 about here.]
The estimation results are presented in Table 1.10. Reported are the coefficients on leads and
lags of the abnormal returns of the peer stocks together with the t-statistics in the parentheses
and the sum of these coefficients together with the F-statistics and the p-values. The column (1)
shows the results for raw excess returns without any controls. All leads and lags are economically
and statistically significant and add up to 0.186. This total comovement coefficient serves as
a benchmark, as it uncovers comovement between stocks in the absence of any other controls.
In the column (2), I regress the out-of-sample residuals from Davis, Fama, and French (2000)
model of focal stocks on the leads and lags of these residuals of the corresponding peer stocks.
This change in the calculation of abnormal returns has a dramatic impact on the results. Two
leads and one lag of Alphapeert are statistically significant and the sum of coefficients decreases to
0.028. This number, if compared to the benchmark comovement coefficient, means that around
85 % of comovement is explained by the market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors.
The coefficient is nevertheless highly significant at any reasonable significance level. Column (3)
includes date fixed effect that decreases the comovement coefficient to 0.0248. Adding control
variables for peer stocks or focal stocks decreases the comovement coefficient even further to
0.209. Extended controls additionally include transaction costs decile portfolio returns and
headquarter states portfolio returns. These controls do not have any strong effect, except that
the significance decreases due to decreased sample size. I do not include the controls for both
focal and peer stocks, because, otherwise, multicollinearity becomes an issue.
An alternative approach is to introduce interacted fixed effects. In columns (8) to (12), I
include date times industry and date times headquarters state fixed effects. The comovement
coefficient stays significant for all specifications. The most conservative specification that in-
cludes all mentioned interacted fixed effects together yields the comovement coefficient of 0.022
with the p-value of 0.0368. The R2 in this specification reaches 0.702. In this specification, the
estimated share of total comovement due to the similarity in names is 0.022/0.186∗100 = 11.83%
of the total stock comovement.
[Table 1.11 about here.]
For comparison, Table 1.11 reports results on comovement between focal stocks and stocks
that are matched to peer stocks on characteristics. The return comovement coefficient based on
raw excess returns is 0.162, which is by 0.024 smaller than for the peer group. Changing to out-
of-sample residuals and including controls in the regression results in the comovement coefficients
that are two to three times smaller than the corresponding coefficients for the peer group. Finally,
the significance of comovement coefficients fully disappears once I control for interacted fixed
effects. In the most conservative specification, the comovement coefficient becomes negative but
indistinguishable from zero.
9Before 1972 much smaller number of firms results in a smaller number of firms with similar names.
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All in all, the results of this analysis reveal that excess comovement due to similar names
explains around 10% of total return comovement between similar stocks. This effect is robust to
a number of stock characteristics. The effect is not present for stocks from the matched group.
1.4.4 Return comovement - robustness checks
A number of alternative explanations of excess comovement are possible. Rashes (2001) docu-
ments excess comovement of two particular stocks with similar tickers (MCI-MCIC). I use my
matching algorithm to match companies based on the similarity of their tickers. The estimation
results are presented in Table A1.3 of the appendix. The results show very weak comovement
for stocks with similar tickers, meaning that the documented comovement is not driven by the
similarity of tickers. The results of further tests are unreported. Cohen and Frazzini (2008)
show mutual return predictability between companies with customer-supplier links. To ensure
that excess comovement is not driven by these economic links, I limit the sample period to
1980-2004 and keep the companies that do not have customer-supplier relationships using the
authors’ data. The results are not influenced by this restriction. I also run the analysis using
alternative industry definition of Hoberg and Phillips (2010) that is based on products descrip-
tion in companies’ 10-K Fillings. The implications of the analysis do not change. Jacobs (2016)
find that stocks of the companies whose names start with the letters that are near the top of an
alphabetical listing experience higher trading activity and have higher liquidity. To exclude that
the comovement effect is due to the alphabetical bias, I drop pairs whose names start with the
same letters. The comovement effect is robust to this test. Finally, return comovement due to
S&P 500 index participation (Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler, 2005), does not explain the effect
either. Excluding pairs with both stocks constituting the index does not change the inference.
1.4.5 Return comovement - cross-sectional tests
In my further analysis, I compare the strength of the effect for stocks with different character-
istics. I extend the baseline methodology by adding stock characteristics dummies and their
interactions with the peer stock’s leads and lags of daily Davis, Fama, and French (2000) al-
phas. In particular, I run the following panel regression with time fixed effects and a number of
controls at a daily frequency:
Alphafocalit = at +
3∑
k=−3
bpeerk ·Alphapeerit+k +
3∑
k=−3
binteractk ·DCS,focalit ×Alphapeerit+k
+ bCS ·DCS,focalit +
3∑
k=−3
bcontrols ′k · controlsit+k + it,
(1.6)
where DCS,focalit is a dummy variable equal to one for above median values of other cross-sectional
variables of a focal stock (absolute trading volume, residual institutional ownership, liquidity
measures, idiosyncratic volatility, age and institutional ownership) or above 75th percentile
of stock’s absolute abnormal daily return. The vector of controls, controlsit+k, consists of
equally-weighted returns on the price, size, book-to-market, momentum, short-term reversal
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decile portfolios and Fama-French 48 industry portfolios of the focal firm. The baseline level
of comovement is bpeer =
∑3
k=−3 b
peer
k . The sum of coefficients on the interaction variable,
binteract =
∑3
k=−3 b
interact
k , reflects by how much the comovement is stronger for stocks for
DCSit = 1. I keep both observations for each pair in this analysis because the regression includes
the characteristics of one company at a time. Thus, the observations are not repeated twice.
For more conservative estimation, standard errors are clustered by stock-pair and day.
[Table 1.12 about here.]
The estimation results are reported in Table 1.12. The first important finding is that stock
return comovement is fully concentrated in the stocks that experience large price movements.
The value of bpeer is negative but insignificant. The value of binteract reflects the return comove-
ment to be 0.0666 for the stocks in the top 25% of absolute returns. This result echoes one of
the first findings of this study that attention, trading and returns spillovers are predominant
for pairs experiencing large price shocks. Also consistent with this interpretation, excess return
comovement is seven times stronger for stocks experiencing high abnormal trading, aturn. The
baseline effect bpeer = 0.0041 increases to bpeer + binteract = 0.0041 + 0.0246 = 0.0287 for the top
50% aturn. Considered proxies for limits to arbitrage are residual institutional ownership (rio),
the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (amihud), the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity mea-
sure (γPS), the Corwin and Schultz (2012) bid-ask spread (hlspread) and idiosyncratic volatility
(ivol). The estimation results for these variables are consistent with return comovement to be
stronger for stocks with higher limits to arbitrage. In particular, binteract is significantly neg-
ative for rio and γPS , with the values of −0.01 and −0.012, respectively. These values mean
that the effect is weaker for stocks with lower short sale constraints and for more liquid stocks
in terms of the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) price pressure measure. The sums of interac-
tion coefficients for hlspread and ivol are positive and significant, reflecting that higher bid-ask
spreads and idiosyncratic volatility are associated with stronger return comovement by 0.0084
and 0.0116, respectively. The interaction effect for the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio is in-
significant. The reason could be that, as noticed by Lou and Shu (2017), this illiquidity measure
is negatively correlated with trading volume. In its turn, trading volume is positively related to
return comovement, potentially attenuating the effect of amihud. The other variables used in
the analysis are age and io. The results reveal a weaker effect for older stocks and stocks with
larger institutional ownership. These results are consistent with the idea that unsophisticated
investors are more prone to irrational behavior and easier confuse new unknown firms. Thus,
the set of cross-sectional tests supports the hypothesis that return comovement results from the
price pressure induced by retail investors.
1.5 Conclusion
In this study, I use a name matching algorithm to identify stocks with similar names and find
that investor attention spills over from one stock to its similarly named peer. Using earnings an-
nouncements and 8-K filings as attention-grabbing events, I show that these attention spillovers
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result in excess trading and return spillovers to similarly named peers. The pattern is consistent
with price pressure driven temporary mispricing that reverts after 40 to 60 days. The result
of such price pressure is the excess comovement of similarly named stocks. This effect is not
explained by economic relatedness, geographical proximity or similarity in stock characteris-
tics. Corporate name changes serve as a natural experiment to test the relationship between
return comovement and similarity of company names. Quasi-exogenous name changes that are
not driven by changes in business strategies are associated with changes in return comovement.
Further analysis reveals the economic magnitude of this excess return comovement to be at 10%
of total stock return comovement. Finally, cross-sectional tests support the price pressure chan-
nel of this comovement. These tests reveal a stronger effect for stocks that experience large price
movements and abnormally high trading, and stocks that are characterized by higher limits to
arbitrage and a larger share of retail investors.
If truly exogenous to firm fundamentals, documented attention spillovers might serve as
an instrument to investor attention. This feature enables testing attention related hypotheses,
for instance, distinguishing between fundamentals based and attention based explanations of
anomalies in the financial markets. This opportunity remains for future research.
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Table 1.2:
Summary Statistics for Firms with Similarly Named Peers and Comparison to All Firms
This table summarizes stock characteristics for the sample of similarly named peers over the period from 1972
to 2016. Panel A displays the mean, standard deviation, 1st, 10th, 50th, 90th and 99th percentiles. Panel B
compares mean and standard deviation of the variables to the overall sample of stocks. Last three rows contain the
difference in the characteristics and the t-statistic of the unpaired t-test under assumption of unequal variances
and the p-values. The detailed description of the variables is in the Table A1.1 of the appendix.
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Firms with Similarly Named Peers
Variable Mean SD 1st 10th Median 90th 99th
size 1932.2 13856.1 1.1 5.9 88.1 2147.7 33799.3
bm 0.846 0.999 0.000 0.154 0.619 1.704 4.098
mom 0.144 0.747 -0.815 -0.482 0.039 0.765 2.779
st rev 0.011 0.190 -0.401 -0.167 0.000 0.184 0.609
misp 49.922 13.645 21.460 32.640 49.270 68.200 82.880
turn 0.110 0.258 0.002 0.009 0.054 0.253 0.783
amihud 3.717 29.046 0.000 0.001 0.138 7.246 59.074
γPS 25.5 456.9 -495.2 -13.2 0.2 62.3 995.9
cGibbs 0.014 0.017 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.033 0.079
hlspread 0.038 0.079 0.002 0.004 0.014 0.082 0.400
ivol 0.031 0.028 0.002 0.009 0.024 0.060 0.134
io 0.346 0.283 0.001 0.020 0.284 0.776 1.000
age 177.485 188.569 3 18 115 439 860
analyst 4.160 6.447 0 0 1 13 29
similarity 0.714 0.083 0.570 0.612 0.707 0.831 0.913
sameIND 0.189 0.392 0 0 0 1 1
sameHQ 0.117 0.321 0 0 0 1 1
Panel B: Comparison of Firms with Peers to Firms without Peers
All With Peers With Peers - All
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Diff t-stat p-value
size 1610.6 10976.0 1932.2 13856.1 321.6 13.84 0.0000
bm 0.8565 1.0219 0.8463 0.9994 -0.0102 -5.64 0.0000
mom 0.1364 0.7699 0.1438 0.7474 0.0074 5.50 0.0000
st rev 0.0113 0.1975 0.0109 0.1900 -0.0003 -1.07 0.2831
misp 49.517 13.590 49.922 13.645 0.405 13.76 0.0000
turn 0.1139 0.3133 0.1096 0.2581 -0.0042 -8.97 0.0000
amihud 3.8174 22.3458 3.7172 29.0460 -0.1002 -1.89 0.0581
γPS 27.614 722.645 25.549 456.938 -2.064 -1.93 0.0531
cGibbs 0.0139 0.0171 0.0137 0.0168 -0.0002 -5.23 0.0000
hlspread 0.0411 0.0857 0.0380 0.0792 -0.0031 -22.25 0.0000
ivol 0.0316 0.0305 0.0311 0.0281 -0.0005 -10.86 0.0000
io 0.3510 0.2882 0.3461 0.2831 -0.0048 -8.76 0.0000
age 167.689 177.906 177.485 188.569 9.796 30.58 0.0000
analyst 3.992 6.289 4.160 6.447 0.169 15.31 0.0000
wind 0.0489 0.0419 0.0492 0.0412 0.0003 4.80 0.0000
wstate 0.0684 0.0631 0.0681 0.0628 -0.0003 -1.67 0.0939
peerD 0.1956 0.3966 1.0000 0.0000 0.8044 2959.74 0.0000
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Table 1.3:
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Table of Attention Measures and Event Dummies
The table displays the mean, standard deviation, 1st, 10th, 50th, 90th and 99th percentiles of variables over the
period from 1996 to 2015. Panel A consists of event dummies, a return reaction and proxies for abnormal investor
attention. All these variables are at a daily frequency. The events are defined as either earnings announcements
or 8-K fillings of the corresponding firms. Due to data availability, the sample period for the attention measures
is from 2008 to 2015. Panel B displays the correlation matrix of all variables. The detailed description of the
variables is in the Table A1.1 of the appendix.
Panel A: Descriptives
Variable Mean SD 1st 10th Median 90th 99th
awiki 0.024 0.377 -0.719 -0.359 -0.023 0.421 1.714
agsv 0.021 0.651 -1.000 -0.640 -0.017 0.504 3.211
aedgar 0.080 0.830 -0.912 -0.688 -0.127 1.053 3.800
aturn 0.072 1.036 -0.997 -0.674 -0.171 0.887 5.716
CAR(−1, 1) 0.002 0.090 -0.234 -0.076 -0.001 0.077 0.258
eventD 0.049 0.216 0 0 0 0 1
eventDpeer 0.044 0.204 0 0 0 0 1
eventDind 0.909 0.287 0 1 1 1 1
eventDstate 0.925 0.263 0 1 1 1 1
Panel B: Correlations
awiki agsv aedgar aturn CAR(−1, 1) eventD eventDpeer eventDind eventDstate
awiki 1.00
agsv 0.04 1.00
aedgar 0.09 0.03 1.00
aturn 0.10 0.06 0.14 1.00
CAR(−1, 1) 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.04 1.00
eventD 0.05 0.02 0.16 0.10 0.00 1.00
eventDpeer 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.00
eventDind 0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 1.00
eventDstate 0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.02 0.13 1.00
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Table 1.4:
Attention Spillovers
This table reports the estimation results of a panel regression of the daily abnormal investor attention (awiki, agsv,
aedgar and aturn) on the focal stock event dummy (eventDfocal), the same industry event dummy (eventDind),
the same headquarters state event dummy (eventDstate), and a number of control variables. If the peer stock
experiences an event (eventDpeer = 1) and comes from the same industry and/or the same state as the focal
stock, the corresponding event dummies (eventDind and/or eventDstate) are also equal to one. To estimate the
regression for the full cross-section of firms, I assume eventDpeer to be zero for firms without peers with similar
names and allow a separate intercept (peerD) for these firms. The events are earnings announcements and 8-K
filings. The sample period is 2008-2015. The regressions are estimated with year-month, day of the week, industry
and headquarters state fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by date and firm. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
awiki agsv aedgar aturn
peerD -0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0021
(-0.01) (-0.23) (-0.88) (-1.35)
ln size -0.0038*** -0.0045*** -0.0076*** -0.0145***
(-8.09) (-5.51) (-12.67) (-14.51)
ln bm -0.0007 -0.0016 -0.0007 0.0002
(-1.52) (-1.53) (-1.26) (0.24)
mom 0.0018 -0.0022** -0.0030*** -0.0009
(1.47) (-1.96) (-2.80) (-0.50)
st rev -0.0007 0.0361*** -0.0138* 0.0084
(-0.15) (5.83) (-1.91) (0.77)
misp 0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0001
(4.64) (1.55) (-5.93) (-1.45)
ivola -0.5589*** -0.3092*** -0.8494*** -2.1507***
(-11.24) (-4.62) (-11.38) (-17.01)
io 0.0050** 0.0163*** -0.0059** -0.0439***
(2.16) (3.69) (-2.03) (-7.29)
ln nanalyst 0.0010 0.0040** -0.0032*** -0.0044**
(1.26) (2.22) (-3.57) (-2.34)
eventDfocal 0.0917*** 0.0839*** 0.6658*** 0.5327***
(37.58) (21.04) (89.66) (59.29)
eventDind 0.0196*** 0.0066*** 0.0444*** 0.0606***
(6.59) (3.37) (8.77) (8.75)
eventDstate 0.0186*** 0.0062** 0.0428*** 0.0658***
(4.91) (2.52) (6.94) (7.88)
eventDpeer 0.0137*** 0.0025 0.0078 0.0190***
(4.18) (0.59) (1.43) (3.48)
Year - Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day of the Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
HQ State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0478 0.0022 0.0922 0.0317
N 2’696’867 3’262’755 3’657’172 3’795’003
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Table 1.5:
Attention Spillovers for Highly Similar Pairs
This table reports the estimation results of a panel regression of the daily abnormal investor attention (awiki, agsv,
aedgar and aturn) on the focal stock event dummy (eventDfocal), the same industry event dummy (eventDind),
the same headquarters state event dummy (eventDstate), the peer stock event dummy (eventpeer), its interaction
with highly similar pairs dummy (HsimilarD) and a number of control variables. HsimilarD is equal to one
for top fifty percent similar firms and zero otherwise. If the peer stock experiences an event (eventDpeer = 1)
and comes from the same industry and/or the same state as the focal stock, the corresponding event dummies
(eventDind and/or eventDstate) are also equal to one. To estimate the regression for the full cross-section of
firms, I assume eventDpeer to be zero for firms without peers with similar names and allow a separate intercept
(peerD) for these firms. The events are earnings announcements and 8-K filings. The sample period is 2008-2015.
The regressions are estimated with year-month, day of the week, industry and headquarters state fixed effects.
The standard errors are clustered by date and firm. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
awiki agsv aedgar aturn
peerD 0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0022
(0.26) (-0.42) (-0.13) (-1.00)
HsimilarD 0.0008 -0.0015 0.0013 -0.0002
(0.38) (-0.40) (0.68) (-0.06)
ln size -0.0038*** -0.0044*** -0.0076*** -0.0145***
(-8.09) (-5.49) (-12.66) (-14.51)
ln bm -0.0007 -0.0016 -0.0007 0.0002
(-1.51) (-1.53) (-1.26) (0.24)
mom 0.0018 -0.0022* -0.0030*** -0.0009
(1.47) (-1.96) (-2.80) (-0.50)
st rev -0.0007 0.0361*** -0.0138* 0.0084
(-0.15) (5.83) (-1.91) (0.77)
misp 0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0001
(4.64) (1.55) (-5.93) (-1.45)
ivola -0.5585*** -0.3093*** -0.8493*** -2.1505***
(-11.23) (-4.62) (-11.38) (-17.01)
io 0.0049** 0.0163*** -0.0059** -0.0439***
(2.15) (3.69) (-2.04) (-7.29)
ln nanalyst 0.0010 0.0040** -0.0032*** -0.0044**
(1.26) (2.22) (-3.56) (-2.34)
eventDfocal 0.0917*** 0.0839*** 0.6658*** 0.5327***
(37.58) (21.04) (89.66) (59.29)
eventDind 0.0196*** 0.0066*** 0.0444*** 0.0606***
(6.59) (3.37) (8.77) (8.75)
eventDstate 0.0186*** 0.0062** 0.0428*** 0.0658***
(4.91) (2.52) (6.94) (7.88)
eventDpeer 0.0082** 0.0026 0.0062 0.0110
(2.19) (0.39) (0.85) (1.57)
HsimilarD × eventDpeer 0.0118* -0.0002 0.0034 0.0172*
(1.82) (-0.03) (0.31) (1.66)
Year - Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day of the Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
HQ State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0478 0.0022 0.0922 0.0317
N 2’696’867 3’262’755 3’657’172 3’795’003
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Table 1.6:
Attention Spillovers for Significant News
This table reports the estimation results of a panel regression of the daily abnormal investor attention (awiki, agsv,
aedgar and aturn) on the focal stock event dummy (eventDfocal), the same industry event dummy (eventDind),
the same headquarters state event dummy (eventDstate), the peer stock event dummy (eventpeer), its interaction
with significant news dummy (Hpeer retD) and a number of control variables. Hpeer retD is one for the top
quarter of absolute 3-days cumulative abnormal returns around peer stock events and zero otherwise. If the peer
stock experiences an event (eventDpeer = 1) and comes from the same industry and/or the same state as the focal
stock, the corresponding event dummies (eventDind and/or eventDstate) are also equal to one. To estimate the
regression for the full cross-section of firms, I assume eventDpeer to be zero for firms without peers with similar
names and allow a separate intercept (peerD) for these firms. The events are earnings announcements and 8-K
filings. The sample period is 2008-2015. The regressions are estimated with year-month, day of the week, industry
and headquarters state fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by date and firm.*, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
awiki agsv aedgar aturn
peerD -0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0022
(-0.01) (-0.23) (-0.88) (-1.35)
ln size -0.0038*** -0.0045*** -0.0076*** -0.0145***
(-8.09) (-5.51) (-12.67) (-14.50)
ln bm -0.0007 -0.0016 -0.0007 0.0002
(-1.52) (-1.53) (-1.26) (0.24)
mom 0.0018 -0.0022** -0.0030*** -0.0009
(1.47) (-1.96) (-2.80) (-0.50)
st rev -0.0007 0.0361*** -0.0138* 0.0084
(-0.15) (5.83) (-1.91) (0.77)
misp 0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0001
(4.64) (1.55) (-5.93) (-1.45)
ivola -0.5589*** -0.3092*** -0.8494*** -2.1508***
(-11.24) (-4.62) (-11.38) (-17.01)
io 0.0050** 0.0163*** -0.0059** -0.0439***
(2.16) (3.69) (-2.03) (-7.29)
ln nanalyst 0.0010 0.0040** -0.0032*** -0.0044**
(1.25) (2.22) (-3.57) (-2.34)
eventDfocal 0.0917*** 0.0839*** 0.6658*** 0.5327***
(37.58) (21.04) (89.66) (59.29)
eventDind 0.0196*** 0.0066*** 0.0444*** 0.0606***
(6.58) (3.37) (8.77) (8.75)
eventDstate 0.0186*** 0.0062** 0.0428*** 0.0658***
(4.91) (2.52) (6.94) (7.88)
eventDpeer 0.0099*** 0.0022 0.0076 0.0135**
(2.86) (0.49) (1.30) (2.14)
Hpeer retD × eventDpeer 0.0154** 0.0008 0.0008 0.0213*
(2.30) (0.09) (0.07) (1.75)
Year - Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day of the Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
HQ State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0478 0.0022 0.0922 0.0317
N 2’696’867 3’262’755 3’657’172 3’795’003
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 0  5  1 0  1 5  2 0  2 5  3 0  3 5  4 0  4 5  5 0  5 5  6 0
 D a y s
 P o s i t i v e  N e g a t i v e
CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,5) CAR(-1,10) CAR(-1,20) CAR(-1,30) CAR(-1,40) CAR(-1,50) CAR(-1,60)
Positive 30.48*** 29.63*** 29.94*** 31.74*** 32.28*** 32.97*** 33.93*** 35.23***
N = 2152 (66.75) (53.21) (46.70) (37.00) (34.61) (29.85) (27.66) (26.71)
Negative -26.03*** -25.33*** -24.77*** -24.27*** -24.21*** -24.00*** -23.56*** -23.44***
N = 1960 (-135.77) (-86.24) (-65.99) (-50.78) (-44.74) (-37.36) (-32.38) (-29.56)
Difference 56.512*** 54.961*** 54.717*** 56.012*** 56.489*** 56.978*** 57.496*** 58.669***
(110.32) (84.90) (71.86) (55.57) (51.10) (43.49) (39.36) (37.23)
Figure 1.1:
Peer Company’s Own Stock Price Reaction to Its Significant News
This figure depicts cumulative abnormal returns around companies’ own announcement events with significant
positive and negative news as a function of holding period. Cumulative abnormal returns are defined as the
difference between the buy-and-hold returns of the announcing company and returns of a portfolio of firms
matched on size and book-to-market, following Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009). Significant news event is
defined as an event in top 2.5% of absolute CAR(−1, 1) in response to earnings announcements or 8-K filings and
classified as positive or negative depending on the sign of the CAR(−1, 1). The holding period starts one day
before the event and ends in 1 day to 60 days after the event. The table under the figure presents cumulative
abnormal returns for positive, negative news and the difference between them. In parentheses are the t-statistics
of the t-test on the statistical difference from zero of cumulative abnormal returns. The sample period is from
January 1996 to December 2015. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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 0  5  1 0  1 5  2 0  2 5  3 0  3 5  4 0  4 5  5 0  5 5  6 0
 D a y s
 P o s i t i v e  N e g a t i v e
CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,5) CAR(-1,10) CAR(-1,20) CAR(-1,30) CAR(-1,40) CAR(-1,50) CAR(-1,60)
Positive 0.432*** 0.664*** 0.600** 0.527 0.530 -0.209 -0.0965 0.443
N = 2242 (2.76) (2.74) (2.06) (1.23) (1.06) (-0.37) (-0.15) (0.59)
Negative -0.348** -0.320 -0.293 -0.494 -0.242 -0.394 -0.129 0.321
N = 1963 (-2.17) (-1.36) (-0.94) (-1.30) (-0.50) (-0.72) (-0.21) (0.45)
Difference 0.780*** 0.984*** 0.893** 1.021* 0.771 0.186 0.032 0.122
(3.47) (2.89) (2.09) (1.77) (1.11) (0.23) (0.04) (0.12)
Figure 1.2:
Focal Company’s Stock Price Reaction to Peer’s Significant News
This figure depicts cumulative abnormal returns around peer companies’ announcement events with significant
positive and negative news as a function of holding period. Cumulative abnormal returns are defined as the
difference between the buy-and-hold returns of the announcing company and returns of a portfolio of firms
matched on size and book-to-market, following Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009). Significant news event is
defined as an event in top 2.5% of absolute CAR(−1, 1) in response to earnings announcements or 8-K filings and
classified as positive or negative depending on the sign of the CAR(−1, 1). The holding period starts one day
before the event and ends in 1 day to 60 days after the event. The table under the figure presents cumulative
abnormal returns for positive, negative news and the difference between them. In parentheses are the t-statistics
of the t-test on the statistical difference from zero of cumulative abnormal returns. The pairs from the same
industry and headquarters state as the focal company are not included in the analysis. The sample period is from
January 1996 to December 2015.*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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 0  5  1 0  1 5  2 0  2 5  3 0  3 5  4 0  4 5  5 0  5 5  6 0
 D a y s
 P o s i t i v e  N e g a t i v e
CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,5) CAR(-1,10) CAR(-1,20) CAR(-1,30) CAR(-1,40) CAR(-1,50) CAR(-1,60)
Positive 0.0845*** 0.0532 0.0626 0.0349 0.0555 0.117 0.160 0.241*
N = 41453 (2.64) (1.16) (1.07) (0.44) (0.58) (1.07) (1.33) (1.79)
Negative -0.0141 -0.0468 0.0598 0.103 -0.0264 -0.00953 0.0691 -0.00770
N = 43046 (-0.44) (-1.03) (1.02) (1.30) (-0.28) (-0.09) (0.57) (-0.06)
Difference 0.099** 0.100 0.003 -0.068 0.082 0.126 0.091 0.248
(2.17) (1.55) (0.03) (-0.61) (0.61) (0.82) (0.53) (1.33)
Figure 1.3:
Focal Company’s Stock Price Reaction to Peer’s Weak News
This figure depicts cumulative abnormal returns around peer companies’ announcement events with weak positive
and negative news as a function of holding period. Cumulative abnormal returns are defined as the difference
between the buy-and-hold returns of the announcing company and returns of a portfolio of firms matched on
size and book-to-market, following Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009). Weak news event is defined as an event
not in top 2.5% of the absolute CAR(−1, 1) in response to earnings announcements or 8-K filings and classified
as positive or negative depending on the sign of the CAR(−1, 1). The holding period starts one day before the
event and ends in 1 day to 60 days after the event. The table under the figure presents cumulative abnormal
returns for positive, negative news and the difference between them. In parentheses are the t-statistics of the
t-test on the statistical difference from zero of cumulative abnormal returns. The pairs from the same industry
and headquarters state as the focal company are not included in the analysis. The sample period is from January
1996 to December 2015. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.7:
Comparison of Peer Firms to Matched Firms in the Name Changes Sample
This table contains the mean and standard deviation of the selected stock characteristics for stocks that are in
the sample of similarly named peers to matched stocks from the control group. The matched stocks are from the
same size quintile, BM quintile, FF 5 industry and are the closest in terms of momentum to the peer stocks. Last
three rows contain the difference in the characteristics, the t-statistic and the p-value.
Matched Peers Peers - Matched
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Diff t-stat p-value
size 1687.9 14252.8 1074.3 6875.2 -613.5 -0.69 0.491
bm 0.6211 0.5622 0.6677 0.6936 0.0466 0.88 0.382
mom 0.1744 0.8489 0.2842 1.0066 0.1098 1.41 0.160
st rev 0.0171 0.2285 0.0025 0.2131 -0.0145 -0.89 0.376
misp 49.301 13.260 51.014 14.218 1.714 0.80 0.427
turn 0.1382 0.2582 0.1219 0.1663 -0.0164 -1.04 0.299
amihud 2.5050 6.7362 7.2213 75.5637 4.7163 1.09 0.277
γPS 30.088 283.608 36.722 137.968 6.634 0.32 0.746
cGibbs 0.0150 0.0161 0.0174 0.0179 0.0024 1.57 0.117
hlspread 0.0392 0.0772 0.0380 0.0509 -0.0012 -0.24 0.811
ivol 0.0386 0.0297 0.0428 0.0284 0.0042 1.96 0.051
io 0.3141 0.2739 0.2422 0.2501 -0.0719 -3.45 0.001
age 146.596 155.678 146.173 168.567 -0.422 -0.04 0.972
nanalyst 4.179 6.337 1.833 4.047 -2.347 -5.66 0.000
wind 0.0554 0.0510 0.0558 0.0513 0.0004 0.10 0.918
wstate 0.0644 0.0639 0.0740 0.0627 0.0097 1.17 0.244
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Table 1.9:
Name Changes and Changes in Comovement - Leaving versus Entering
This table reports the results of the pooled panel regressions of the daily four-factor abnormal returns of fo-
cal stocks on the leads and lags of abnormal returns of the corresponding peer stocks around name chang-
ing events that are not associated with any other corporate events. Name changes are from Green and
Jame (2013) and divided into three categories (Leaving and Entering) depending on whether the compa-
nies are similar before the event or become similar after the event. I estimate two separate regressions for
the cases when the company names are similar and not similar, and calculate the difference in comovement:
Alphafocalit =
3∑
k=−3
bpeer, similark ·Alphapeer, similarit+k + it
Alphafocalit =
3∑
k=−3
bpeer, nonsimilark ·Alphapeer, nonsimilarit+k + it
∆b =
3∑
k=−3
bpeer, similark −
3∑
k=−3
bpeer, nonsimilark
Displayed are the estimated comovement estimates, F-statistics and p-values for all groups. For the change in
comovement, the chi-squared and p-values of the difference in estimates are reported. I skip two months right
before and two months right after the name changes. The estimation window is limited to two years before and
two years after the event (excluding skipped months). The standard errors are clustered on the event level. The
sample period is 1980 - 2008.
Panel A: Peer Group
Leaving Entering All
Similar Nonsimilar Difference Similar Nonsimilar Difference Similar Nonsimilar Difference
bpeer 0.046 0.034 0.012 0.054 0.000 0.054 0.050 0.018 0.032
F stat 8.63 5.37 0.30 12.29 0.00 6.84 20.31 3.31 4.17
p val 0.004 0.021 0.582 0.001 0.996 0.009 0.000 0.069 0.041
R2 0.00027 0.00017 0.00032 0.00009 0.00029 0.00010
N 81,236 79,034 79,743 72,862 160,979 151,896
Panel B: Matched Group
Leaving Entering All
Similar Nonsimilar Difference Similar Nonsimilar Difference Similar Nonsimilar Difference
bcontol 0.019 0.036 -0.018 0.013 0.013 -0.001 0.016 0.025 -0.009
F stat 2.12 5.28 0.48 0.75 0.87 0.00 2.60 5.39 0.32
p val 0.146 0.023 0.487 0.387 0.352 0.972 0.108 0.021 0.572
R2 0.00006 0.00014 0.00010 0.00012 0.00005 0.00007
N 75,505 69,111 80,003 71,056 155,508 140,167
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Appendix to Chapter 1
Table A1.1:
Definitions of Variables
Variable: Description: Source:
awiki Wikipedia page views of company i on a given day minus the same
company’s average page views for the same weekday over the past 10
weeks divided by this average term:
awikii,t =
wikii,t−meank∈{7,14,...70}(wikii,t−k)
meank∈{7,14,...70}(wikii,t−k)
.
Authors
agsv Google search volume of company i on a given day minus the average
company search volume for the same weekday over the past 10 weeks
divided by this average term:
agsvi,t =
gsvi,t−meank∈{7,14,...70}(gsvi,t−k)
meank∈{7,14,...70}(gsvi,t−k)
.
Google Trends
aedgar EDGAR requests of company i filings on a given day minus the aver-
age company filings requests for the same weekday over the past 10
weeks divided by this average term:
aedgari,t =
edgari,t−meank∈{7,14,...70}(edgari,t−k)
meank∈{7,14,...70}(edgari,t−k)
.
EDGAR, Au-
thors
aturn Company’s share turnover on a given day minus the average share
turnover for the same weekday over the past 10 weeks divided by this
average term:
aturni,t =
turni,t−meank∈{7,14,...70}(turni,t−k)
meank∈{7,14,...70}(turni,t−k)
.
CRSP
CAR(−1, 1) Cumulative abnormal return over the three-day window around the
event date adjusted for size and bm following Hirshleifer, Lim, and
Teoh (2009).
CRSP, IBES
eventD An event dummy that is equal to one on the day of either earnings
announcement or 8-K filing of the focal company and zero otherwise.
Compustat,
EDGAR
eventDpeer An event dummy that is equal to one on the day of either earnings
announcement or 8-K filing of the peer company and zero otherwise.
Compustat,
CRSP, EDGAR
eventDind An event dummy that is equal to one on the day of either earnings
announcement or 8-K filing of the company from the same industry
(the default is Fama French 48 industries based on FIC codes) and
zero otherwise.
Compustat,
CRSP, EDGAR
eventDstate An event dummy that is equal to one on the day of either earnings
announcement or 8-K filing of the company from the same state and
zero otherwise.
Compustat,
EDGAR, Au-
thors
ln size The log market capitalization is calculated as the number of shares
outstanding times price per share (in $Mio).
CRSP
Continued on next page
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Table A1.1 – Continued from previous page
Variable: Description: Source:
ln bm The log book-to-market ratio is calculated following Davis, Fama, and
French (2000). The book-to-market ratio in year t is the total book
value at the end of fiscal year ending in year t − 1 divided by total
market capitalization on the last trading day of the calendar year
t−1, as reported by CRSP. The total book value is the book value of
stockholders’ equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment
tax credit minus the book value of preferred stock. To estimate the
book value of preferred stock, we use the redemption, liquidation , or
par value, in this order (depending on data availability).
CRSP,
Compustat
mom Return momentum is the cumulative return from month t − 12 to
t− 2.
CRSP
st rev Return reversal is the return over the month t− 1. CRSP
misp The mispricing score from Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015). Authors
turn The monthly turnover ratio over the previous month. CRSP
amihud The Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio is calculated following the original
study using one year of daily data.
CRSP
γPS The Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) gamma liquidity variable that
measures the correlation of stock’s return and the liquidity factor.
Authors
cGibbs The Gibbs estimate calculated using the market model applied to the
daily CRSP prices over the past year as in Hasbrouck (2009).
Authors
hlspread The bid-ask spread of Corwin and Schultz (2012). Authors
ivol Idiosyncratic volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the
most recent month’s daily residuals obtained from the regression of
the excess stock returns on Fama-French three factors.
CRSP
io Institutional ownership is a ratio of shares held by institutional in-
vestors in a given company to the total number of company’s shares.
13F
rio Residual institutional ownership is calculated as a residual in the
cross-sectional regression of the logit-transformed institutional own-
ership ratio on log size and log size squared following Nagel (2005).
13F, EST
age Number of months since the appearance in CRSP. CRSP
analyst Number of analysts making earnings forecast of a given company. IBES
similarity Names similarity measured as a Jaccard distance between two sets of
bi-grams from two companies’ names. See more detailed description
in Subsection 1.2.2.
CRSP, EST
sameIND A dummy variable equal to one if the peer company is in the same
Fama-French 48 industry.
CRSP
Continued on next page
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Table A1.1 – Continued from previous page
Variable: Description: Source:
sameHQ A dummy variable equal to one if the peer company is in the same
US state.
Authors, EST
wind Share of companies in the same Fama-French 48 industry as a given
company.
CRSP
wstate Share of companies in the same US state as a given company. Authors, EST
peerD A dummy variable equal to one for companies from the sample of
companies with similar names.
CRSP, EST
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Table A1.2:
Comparison of Firms with Peers to Matched - Whole Sample
This table contains mean and standard deviation of the selected stock characteristics for the stocks that are in the
full sample to the matched stocks from the control group. The matched stocks are from the same size quintile,
BM quintile, FF 5 industry and the closest in terms of momentum to the peer stocks. Last three rows contain
the difference in the characteristics, the t-statistic and the p-value.
Matched With Peers With Peers - Matched
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Diff t-stat p-value
size 1746.0 11334.4 1974.7 14075.0 228.6 7.78 0.000
bm 0.8509 1.0885 0.8503 1.0153 -0.0006 -0.22 0.825
mom 0.1407 0.7374 0.1463 0.7494 0.0056 3.29 0.001
st rev 0.0113 0.1949 0.0110 0.1899 -0.0003 -0.78 0.433
misp 49.435 13.502 49.649 13.511 0.214 4.57 0.000
turn 0.1145 0.3623 0.1140 0.2674 -0.0005 -0.61 0.540
amihud 3.3688 15.5521 3.6873 30.5314 0.3186 5.08 0.000
γPS 21.965 431.548 23.307 379.477 1.342 1.09 0.275
cGibbs 0.0139 0.0173 0.0138 0.0171 -0.0001 -1.18 0.238
hlspread 0.0377 0.0770 0.0379 0.0791 0.0001 0.88 0.381
ivol 0.0310 0.0283 0.0311 0.0280 0.0001 0.95 0.343
io 0.3557 0.2864 0.3550 0.2859 -0.0007 -1.10 0.273
age 173.119 181.856 178.017 188.430 4.898 12.24 0.000
analyst 4.300 6.593 4.164 6.458 -0.136 -9.66 0.000
wind 0.0488 0.0416 0.0492 0.0412 0.0004 4.26 0.000
wstate 0.0699 0.0647 0.0688 0.0638 -0.0010 -3.78 0.000
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Appendix
Table A1.4:
Attention Spillovers - No Controls
This table reports the estimation results of a panel regression of the daily abnormal investor attention (awiki, agsv,
aedgar and aturn) on the focal stock event dummy (eventDfocal), the same industry event dummy (eventDind),
the same headquarters state event dummy (eventDstate). If the peer stock experiences an event (eventDpeer = 1)
and comes from the same industry and/or the same state as the focal stock, the corresponding event dummies
(eventDind and/or eventDstate) are also equal to one. To estimate the regression for the full cross-section of
firms, I assume eventDpeer to be zero for firms without peers with similar names and allow a separate intercept
(peerD) for these firms. The events are earnings announcements and 8-K filings. The sample period is 2008-2015.
The standard errors are clustered by date and firm.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
awiki agsv aedgar aturn
peerD 0.0006 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0033
(0.56) (-0.87) (-1.20) (-1.34)
eventDfocal 0.0904*** 0.0818*** 0.6830*** 0.5243***
(36.71) (24.95) (94.10) (67.12)
eventDind 0.0211*** 0.0117*** 0.0378*** 0.0410***
(6.12) (4.62) (6.70) (6.43)
eventDstate 0.0164*** 0.0059** 0.0338*** 0.0376***
(4.23) (2.03) (5.54) (5.29)
eventDpeer 0.0146*** 0.0051 0.0100* 0.0147**
(4.58) (1.38) (1.90) (2.45)
Year - Month FE No No No No
Day of the Week FE No No No No
Industry FE No No No No
HQ State FE No No No No
R2 0.0033 0.0007 0.0327 0.0122
N 3’376’063 4’642’550 5’130’453 5’409’946
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Table A1.5:
Attention Spillovers - Earnings Announcements
This table reports the estimation results of a panel regression of the daily abnormal investor attention (awiki,
agsv, aedgar and aturn) on the focal stock event dummy (eaDfocal), the same industry event dummy (eaDind),
the same headquarters state event dummy (eaDstate), and a number of control variables. If the peer stock
experiences an event (eaDpeer = 1) and comes from the same industry and/or the same state as the focal stock,
the corresponding event dummies (eaDind and/or eaDstate) are also equal to one. To estimate the regression
for the full cross-section of firms, I assume eaDpeer to be zero for firms without peers with similar names and
allow a separate intercept (peerD) for these firms. The events are earnings announcements. The sample period
is 2008-2015. The regressions are estimated with year-month, day of the week, industry and headquarters state
fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by date and firm.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
awiki agsv aedgar aturn
peerD 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0016
(0.37) (-0.19) (-0.43) (-0.99)
ln size -0.0036*** -0.0042*** -0.0061*** -0.0131***
(-7.68) (-5.21) (-10.69) (-13.32)
ln bm -0.0008* -0.0016 -0.0010** -0.0002
(-1.66) (-1.55) (-2.26) (-0.20)
mom 0.0019 -0.0020* -0.0020* -0.0002
(1.53) (-1.85) (-1.75) (-0.11)
st rev -0.0004 0.0365*** -0.0129* 0.0100
(-0.08) (5.89) (-1.74) (0.91)
misp 0.0002*** 0.0001* -0.0001*** -0.0000
(4.99) (1.70) (-3.46) (-0.25)
ivola -0.5290*** -0.2784*** -0.6873*** -1.9903***
(-10.67) (-4.16) (-9.30) (-16.01)
io 0.0051** 0.0161*** -0.0060** -0.0441***
(2.25) (3.66) (-2.18) (-7.39)
ln nanalyst 0.0009 0.0037** -0.0047*** -0.0064***
(1.04) (2.01) (-5.56) (-3.42)
eaDfocal 0.1416*** 0.1760*** 0.9437*** 0.9707***
(26.68) (20.10) (58.69) (45.39)
eaDind 0.0221*** 0.0047*** 0.0469*** 0.0479***
(10.20) (4.16) (13.99) (10.70)
eaDstate 0.0194*** 0.0057*** 0.0463*** 0.0404***
(8.36) (4.66) (12.44) (8.09)
eaDpeer 0.0161*** 0.0080 0.0113 0.0360***
(2.72) (1.13) (1.04) (2.91)
Year - Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day of the Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
HQ State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.0484 0.0025 0.0812 0.0332
N 2’696’867 3’262’755 3’657’172 3’795’003
48
Table A1.6:
Attention Spillovers - 8-K
This table reports the estimation results of a panel regression of the daily abnormal investor attention (awiki,
agsv, aedgar and aturn) on the focal stock event dummy (8kDfocal), the same industry event dummy (8kDind),
the same headquarters state event dummy (eventDstate), and a number of control variables. If the peer stock
experiences an event (8kDpeer = 1) and comes from the same industry and/or the same state as the focal stock,
the corresponding event dummies (8kDind and/or eventDstate) are also equal to one. To estimate the regression
for the full cross-section of firms, I assume 8kDpeer to be zero for firms without peers with similar names and
allow a separate intercept (peerD) for these firms. The events are 8-K filings. The sample period is 2008-2015.
The regressions are estimated with year-month, day of the week, industry and headquarters state fixed effects.
The standard errors are clustered by date and firm.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
awiki agsv aedgar aturn
peerD 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0019
(0.05) (-0.20) (-0.74) (-1.22)
ln size -0.0038*** -0.0045*** -0.0080*** -0.0148***
(-8.16) (-5.57) (-13.32) (-14.73)
ln bm -0.0007 -0.0016 -0.0007 0.0002
(-1.50) (-1.53) (-1.24) (0.27)
mom 0.0018 -0.0021* -0.0030*** -0.0008
(1.48) (-1.95) (-2.75) (-0.45)
st rev -0.0008 0.0360*** -0.0144** 0.0080
(-0.16) (5.82) (-1.98) (0.73)
misp 0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0001
(4.70) (1.59) (-5.65) (-1.22)
ivola -0.5636*** -0.3136*** -0.8841*** -2.1775***
(-11.32) (-4.68) (-11.79) (-17.17)
io 0.0050** 0.0163*** -0.0059** -0.0438***
(2.16) (3.69) (-2.03) (-7.29)
ln nanalyst 0.0011 0.0041** -0.0028*** -0.0041**
(1.29) (2.26) (-3.16) (-2.15)
8kDfocal 0.0896*** 0.0806*** 0.6669*** 0.5190***
(37.20) (20.60) (89.00) (57.08)
8kDind 0.0148*** 0.0059*** 0.0367*** 0.0531***
(4.84) (3.23) (7.36) (7.45)
8kDstate 0.0123*** 0.0052** 0.0297*** 0.0544***
(3.06) (2.31) (4.73) (5.99)
8kDpeer 0.0125*** 0.0013 0.0062 0.0165***
(3.84) (0.29) (1.13) (2.94)
Year - Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day of the Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
HQ State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.0474 0.0021 0.0902 0.0295
N 2’696’867 3’262’755 3’657’172 3’795’003
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 D a y s
 P o s i t i v e  N e g a t i v e
CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,5) CAR(-1,10) CAR(-1,20) CAR(-1,30) CAR(-1,40) CAR(-1,50) CAR(-1,60)
Positive 0.507** 0.650* 0.792* 1.144* 1.411 -0.0112 0.191 0.853
N = 844 (1.99) (1.79) (1.72) (1.66) (1.63) (-0.01) (0.18) (0.66)
Negative -0.302 0.0923 0.0718 -0.297 -0.113 -0.236 0.0409 0.545
N = 802 (-1.06) (0.23) (0.14) (-0.47) (-0.15) (-0.26) (0.04) (0.47)
Difference 0.809** 0.558 0.720 1.441 1.524 0.225 0.150 0.307
(2.12) (1.04) (1.03) (1.53) (1.30) (0.18) (0.10) (0.18)
Figure A1.1:
Focal Company’s Price Reaction to Peer’s Significant News - Earnings Announcements
This figure depicts the cumulative abnormal returns around the peer companies’ announcement events with
significant positive and negative news as the function of holding period. The cumulative abnormal returns are
defined as the difference between the buy-and-hold return of the focal company and that of a matching portfolio
based on size and book-to-market, following Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009). Significant news event is defined
as an event in top 2.5% of absolute CAR(−1, 1) in response to earnings announcements and classified as positive
or negative depending on the sign of the CAR(−1, 1). The holding period starts one day before the event and
ends in 1 day to 60 days after the event. The table under the figure presents the cumulative abnormal returns
for positive, negative news and the difference between them. In parentheses are the t-statistics of the t-test
on the statistical difference from zero of cumulative abnormal returns. The pairs from the same industry and
headquarters state as the focal company are not included in the analysis. The sample period is from January
1996 to December 2015.*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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 D a y s
 P o s i t i v e  N e g a t i v e
CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,5) CAR(-1,10) CAR(-1,20) CAR(-1,30) CAR(-1,40) CAR(-1,50) CAR(-1,60)
Positive 0.410** 0.821** 0.650* 0.666 0.554 0.0425 0.0528 0.331
N = 1382 (2.02) (2.53) (1.76) (1.20) (0.90) (0.06) (0.07) (0.36)
Negative -0.393* -0.499* -0.627 -0.576 0.149 0.0311 0.346 0.641
N = 1127 (-1.92) (-1.67) (-1.64) (-1.24) (0.24) (0.04) (0.42) (0.67)
Difference 0.803*** 1.320*** 1.277** 1.242* 0.405 0.011 -0.293 -0.310
(2.76) (2.94) (2.39) (1.66) (0.46) (0.01) (-0.25) (-0.23)
Figure A1.2:
Focal Company’s Price Reaction to Peer’s Significant News - 8-K Filings
This figure depicts the cumulative abnormal returns around the peer companies’ announcement events with
significant positive and negative news as the function of holding period. The cumulative abnormal returns are
defined as the difference between the buy-and-hold return of the focal company and that of a matching portfolio
based on size and book-to-market, following Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009). Significant news event is defined
as an event in top 2.5% of absolute CAR(−1, 1) in response to 8-K filings and classified as positive or negative
depending on the sign of the CAR(−1, 1). The holding period starts one day before the event and ends in 1 day
to 60 days after the event. The table under the figure presents the cumulative abnormal returns for positive,
negative news and the difference between them. In parentheses are the t-statistics of the t-test on the statistical
difference from zero of cumulative abnormal returns. The pairs from the same industry and headquarters state as
the focal company are not included in the analysis. The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2015.*,
** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Chapter 2
Do Short Sellers Exploit Mispricing
Smartly?
2.1 Introduction
The finance literature documents a number of stylized facts in equity markets that appear to
be at odds with standard asset pricing models. These stylized facts are commonly referred to
as market anomalies.1 Understanding why these anomalies exist and persist requires a careful
study of the arbitrage process. This process usually consists of three components. The first
component is investors’ demand shocks that push prices in the underlying securities away from
their fundamental values. The second component is arbitrageurs that identify the demand
imbalances and return the security prices back to their fundamental values. The third component
is limits to arbitrage that prevent arbitrageurs from correcting mispricing. Many papers are
devoted to the demand shocks and limits to arbitrage components.2 Less attention is paid to
arbitrageurs and their ability to identify and exploit mispricing.
In this paper, I use monthly aggregate short interest to track arbitrageurs’ positions and
the mispricing score of Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) as a measure of mispricing to fill
this gap in the literature. Short interest predominantly reflects short positions of hedge funds,
a group of informed arbitrageurs that actively engage in short selling (Boehmer, Jones, and
Zhang, 2013; Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi, 2012). The mispricing score of Stambaugh,
Yu, and Yuan (2015) is a well-established proxy for stock-level mispricing that is related to
investor sentiment (Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2012) and is associated with anomalous returns
around the globe (Jacobs, 2016). In this study, I show that arbitrageurs are able to identify
and profit from mispricing. I measure stocks’ short interest ratios (the ratios of shares shorted
to shares outstanding) in the middle of the month following the measurement of the composite
mispricing score. The short interest ratio in the short leg of the mispricing anomaly exceeds the
short interest ratio in the long leg by 0.98 p.p. after accounting for other determinants and stock
fixed effects. This spread is economically highly significant given the median short interest ratio
of 1.72%. I use this spread as a measure of shortsellers’ exposure to the composite mispricing
1See McLean and Pontiff (2016) and Jacobs and Mu¨ller (2018) for reviews of anomalies in the US and around
the globe, respectively.
2See Gromb and Vayanos (2010) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) for the review of theoretical and empirical
findings.
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strategy. Consistent with arbitrageurs’ ability to time strategy returns, this spread is 0.54 p.p.
larger after periods of high sentiment, when the mispricing anomaly returns are especially high.
I also analyze the effect of limits to arbitrage on arbitrageurs’ short selling activity. Stambaugh,
Yu, and Yuan (2015) show that higher idiosyncratic volatility is associated with significantly
larger anomaly returns in the following months. Consistent with arbitrageurs’ stock picking skill,
the spread increases by 0.11 p.p. for a one standard deviation increase in the most recent month’s
idiosyncratic volatility. In an alternative setting of the Regulation SHO, Chu, Hirshleifer, and
Ma (2016) show a decrease in abnormal returns associated with the mispricing score for randomly
chosen pilot stocks that were exempted from short sale tests as the result of the pilot program.
The exemption from short sale tests looses short-selling constraints and prevents building up of
mispricing. Consistent with arbitrageurs’ ability to identify mispriced stocks, I show a decrease
of 2.86 p.p in exposure to these pilot stocks relative to control stocks. In accordance with the
implications of Chu, Hirshleifer, and Ma (2016), the difference is not observed pre- and post-pilot
program and is driven by the short leg of the anomaly.
Finally, I reconsider the relationship between the short interest spread and future mispricing
strategy returns. Hanson and Sunderam (2014) use the quarterly short interest spread as a
measure of constrained arbitrage capital and show that its increase is associated with lower future
long-short returns of book-to-market and momentum strategies. The interpretation is that the
more arbitrage capital is exploiting anomalies the lower is the profitability of these anomalies. I
confirm this result for the mispricing anomaly for the earlier period but document a significant
structural break in 2008. After 2008 the relationship turns positive. This positive correlation
means higher strategy returns for a higher level of short interest spread and is consistent with
the spread reflecting arbitrageurs’ expectations of future strategy profitability. I document a
related structural break in the same year. The correlation between the short interest spread
and assets under management of market neutral hedge funds drops from 0.85 before 2008 to a
statistically insignificant 0.13 after 2008. This finding strengthens the alternative interpretation
of the short interest spread.
This study contributes to the literature on a number of dimensions. First, it contributes to
the discussion on the ability of institutional investors to exploit market anomalies. DeVault,
Sias, and Starks (2016) provide evidence that it is institutional investors, in particular, the
hedge funds, not the retail investors whose demand shocks drive the deviation of stock prices
from their fundamental levels associated with Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index. Ede-
len, Ince, and Kadlec (2016) document another surprising result. They show that institutional
investors are in aggregate on the wrong side of mispricing-based anomalies in their long posi-
tions. Akbas, Armstrong, et al. (2015) use money flow to distinguish between different types of
institutional investors. The authors show that money flows to mutual funds exacerbate market
anomalies, whereas money flows to hedge funds attenuate these anomalies. From the short side
perspective, Dechow et al. (2001) and Hanson and Sunderam (2014) show arbitrageurs’ ability
to exploit book-to-market and momentum anomalies. My study contributes to this discussion
by documenting short sellers’ superior ability to identify mispricing based anomalies and exploit
them.
54
2.1 Introduction
This study also contributes to the strand of literature on the general predictive ability of
short positions. Desai et al. (2002) are first to show that a high short interest ratio is associated
with negative future abnormal returns. Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan (2010) propose that a
low short interest ratio is good news for a company and show that it is associated with positive
future returns. Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) use proprietary daily data on short trades
and show that they are informed and deliver high abnormal returns. Diether, Lee, and Werner
(2009) study trading patterns used by short sellers and document their trading on short-term
overreaction of stock prices. Hwang and Liu (2014) find that short sellers shy away from risky
and prefer low-volatility high-return strategies that have weak correlations with other strategies.
Wu and Zhang (2014) observe that short interest contains increasingly more return predictive
information beyond discovered anomalies, especially in more recent years. Jiao, Massa, and
Zhang (2016) show that short positions of hedge funds contain complementing information to
their long positions about future stock performance. Drechsler and Drechsler (2016) argue that
short sales are profitable even after accounting for lending fees. I contribute to this strand of
literature by showing short sellers’ informational advantages in exploiting mispricing.
I also contribute to the literature on the effect of arbitrageurs on market efficiency. McLean
and Pontiff (2016) documents an increase in short sellers’ activity after anomalies are published
in academic journals. The authors show that this increase in activity is associated with lower
anomaly returns. The short sellers’ activity is measured as the spread in the short interest ratio
between the short leg and the long leg of an anomaly. Hanson and Sunderam (2014) confirm
the findings of McLean and Pontiff (2016) by showing that higher activity for momentum and
book-to-market anomalies results in lower anomaly profits over time. My study emphasizes an
alternative way to interpret short sellers’ activity. In particular, I argue that in recent years it
reflects short seller expectations of future anomaly profits. Consistent with this interpretation,
after 2008 I document an increase in short sellers’ activity to lead to higher future anomaly
returns for the composed mispricing anomaly of Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015).
Finally, my paper contributes to the literature on limits of arbitrage. Shleifer and Vishny
(1997), Pontiff (2006), and Drechsler and Drechsler (2016) develop models that emphasize the
role of such limits to arbitrage as constraints on equity capital, non-fundamental risk and short-
selling costs, correspondingly. Many empirical studies, in particular Chu, Hirshleifer, and Ma
(2016), Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015), Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) and Baker and
Wurgler (2006) use these models to interpret their results. Findings of my study confirm the
assumption of ”smart” arbitrageurs underlying these theoretical and empirical papers.
This paper is structured in the following way. In Section 2.2, I introduce the data and
define my main and control variables. In Section 2.3, I document short sellers’ ability to identify
and time returns of the mispricing strategy using publicly available information. In Section
2.4, I show the effect of limits on arbitrage on short sellers’ behavior and document their stock
picking skills. In Section 2.5, I consider the relationship between short sellers’ activity and
future mispricing strategy returns. Finally, I conclude and make suggestions for future research
in Section 2.6.
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2.2 Data
2.2.1 Data sources
Stock level data are obtained from CRSP and accounting data are from the Compustat annual
file. The number of shares shorted is from the Compustat supplementary short interest file. The
short interest ratio (SR) is the mid-month ratio of the number of shares shorted over the number
of shares outstanding. Idiosyncratic volatility (IV OL) is the standard deviation of residuals
over the past month in regression of the excess returns on the Fama and French (1993) three
factors using daily data, as in Ang et al. (2006). The mispricing score (MISP ) of Stambaugh,
Yu, and Yuan (2015) is from Robert Stambaugh’s website. It is a composite score equal to
the arithmetic average of the ranking percentile over eleven mispricing based anomalies. The
mispricing score is an ordinal value, i.e. it shows only that one stock is more or less overpriced
relative to another stock in the cross-section but does not show whether the mispricing increased
or decreased over time. Stock analyst coverage (ACOV ERAGE) is from IBES. Other standard
control variables, such as log size, log book-to-market ratio and momentum are defined as it is
common in the literature. The sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) is obtained from
the author’s website. The data on assets under management of equity market-neutral hedge
funds (AUMMN ) is available starting the first quarter of 2000 and comes from Barclay Hedge
database. A more detailed description of all variables is given in the Appendix in Table A2.1
My sample period is from March 1980 to December 2013. The starting date of the sample
is determined by the availability of reliable data on institutional ownership. To construct the
universe of the U.S. equity market, I consider stocks with share codes 10 and 11 that are traded
at AMEX, NYSE and NASDAQ. The NASDAQ stock data starts in June 2003 due to limited
availability of short interest data in Compustat. To ensure that my results are not driven by
penny stocks, I drop stocks with a previous month’s price below 1$ and stocks below the 5th
NYSE market capitalization percentile.
2.2.2 Summary statistics
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics. Panel A reports the mean, standard deviation, 10th,
50th, and 90th percentiles of the variables. All variables are winsorized at 0.1% and 99.9%
levels. The variable of our main interest is the short interest ratio. Its distribution is skewed
with a mean of 3.55% and a median of 1.72%. SR is highly correlated with the lagged turnover
ratio, institutional ownership and illiquidity with correlation coefficients of 0.74, 0.54 and -
0.42, respectively. The strong correlations show the importance to control for these variables
in a regression analysis. The correlation of the short interest ratio with the mispricing score
is weaker but also positive. In the next sections, I consider the relationship of mispricing and
short interest in a multiple linear regression.
[Insert Table 2.1]
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2.3 Short sellers and mispricing
2.3.1 Short interest ratio over misprcing deciles
Short sellers are shown to predict future stock returns (e.g., Desai et al., 2002; Boehmer, Jones,
and Zhang, 2008). In this section, I test whether this predictive ability of short sellers is related
to their ability to identify and exploit mispricing, MISP , as defined in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan
(2015). To test this hypothesis, I run a panel regression adopted from Hanson and Sunderam
(2014):
SRi,t = Timet + Stocki + β
MISP ′DMISPit−1 + β
BM ′DBMit−1 + β
Size′DSizeit−1 + γ
′xit−1 + εi,t, (2.1)
where Timet and Stocki are month and stock fixed effects, respectively, D
MISP
it−1 is a vector
of decile dummies based on the mispricing score at the end of the previous month and βMISPit
is a vector of coefficients on mispricing dummies. A dummy variable for the fifth decile is not
included in the regression. Stocks from this decile serve as reference stocks, i.e., coefficients
on the decile dummies measure short interest ratio relative to the short interest ratio of stocks
from this decile. Decile 10 is the short side of the mispricing strategy (stocks with the highest
mispricing score), and decile 1 is the long side of the mispricing strategy (stocks with the
lowest mispricing score). Following Hanson and Sunderam (2014), I control for a potential
non-linear impact of size and the book-to-market ratio by including decile dummies, DBMit−1 and
DSizeit−1. These dummies are defined similarly to D
MISP
it−1 . xit is a set of control variables that
includes turnover (Turn), institutional ownership (IO), illiquidity (Illiq), idiosyncratic volatility
(IV OL), a convertible debt dummy (D convert), dummies for stock exchanges (D nasdaq,
D nyse), and analyst coverage (Acoverage). The standard errors are clustered by stock and
date as advocated by Petersen (2009).
The estimation results are presented in Table 2.2. The regression specification in Column (1)
does not include stock fixed effects. The coefficients on the mispricing dummies increase mono-
tonically from -0.341 for decile 1 to 1.200 for decile 10. The difference between the two extreme
deciles of 1.541% is economically and statistically significant. This result is consistent with short
sellers’ ability to exploit the mispricing anomaly.
[ Insert Table 2.2 ]
The specification in Column (2) introduces stock fixed effects. This specification measures
within stock variation in the level of the short interest ratio depending on stock characteristics.
The spread in short interest ratios between the extreme underpriced and the extreme overpriced
decile decreases to 0.977%. The relation of abnormal short interest over mispricing deciles
stays monotonic. It is graphically depicted on Figure 2.1.3 Other significant control variables
are trading volume, institutional ownership, convertible dummy, S&P 500 dummy and analyst
coverage. The coefficients on control variables are in line with the literature. R2 increases from
3The coefficients on size and book-to-market decile dummies are depicted on Figure A2.1 and Figure A2.2,
respectively. Observable patterns confirm the necessity to control for the non-monotonicity in relationships.
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0.503 in Column (1) to 0.705 in Column (2). This increase in explanatory power is consistent
with Lesnevski and Smajlbegovic (2018) who document strong persistence in short interest on
the stock level. Based on this insight, the authors show that a deviation of stock’s short interest
from its persistent level is informative about stock’s future performance. If not stated otherwise,
further in this study, I include stock fixed effects as important control variables. Overall, my
results confirm that the predictive ability of the short interest ratio comes, at least partially,
from short sellers’ ability to exploit mispricing.
[ Insert Figure 2.1 ]
2.3.2 Short interest ratio, mispricing and sentiment
In this subsection, I test whether short sellers can time anomaly returns, in the sense of being
able to increase their exposure when the profitability of anomalies increases. The literature doc-
uments a substantial role of sentiment in mispricing-based anomalies. In particular, Stambaugh,
Yu, and Yuan (2012) document that the profitability of the underlying anomalies composing the
mispricing score is significantly stronger after periods of high sentiment, as proxied by the Baker
and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index, and is predominantly driven by the short side. To test
whether short sellers react to changes in profitability due to investor sentiment, I remove time
fixed effects and add interaction terms between the high sentiment dummy and the mispricing
decile dummies to the baseline regression:
SRi,t = Stocki + β
MISP ′DMISPit−1 + β
HsentDHsentDt−1 + βMISP×HsentD′DMISPit−1 ×HsentDt−1+
+ βBM ′DBMit−1 + β
Size′DSizeit−1 + γ
′xit−1 + εi,t,
(2.2)
where HsentDt−1 is the high sentiment dummy which is equal to 1 if the average sentiment
index over the three most recent months is above the sample median and DMISPit ×HsentDt−1
is the interaction term between mispricing decile dummies and the high sentiment dummy.
Estimation results are presented in Column (2) of Table 2.3. For comparison, Column (1)
displays the results of the baseline regression with time fixed effects. The coefficient on HsentD
reflects the change in short selling activity after the periods of high sentiment for the reference
mispricing decile 5. Its value reflects on average a 0.366 p.p. increase in the short selling ratio for
the stocks that are correctly priced according to the Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) mispricing
score. The increase is stronger by 0.268 p.p. for the most overpriced decile (coefficient on the
MISPDecile=10 × HsentD), adding up to 0.634 p.p, and weaker by -0.271 p.p for the most
underpriced decile (coefficient on the MISPDecile=1 × HsentD), amounting to economically
insignificant 0.095 p.p. In total, the spread in short interest between the most extreme deciles
increases from 0.724% after periods of low sentiment to 1.263% after periods of high sentiment.
Overall, my results are consistent with short sellers’ ability to time anomaly returns by using
the publicly available sentiment index.
[ Insert Table 2.3 ]
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2.4 Short sellers and limits to arbitrage
Theoretical models developed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), D’Avolio (2002) and Pontiff (2006)
show that limits to arbitrage prevent arbitrageurs from correcting mispricing. These models
predict higher limits to arbitrage to be associated with larger future mispricing returns. Two
prominent studies that use the mispricing score to test this prediction empirically are Stambaugh,
Yu, and Yuan (2015) and Chu, Hirshleifer, and Ma (2016).
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) assume that idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) represents an
important source of limits to arbitrage. The authors find that among overpriced stocks, those
with high IVOL experience abnormally lower future returns than those with low IVOL. The
reason for this finding is that high-IVOL stocks stay overpriced longer due to higher limits
to arbitrage. An opposite pattern is documented for the underpriced stocks, i.e. high-IVOL
underpriced stocks deliver higher abnormal positive returns than high-IVOL underpriced stocks.
Chu, Hirshleifer, and Ma (2016) use a pilot program under Rule 202T of Regulation SHO,
adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in July 2004, as a natural experiment
to show the causal effect of short sale constraints on anomaly profits. The authors find that
relaxed short sale constraints associated with the new regulation result in lower profitability of
anomaly returns.
In this study, I employ both settings to test whether short sellers are able to profit from the
return predictability associated with the corresponding types of limits to arbitrage.
2.4.1 Short sellers and idiosyncratic volatility
Idiosyncratic volatility is a common proxy for limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997;
Pontiff, 2006; Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2015; Drechsler and Drechsler, 2016). Stambaugh,
Yu, and Yuan (2015) use the mispricing score to show that among overpriced stocks, those with
higher idiosyncratic volatility deliver more negative abnormal returns. They document a return
spread of -1.5% between the 5th and the 1st IVOL quintiles for the most overpriced quintile of
stocks in the month following the portfolio formation. To test whether short sellers are profiting
from these abnormal returns, I add the interaction terms between IVOL and the mispricing
decile dummies to the baseline regression:
SRi,t = Stocki + Timet + β
MISP ′DMISPit−1 + β
IV OLIV OLt−1+
+ βMISP×IV OL′DMISPit−1 × IV OLt−1 + βBM ′DBMit−1 + βSize′DSizeit−1 + γ ′xit + εi,t,
(2.3)
where IV OLt−1 is the standard deviation of the most recent month’s daily benchmark-adjusted
returns following Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015), and DMISPit × IV OLt−1 are interaction
terms between the mispricing decile dummies and IVOL. As in the baseline specification, both
stock and date fixed effects are included. Moreover, the interaction term for the 5th decile is
skipped as IV OL already captures the effect of idiosyncratic volatility on short interest ratio
for stocks in this decile.
Estimation results are presented in Column (1) of Table 2.4. The effect of volatility on
the short interest ratio for decile 5 is -6.351, which is weakly significant at the 10 percent
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significance level. Given the standard deviation of IVOL in my sample of 0.01, this coefficient
corresponds to a 0.06 p.p. decrease in the short interest ratio for a one standard deviation
increase in idiosyncratic volatility in stocks which are not mispriced. The pattern is similar for
the underpriced deciles. All interaction terms for theses deciles are insignificant. In contrast,
there is a monotonic increase in the coefficients on the interaction terms for overpriced stocks.
The coefficient for the tenth decile, 18.28, implies an overall 0.11 p.p. increase in the short
interest ratio for a one standard deviation increase in idiosyncratic volatility. The documented
pattern is consistent with the following interpretation: If high IVOL stops arbitrageurs from
arbitraging away mispricing at initiation, then high-IVOL stocks are associated with higher
mispricing in the following period, as documented by Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015). Short-
sellers profit from these more mispriced stocks, whose value converges to its fundamental value
during the observed period. Thus, my results are consistent with the short sellers’ ability to
profit from this variation in abnormal returns. In Column (2), I substitute the mispricing decile
dummies with a piecewise linear function of the mispricing score with ten intervals corresponding
to the mispricing deciles. This adjustment allows addressing further concerns of potential non-
linearities with respect to the mispricing score. The results stay qualitatively similar.
[ Insert Table 2.4 ]
To show that changes in short positions are intentional, I test how the short interest ratio
evolves during the 24 months around stocks’ entering the extreme deciles. I split stocks into two
groups, a group with above median IVOL (ivolH = 1) and a group with below median IVOL
(ivolL = 1) right before the event, and follow the procedure of Hanson and Sunderam (2014).
In particular, I run the following regression:
SRi,t = [h
−24D−24it (MISP ) + . . .+ h
0D0it(MISP ) + . . .+ h
+24D+24it (MISP )]× 1{ivolH = 1}+
+ [l−24D−24it (MISP ) + . . .+ l
0D0it(MISP ) + . . .+ l
+24D+24it (MISP )]× 1{ivolL = 1}+
+ βIV OL′DIV OLit + β
BM′DBMit + β
Size′DSizeit + γ
′xit + T imet + Stocki + εi,t,
(2.4)
where D0it(MISP ) is a dummy which is equal to one when a stock is in the extreme mispricing
decile in month t. If a stock spends more than one month in the extreme decile, then D0it(MISP )
is one for all of these months. D−kit (MISP ) is a dummy that is equal to one if a stock enters the
extreme mispricing decile in k months from t, and D+kit (MISP ) is a dummy that is equal to one
k months after the stock leaves the extreme mispricing decile. Thus, the coefficients h−k and
l−k reflect the abnormal short interest ratio k months before entering the extreme decile for the
stocks with high IVOL and low IVOL right before the event, correspondingly. The coefficients
h+k and l+k reflect the abnormal short interest ratio k months after leaving the extreme decile for
the stocks with high IVOL and low IVOL right after the event, correspondingly. The regression
is estimated separately for stocks entering the mispricing decile 10 and 1, respectively.
Results are presented in Figure 2.2. Panel (a) depicts the estimated coefficients for the
stocks entering the most overpriced decile. There are significant differences depending on the
level of idiosyncratic volatility. For highly volatile stocks, the abnormal short interest ratio
increases almost monotonically prior to entering the extreme decile, reaching 0.75% one month
prior to the event. The ratio jumps to 1.72% on the event months and reverts to 0.63% right
after leaving the extreme decile. It is insignificantly different from zero after 12 months. The
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increase in abnormal short interest ratio upon the event month is much weaker for non-volatile
stocks. It jumps from 0.39% to 0.62% and returns back to 0.35% right after leaving the decile of
overpriced stocks. Moreover, for these stocks, the abnormal short interest ratio has higher levels
months prior to the event that might indicate higher arbitrageurs’ activity in advance of the
event. Results in Panel (b) show that short sellers also react to stocks’ entering the underpriced
decile. The jump of around 0.4% is economically much weaker and does not differ with the level
of idiosyncratic volatility. Overall, my results indicate that short sellers are able to profit from
the return predictability arising from limits of arbitrage associated with idiosyncratic volatility.
[ Insert Figure 2.2 ]
2.4.2 Short sellers and Regulation SHO
According to the pilot program under Rule 202T of Regulation SHO announced in July 2004,
from May 2, 2005, to July 6, 2007, every third stock in the Russell 3000 index ranked by its
average daily trading volume was exempted from short sale tests. Stocks at NYSE/AMEX stock
exchanges were exempted from the uptick rule that limited a short sale to be placed exclusively
on a minus tick and therefore impeded short-selling activity. In comparison, Nasdaq stocks were
exempted from the bid price test that was used at this exchange instead of the uptick rule. I
focus on NYSE/AMEX stocks because the NASDAQ’s bid price test was less restrictive and
its removal had little effect on the short sale constraints.4 Chu, Hirshleifer, and Ma (2016)
document that as the result of the exemption from the short sale tests the combined mispricing
anomaly long-short portfolio returns for pilot NYSE/AMEX stocks decreased by 77 basis points
per month. In my further analysis, I compare short sellers’ exposure to the mispricing score for
pilot stocks relative to control stocks around the event period to test their ability to adjust to
the new regulation.
I follow SEC’s procedure (Securities Exchange Act Release No. 50104) to identify pilot
(treated) and non-pilot (control) stocks. The final sample consists of 1363 NYSE/AMEX stocks.
In accordance with the design of the experiment, approximately one-third of these stocks are
pilot and two-thirds are non-pilot. If short sellers are able to understand the implication of the
program, they should decrease their exposure to the mispricing anomaly in these stocks. To
reduce estimation noise, I measure time-varying exposure of short sellers to the mispricing score
at a quarterly frequency. Using all monthly observation in quarter t, I run the following pooled
regression separately for pilot and control stocks:
SRi,τ = β
MISP ′
t D
MISP
iτ−1 + β
BM ′
t D
BM
iτ−1 + β
Size′
t D
Size
iτ−1 + γ
′
txiτ−1 + εi,τ , (2.5)
where SRi,τ is the short interest ratio of stock i in the middle of month τ , and D
MISP
iτ−1 are
mispricing dummies based on the mispricing score at the end of month τ−1. From this regression,
I obtain quarterly estimates of βMISPt for pilot and control stocks. Alternatively, I designate
these coefficients as βMISPl,t , where l takes values of 1 for the long leg or 10 for the short leg of
4See Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) for more details on Regulation SHO.
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mispricing anomaly. The difference βMISP10,t − βMISP1,t is the spread in abnormal short interest
ratios between the short and long leg.
Figure 2.3 depicts the evolution of long-short spreads in abnormal short interest ratios for
pilot and control stocks over time. The timeline is divided by into four periods: the pre-
announcement period (before July 2004), the announcement period (July 2004 - April 2005),
the Reg SHO period (May 2005 - June 2007), and the post-Reg SHO period (after July 2007).
The figure shows no significant difference in the long-short short interest spread in the pre-
announcement period of the pilot program, with the level of spread around 1%. After the
announcement, the spread goes down for the pilot stocks, but not for the control stocks. The
difference becomes substantial after the program initiation. In particular, the spread drops
to zero for the pilot stocks and stays highly positive for the non-pilot stocks. This pattern
is consistent with short sellers’ avoiding the stocks that do not deliver abnormal returns. The
difference in spreads vanishes after the program termination, with the spreads dropping for both
pilot and non-pilot stocks. The last result is consistent with the fact that after the termination
of the pilot program SEC eliminated the price test for all stocks.
[ Insert Figure 2.3 ]
Next, I compare the effect of the regulation separately for the long and the short leg of the
mispricing anomaly. I define βMISPl,t (Pilot)− βMISPl,t (Control) as a measure of the difference in
exposures to the anomaly between pilot and control stocks, and run the following regression:
βMISPl,t (Pilot)− βMISPl,t (Control) = b0,l · preDt + b1,l · announcementDt+
+ b2,l · duringDt + b3,l · postDt + εl,t,
(2.6)
where preDt is one for the pre-announcement period and zero, otherwise, announcementDt is
one for the announcement period, duringDt is one for the period during the pilot program (May
2005 - June 2007), and postDt is the period after the program, when the SEC eliminated the
short sale price test for all exchange-listed stocks (July 2007 - December 2010). The regression
is estimated with robust standard errors.
The results of the regression for the short leg, long leg, and the spread between long and
short legs are presented in Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 2.5, correspondingly. For the short
leg, the difference in short interest between pilot and control stocks is as small as -0.390% before
the Reg SHO announcement. It reaches -1.074% after the announcement and becomes -2.608%
during the pilot program. The difference reverts to insignificant 0.307% after the program ter-
mination. For the long leg, the difference in exposures is close to zero before the announcement,
significantly positive after the announcement and stays significantly positive after the pilot pro-
gram is finished. Column (3) reports the difference in long-short spreads between pilot and
control stocks. Corroborating results of Figure 2.3, this difference is insignificant before the
announcement and after the termination of the program, and is significantly negative after the
announcement and especially during the pilot program with the corresponding values of -1.480%
and -2.858%. The difference between the coefficient on duringDt and preDt is equal to -2.529%,
highly significant and is equivalent to the difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of Reg
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SHO, as shown in Chu, Hirshleifer, and Ma (2016). Overall, these results show that short sell-
ers decrease their exposure to the mispricing anomaly in affected stocks as a reaction to lower
anomaly profitability. The effect is driven by the short leg and does not exist before and after
the pilot program. The pattern is consistent with the short sellers’ ability to predict the effect
of the regulation on strategy returns.
[ Insert Table 2.5 ]
Overall, results for both proxies to limits of arbitrage show that short sellers are able to
adjust their positions to the changing profitability of the mispricing anomaly. These findings
are broadly consistent with arbitrageurs’ informational advantage assumed in theoretical models
(Drechsler and Drechsler, 2016; Pontiff, 2006; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and empirical studies
(Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2015; Chu, Hirshleifer, and Ma, 2016).
2.5 Short sellers’ activity and arbitrage profits
Results in previous sections show the arbitrageurs’ ability to exploit stock mispricing and time
their exposure in return maximizing manner. In this section, I analyze the relationship between
arbitrage activity and future mispricing strategy returns. Hanson and Sunderam (2014) use the
spread in short interest as a proxy for arbitrage activity and document a negative relationship
between short interest activity and abnormal returns for a number of anomalies, in particular
value and momentum. Similarly, McLean and Pontiff (2016) show a decline in strategy returns
and a simultaneous increase in the short-long short interest spread after the academic publication
of discovered anomalies. Both studies assume the spread in short interest to be a proxy for
arbitrage capital allocated to the exploitation of the corresponding strategies. Results of these
studies are consistent with an increase in arbitrage capital as investors learn about mispricing,
leading to lower subsequent strategy profitability. In this section, I revisit the findings of the
literature by testing the relationship between the short interest spread and mispricing strategy
returns. In particular, I show that larger short interest spreads might not only serve as a measure
of arbitrage capital but also reflect arbitrageurs’ opinion about future anomaly returns.
As in subsection 2.4.2, I turn to quarterly frequency and use short minus long abnormal
short interest on the extreme mispricing score deciles as a measure for short sellers activity. This
measure, SMISP , is calculated every quarter as a difference between the coefficients, βMISP10 −
βMISP1 , from the following pooled regression with monthly observations from Equation (2.5):
SRi,τ = β
MISP ′DMISPiτ−1 + β
BM ′DBMiτ−1 + β
Size′DSizeiτ−1 + γ
′xiτ−1 + εi,τ
I start my analysis by plotting quarterly misprcing strategy returns against lagged estimated
short interest spreads. The results are presented in Figure 2.4. The plot reveals the following
pattern. First, there is a decrease in strategy returns over time that is especially significant after
2000. On the other hand, the short interest spread grows only until around 2007-2008, reaching
3% at the peak, and then dramatically drops to around 1%. An upward trend in the spread and
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a downward trend in strategy returns are cosistent with the negative relationship between these
variables documented by Hanson and Sunderam (2014) and McLean and Pontiff (2016).
[ Insert Figure 2.4 ]
I test shifts in relationships formally by running two linear regressions and conducting supremum
Wald tests on the structural break in coefficients with an unknown break date following Andrews
(1993). In the first regression, mispricing strategy returns are regressed on a constant to estimate
average strategy returns. The second regression takes the following form:
RetMISPt = α+ β1S
MISP
t−1 + β2Ret
MISP
t−1 + β3Sentt−1 + εt, (2.7)
where SMISPt−1 is the short interest spread over the previous quarter, RetMISPt−1 is the recent
performance of the strategy to control for possible momentum in the strategy performance,
and Sentt−1 is the average sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) over the most recent
quarter to control for the effect of investor sentiment. Standard errors are adjusted for time series
correlation following Newey and West (1987). The test for structural breaks in all regression
coefficients consists of performing Wald tests for each potential date and yields the most probable
break date. To test the null hypothesis of no structural break, I compute p-values for the non-
standard limiting distributions using the method of Hansen (1997).5 After the break dates are
determined, I estimate regression coefficients before and after the structural breaks.
Regression results are presented in Table 2.6. The left panel of the table presents the results
of the regression on the intercept. The coefficient on the intercept reflects the mean returns.
Regression coefficient in Column (1) reveals 3.61% average quarterly strategy returns over the
whole sample period. The supremum Wald test indicates a significant shift in returns in 2002Q3.
The null hypothesis of no structural break is rejected with the p-value of 0.009 (untabulated).
Results in Columns (2) and (3) reveal a substantial 5.05% average return prior and an insignif-
icant return of 0.918% after the break date. This result echoes findings of Green, Hand, and
Zhang (2017), who document close to zero long-short returns for a number of anomalies starting
2003 outside small caps. The authors list a number of regulatory and technological changes that
could drive this change. In particular, adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure in October 2000
and NYSE’s introduction of an autoquoting software in January 2003 dramatically reduced trad-
ing frictions and costs. Moreover, passing of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in November 2002 increased
auditing quality and managers’ responsibilities, and changed the filing procedure of annual and
quarterly SEC reports resulted in more timely data availability that improved information flow
from companies to investors. As Figure 2.4 shows, the drop in anomaly returns is also associated
with the growth of short sellers’ activity.
The right panel of Table 2.6 present estimation results for the regression (2.7). For the whole
sample period, there is no significant relationship between the short-long spread and mispricing
strategy returns. The coefficient on SMISPt−1 is negative but insignificantly different from zero.
The only significant coefficients in Column (4) are on the constant and SMISPt−1 with the values of
0.353 and 0.0320, correspondingly. The supremum Wald test identifies a structural break in the
5For literature review of the methods estimating structural break with unknown date see Perron (2006).
64
2.5 Short sellers’ activity and arbitrage profits
coefficients in 2008Q1 with a p-value of 0.0595 (untabulated). Splitting the sample period before
and after this date reveals a significant difference in coefficients. In particular, the coefficient on
the spread in abnormal short interest before 2008Q1 is -0.0175 and highly statistically significant.
One standard deviation (equal to 0.74%) in this spread is associated with 1.3% lower future
strategy quarterly performance. This result is consistent with the literature that higher short
sellers activity leads to lower arbitrage profitability. From 2008Q2 to 2013Q4, the respective
coefficient, 0.0930, is positive and highly statistically and economically significant. This result is
consistent with short sellers’ ability to increase their exposure to the mispricing anomaly prior
to strategy’s larger abnormal returns. In Column (7), I estimate the same regression with the
period starting in 2010Q2 to show that the results are not driven by the financial crisis. The
coefficient is economically slightly weaker, with one standard deviation increase in the short-long
spread leading to 4.5% higher future quarterly returns.6
[ Insert Table 2.6 ]
To take a closer look at the structural break, I plot Wald test statistics for all quarters
used for the estimation of regression (2.7). The results are presented in Figure 2.5. The graph
reveals that the test statistic is especially high for any point between the Quant Meltdown in
2007Q3 and the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008Q3. Both events are relevant for short
sellers employing long-short strategies as they revealed new sources of systematic and liquidity
risks associated with arbitrage strategies and resulted in regulatory changes in the financial
markets.7 Finally, on July 3, 2007, the uptick rule and the short-sale price tests were removed
for all stocks, as the result of Regulation SHO described in subsection 2.4.2. This cofounding
event could additionally contribute to the observed structural break.8
[ Insert Figure 2.5 ]
Additionally, I consider the relationship between assets under management of market neutral
hedge funds and the moving average of short interest spread over the most recent four quarters.
Market neutral hedge funds were documented to exploit strategies similar to the mispricing
strategy on both the long and the short side and therefore serve as a perfect example of arbi-
trageurs. The results are presented in Table 2.7. The average correlation between AUMMNQ and
SMISPY over the period of 2000Q1 to 2014Q3 is 0.295 and is significant at 5% significance level.
The test on structural breaks reveals that the hypothesis of no structural break is rejected at any
6The results are qualitatively similar if three-factor Fama and French (1993) alphas are used as a measure of
strategy performance.
7The events on August 6, 2007, resulted in poor performance of long-short equity strategies that revealed
an additional systematic risk in the hedge fund industry (Khandani and Lo, 2007). The financial crisis of 2008
was associated with severe market declines, liquidity dry-ups, bailouts and disruptions in short selling markets
(Brunnermeier, 2009; Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2011). See Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2012) for the review
of hedge fund trading around these events.
8In Figure A2.3 of the Appendix, I depict the dynamics of the test statistics for the regression with the
constant only. The figure reveals a less clear break date for the strategy returns. This result could be reconciled
by observing that the mispricing score consists of multiple anomalies that could have different dynamics. In
Table A2.2 I estimate structural break dates for each anomaly separately. The results reveal qualitatively similar
relationship for all of these anomalies.
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common significance level. The most probable break date according to the test is 2008Q3. This
break date is consistent with the previously found structural break for the relationship between
short interest spread and strategy returns. The correlation before 2008Q3 is 0.846. After this
date, the correlation decreases to a statistically insignificant level of 0.130. The result of the
analysis is consistent with the change in the behavior of the short interest spread.
[ Insert Table 2.7 ]
Overall, the results of this section emphasize the possibility of different interpretations of the
short interest spread. Until the third quarter of 2008, the spread is highly correlated with assets
under management of market neutral hedge funds. Moreover, higher arbitrageurs’ activity is
associated with lower anomaly returns. Consistently with Hanson and Sunderam (2014), for this
period, the short interest spread could be interpreted as the measure of constrained arbitrage
capital. After this period, the short interest spread is positively associated with future strat-
egy returns and is uncorrelated with assets under management of market neutral hedge funds.
These results support an alternative interpretation of the short interest spread for the later
period, in particular, that it reflects the opinion of short sellers about the future performance
of the mispricing strategy. Earned abnormal returns are consistent with the compensation to
arbitrageurs for the generation of private information (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) and with a
general predictive power of short interest (Desai et al., 2002; Drechsler and Drechsler, 2016).
2.6 Conclusion
In this study, I show that short sellers are smart in exploiting mispricing. First, short sellers
have a high exposure to stocks belonging to the short leg of the mispricing strategy and avoid
stocks in the long leg. This result is consistent with their ability to capture abnormal returns
associated with the mispricing strategy. The effect is stronger after periods of high sentiment
and for stocks with a high level of idiosyncratic volatility, i.e. when the mispricing strategy is
especially profitable. Moreover, I analyze a change in short sellers’ exposure to pilot stocks due
to a change in limits to arbitrage around the Regulation SHO. Arbitrageurs predict a decrease
in anomaly profits due to the new regulation and decrease their exposure to these stocks. All
these results are consistent with arbitrageurs’ strategy timing and stock picking skills. Finally,
to test whether short sellers activity leads to more efficient markets, I reconsider the relation of
the short interest spread with future strategy returns. I find a significantly negative relationship
between these variables prior to 2008. This result is consistent with the interpretation of Hanson
and Sunderam (2014) that the rise of arbitrage capital is associated with a decline in arbitrage
profits. On the other hand, I document a positive relationship after 2008. Such a strong change
in the relationship manifests a structural break in the behavior of short sellers and financial
markets but also confirms arbitrageurs’ ability to time strategy returns. All in all, my findings
support existing theoretical models, such as Drechsler and Drechsler (2016), Pontiff (2006), and
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and reinforce the results of empirical studies, such as Chu, Hirshleifer,
and Ma (2016), Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015), Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) and Baker
66
2.6 Conclusion
and Wurgler (2006). This study also complements McLean and Pontiff (2016) and Hanson and
Sunderam (2014) by emphasizing an alternative interpretation of the short interest spread.
There is a number of questions that remain unanswered. One important question is on the
causes of the documented structural break in the relationship between short interest spread and
future strategy returns. Another important question is why the mispricing is not arbitraged
away when it is initiated and what role short sellers play in this process. My study employs
monthly snapshots of short interest that do not allow more detailed analysis. Data of higher
frequency would be helpful to address this question. Among potential data sources are Markit
(Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2011; Prado, Saffi, and Sturgess, 2016) , ANcerno (Puckett and Yan,
2011; Choi et al., 2017) and other proprietary data sources (Cohen, Diether, and Malloy, 2007;
Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008; Kelley and Tetlock, 2016). Markit’s data on the lending
market would be helpful to address one more concern, in particular, that lending fees (Drechsler
and Drechsler, 2016) and short selling risks (Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg, 2018) could
outweigh the abnormal returns earned by short sellers. Answering these questions is a potential
agenda for future research.
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Tables and Figures of Chapter 2
Table 2.1:
Descriptive Statistics
This table summarizes stock characteristics over the period from March 1980 to December 2013. Panel A displays
the mean, standard deviation, 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles. Panel B displays the correlation matrix of all
variables. The detailed description of the variables is in the Table A2.1 of the appendix.
Panel A: Descriptives
Percentiles
Variable Mean SD 10th Median 90th
SR 3.55 4.95 0.10 1.72 9.29
MISP 48.90 12.74 32.80 48.31 65.87
IV OL 0.017 0.010 0.008 0.015 0.029
SIZE 4600 17430 138 853 8425
BM 0.637 0.512 0.189 0.542 1.159
TURN 0.133 0.163 0.023 0.083 0.295
IO 0.566 0.258 0.195 0.582 0.905
ILLIQ 0.090 0.782 0.000 0.006 0.167
ACOV ERAGE 9.58 8.02 1 7 21
D CONV ERT 0.16 0.37 0 0 1
D SP500 0.27 0.44 0 0 1
D NASDAQ 0.23 0.42 0 0 1
D NY SE 0.70 0.46 0 1 1
SENT 0.33 0.62 -0.36 0.25 0.96
RetMISP 0.011 0.034 -0.026 0.012 0.051
Panel B: Correlations
SR MISP IV OL SIZE BM TURN IO ILLIQ ACOV ER D CONV ERT D SP500 D NASDAQ D NY SE
SR 1.00
MISP 0.13 1.00
IV OL 0.14 0.17 1.00
SIZE 0.18 -0.20 -0.35 1.00
BM -0.21 0.12 -0.08 -0.24 1.00
TURN 0.74 0.06 0.22 0.32 -0.21 1.00
IO 0.54 -0.08 -0.03 0.42 -0.16 0.65 1.00
ILLIQ -0.42 0.13 0.27 -0.91 0.26 -0.58 -0.59 1.00
ACOV ERAGE 0.06 -0.09 -0.20 0.72 -0.16 0.26 0.30 -0.69 1.00
D CONV ERT 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.06 -0.05 0.07 1.00
D SP500 -0.13 -0.19 -0.22 0.60 -0.04 0.03 0.10 -0.52 0.59 0.04 1.00
D NASDAQ 0.41 0.07 0.10 -0.11 -0.17 0.31 0.20 -0.03 -0.12 -0.05 -0.24 1.00
D NY SE -0.26 -0.09 -0.15 0.29 0.15 -0.14 -0.01 -0.18 0.29 0.04 0.31 -0.82 1.00
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Table 2.2:
Determinants of Short Interest Ratio
This table reports the estimation results of a panel regression of the short interest ratio (SR) on the mispricing
score decile dummies (MISPDecile=k) and other determinants of the short interest ratio. Column (1) presents
results without stock fixed effects. Column (2) includes stock fixed effects. Coefficients on the size and book-
to-market decile dummies are not reported. The sample period is from March 1980 to December 2013. The
regressions are estimated with time fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by date and stock.*, ** and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2)
SR SR
MISPDecile=10 1.200*** 0.739***
(12.88) (10.92)
MISPDecile=9 0.598*** 0.397***
(9.57) (8.75)
MISPDecile=8 0.413*** 0.297***
(8.21) (7.83)
MISPDecile=7 0.173*** 0.144***
(4.16) (4.56)
MISPDecile=6 0.0701** 0.0538**
(2.41) (2.46)
MISPDecile=4 -0.0354 -0.0246
(-1.23) (-1.08)
MISPDecile=3 -0.143*** -0.118***
(-3.58) (-3.66)
MISPDecile=2 -0.239*** -0.158***
(-4.87) (-4.23)
MISPDecile=1 -0.341*** -0.238***
(-5.01) (-4.36)
Turn 13.29*** 11.25***
(11.82) (12.40)
IO 3.059*** 6.242***
(12.11) (18.10)
IV OL -2.219 -2.458
(-0.46) (-0.95)
D convert 0.641*** 0.758***
(7.55) (9.52)
D sp500 -0.463*** -0.520***
(-5.21) (-4.19)
D nasdaq 0.920*** 0.490
(6.11) (1.37)
D nyse 0.365*** 0.362**
(3.12) (2.08)
Illiq -0.0615** -0.0321*
(-2.11) (-1.86)
Acoverage 0.0305*** 0.0449***
(4.12) (7.76)
SIZE Decile Dummies Yes Yes
BM Decile Dummies Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Stock Fixed Effects No Yes
N 575371 575279
R-sq 0.503 0.705
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Figure 2.1:
Abnormal Short Interest Over Misprcing Score Deciles.
This figure shows the dynamics of the abnormal short interest over misprcing score deciles. Abnormal short
interest for a given decile is estimated as a coefficient on the corresponding decile dummy from the following
panel regression:
SRi,t = T imet + Stocki + β
MISP ′DMISPit−1 + β
BM′DBMit−1 + β
Size′DSizeit−1 + γ
′xit−1 + εi,t,
This specification includes both time and stock fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by stock
and date. The 95% confidence intervals are shown.
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Table 2.3:
Impact of Sentiment on Short Selling Activity
This table reports the estimation results of a panel regression of the short interest ratio (SR) on high investor
sentiment dummy (HsentD) and its interaction with mispricing score decile dummies (MISPDecile=k×HsentD),
and other control variables. HsentD is equal to one if the average sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006)
over the three most recent months is above the sample median and zero, otherwise. Column (1) presents results
without sentiment for comparison. Column (2) introduces the high sentiment dummy and its interaction terms
with mispricing score decile dummies. The sample period is from March 1980 to December 2013. The regressions
are estimated with stock fixed effects. Column (1) also includes time fixed effects. The standard errors are
clustered by date and stock.*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2)
SR SR
MISPDecile=10 0.739*** 0.625***
(10.92) (7.96)
MISPDecile=9 0.397*** 0.312***
(8.75) (5.37)
MISPDecile=8 0.297*** 0.215***
(7.83) (4.49)
MISPDecile=7 0.144*** 0.0661
(4.56) (1.57)
MISPDecile=6 0.0538** 0.0144
(2.46) (0.47)
MISPDecile=4 -0.0246 -0.0167
(-1.08) (-0.54)
MISPDecile=3 -0.118*** -0.0678
(-3.66) (-1.60)
MISPDecile=2 -0.158*** -0.0756
(-4.23) (-1.50)
MISPDecile=1 -0.238*** -0.0990
(-4.36) (-1.50)
HsentD 0.366***
(4.60)
MISPDecile=10 ×HsentD 0.268**
(2.26)
MISPDecile=9 ×HsentD 0.185**
(2.31)
MISPDecile=8 ×HsentD 0.189***
(2.74)
MISPDecile=7 ×HsentD 0.168***
(2.93)
MISPDecile=6 ×HsentD 0.0891**
(2.22)
MISPDecile=4 ×HsentD -0.0136
(-0.32)
MISPDecile=3 ×HsentD -0.0957*
(-1.87)
MISPDecile=2 ×HsentD -0.164***
(-2.81)
MISPDecile=1 ×HsentD -0.271***
(-3.91)
Control Variables Yes Yes
SIZE Decile Dummies Yes Yes
BM Decile Dummies Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes No
Stock Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 575279 575279
R-sq 0.705 0.687
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Table 2.4:
Impact of Idiosyncratic Volatility on Short Selling Activity
This table reports the estimation results of a panel regression of short interest ratio (SR) on stock’s idiosyncratic
volatility (IV OL) and its interaction terms with mispricing score decile dummies (MISPDecile=k × IV OL) and
other control variables. Column (1) includes mispricing decile dummies to control for stock’s mispricing. Column
(2) includes a piecewise linear function of mispricing score with breakpoints equal to cutoff points of mispricing
score deciles to control for non-linearities inside of mispricing deciles. The sample period is from March 1980
to December 2013. The regressions are estimated with month and stock fixed effects. The standard errors are
clustered by date and stock.*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2)
SR SR
IV OL -6.351* -5.837*
(-1.74) (-1.80)
MISPDecile=10 × IV OL 18.28*** 16.44***
(3.89) (4.06)
MISPDecile=9 × IV OL 10.56** 10.98***
(2.47) (3.30)
MISPDecile=8 × IV OL 15.52*** 10.67***
(3.98) (3.84)
MISPDecile=7 × IV OL 3.453 2.635
(1.13) (1.31)
MISPDecile=6 × IV OL -0.654 -0.567
(-0.25) (-0.39)
MISPDecile=4 × IV OL 0.879 2.155
(0.34) (1.43)
MISPDecile=3 × IV OL 3.503 1.071
(1.09) (0.50)
MISPDecile=2 × IV OL 1.360 1.410
(0.36) (0.52)
MISPDecile=1 × IV OL 2.032 2.764
(0.46) (0.76)
Other Control Variables Yes Yes
MISP Decile Dummies Yes
MISP Piecewise Linear Yes
Stock Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 575279 575279
R-sq 0.705 0.705
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Figure 2.2:
Abnormal Short Interest for High- and Low-Volatility Stocks Entering Extreme Mispricing Deciles
This figure displays the abnormal short interest ratio for high-IVOL and low-IVOL stocks around entering
the extreme mispricing deciles. Panel (a) plots the abnormal short interest around entering the most over-
priced decile, whereas Panel (b) plots the abnormal short interest around entering the most underpriced
decile. The abnormal short interest is estimated as coefficients hk and lk from the following regression:
SRi,t = [h
−24D−24it (MISP ) + . . .+ h
0D0it(MISP ) + . . .+ h
+24D+24it (MISP )]× 1{ivolH = 1}+
+ [l−24D−24it (MISP ) + . . .+ l
0D0it(MISP ) + . . .+ l
+24D+24it (MISP )]× 1{ivolL = 1}+
+ βIV OL′DIV OLit + β
BM′DBMit + β
Size′DSizeit + γ
′xit + T imet + Stocki + εi,t,
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Figure 2.3:
Abnormal Short Interest Ratio Around the Implementation of Regulation SHO
This figure presents the dynamics of the mispricing strategy short interest ratio spread for affected and non-
affected stocks around the implementation of the pilot program under Rule 202T of Regulation SHO. The short
interest ratio short-long spread is estimated every quarter as a difference between coefficients, βMISP10 − βMISP1 ,
from the following pooled regression with monthly observations:
SRi,τ = β
MISP ′DMISPiτ−1 + β
BM′DBMiτ−1 + β
Size′DSizeiτ−1 + γ
′xiτ−1 + εi,τ
The sample consists of 1363 NYSE/AMEX stocks from Russell 3000 over 2000-2012. The timeline is di-
vided into four periods: the pre-announcement period (before July 2004), the announcement period (July 2004 -
April 2005), the Reg SHO period (May 2005 - June 2007), and the post-Reg SHO period (after July 2007). In
addition to the estimates depicted are 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 2.5:
Difference in Abnormal Short Positions Between Pilot and Control Stocks Around the SHO
Regulation for Long and Short Leg of Mispricing Strategy
This table presents an average difference in the abnormal short interest ratio for extreme deciles of the mispricing
strategy between affected and non-affected stocks around the implementation of the pilot program under Rule
202T of Regulation SHO. The average difference by period is estimated from the following regression:
βMISPl,t (Pilot)− βMISPl,t (Control) = b0,l · preDt + b1,l · announcementDt+
+ b2,l · duringDt + b3,l · postDt + εl,t,
preDt is one for the pre-announcement and zero, otherwise, announcementDt is one for the announcement period,
duringDt is one for the period during pilot program (May 2005 - June 2007), and postD is the period after the
program, when the SEC eliminated short sale price test for all exchange-listed stocks (July 2007 - December
2010).
(1) (2) (3)
Short Leg Long Leg Short - Long
preD -0.390** -0.0606 -0.329
(-2.46) (-0.90) (-1.60)
announcementD -1.074*** 0.407*** -1.480***
(-5.49) (3.89) (-5.00)
duringD -2.608*** 0.250** -2.858***
(-11.70) (2.36) (-11.18)
postD 0.307 0.729*** -0.422
(1.66) (5.70) (-1.63)
N 52 52 52
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Figure 2.4:
Profitability of Mispricing-based Long-Short Strategy and Short Interest Spread
The figure depicts the dynamics of mispricing strategy quarterly returns and the spread in abnormal short interest
between short and long leg of the mispricing strategy. The sample period is 1980 to 2013.
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Table 2.6:
Short Interest Spread and Mispricing Returns.
This table presents results of the time-series regression of mispricing quarterly long minus short strategy returns
on a constant, spread in the abnormal short interest, past quarter strategy performance and the sentiment index
of Baker and Wurgler (2006). Regression split dates of 2002Q3 and 2008Q1 are determined using supremum Wald
test for a structural break at an unknown break date following Andrews (1993). The sample period is 1980 to
2013. The standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation following Newey and West (1987).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1980-2013 1980-2002q3 2002q4-2013 1980-2013 1980-2008q1 2008q2-2013 2010q2-2013
RetMISPt Ret
MISP
t Ret
MISP
t Ret
MISP
t Ret
MISP
t Ret
MISP
t Ret
MISP
t
const 0.0361*** 0.0503*** 0.00918 0.0353*** 0.0513*** -0.0769** -0.0415
(5.58) (7.35) (1.09) (2.79) (5.86) (-2.23) (-1.67)
SMISPt−1 -0.00880 -0.0175*** 0.0930*** 0.0610**
(-1.13) (-3.38) (3.11) (2.47)
RetMISPt−1 0.00563 -0.0379 -0.0195 -0.157
(0.08) (-0.48) (-0.20) (-1.32)
Sentt−1 0.0320*** 0.0248*** 0.0631*** 0.0296
(3.13) (2.65) (3.25) (1.11)
N 134 89 45 133 110 23 14
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Figure 2.5: Wald Test for a Structural Break in Relationship between Short Interest Spread and
Mispricing Strategy Quarterly Returns
This figure displays the test statistic of Wald test for a structural break at an unknown break date as a function
of a quarter. The structural break test is performed jointly for all coefficients of the following relationship:
RetMISPt = α+ β1S
MISP
t−1 + β2Ret
MISP
t−1 + β3Sentt−1 + εt
The sample period is 1980 to 2013. Two lines mark the quarters of the quant meltdown and the start
of the financial crisis. These events happened in the 3rd quarter of 2007 and the 3rd quarter of 2008,
correspondingly.
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Table 2.7:
Relation between Average Short Interest Spread and AUM
The table shows the estimation results of the regression of four quarters moving average of the strategy short
interest spread and assets under management of market neutral hedge funds. Additionally, the corresponding
correlation between the variables is presented. The sample period is from 2000Q1 to 2014Q3. The time line is
split into two periods, before and after 2008Q3. The standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation following
Newey and West (1987).
2000Q1-2014Q3 2000Q1-2008Q3 2008Q4-2014Q3
SMISPY S
MISP
Y S
MISP
Y
cons 1.237*** 1.405*** 0.871***
(6.51) (10.72) (3.90)
AUMMNQ 0.0186** 0.0300*** 0.00939
(2.33) (5.92) (0.97)
Correlation 0.295 0.846 0.130
N 59 35 24
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Table A2.1:
Definitions of Variables
Variable: Description: Source:
SR The short interest ratio is the mid-month reported short interest di-
vided by shares outstanding. To aggregate on PERMNO level, we
sum short interest over global issue key. We use the version of short
interest variable from Compustat supplementary file that is not ad-
justed for stock splits. Short interest for NASDAQ stocks is available
starting June 2003.
CRSP/Compustat.
MISP The mispricing score from Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015). Authors
IV OL Idiosyncratic volatility is defined as the the log of the standard de-
viation of residuals obtained in the the most recent month’s daily
regression of the excess stock returns on Fama-French 3-factors.
CRSP
Size Market capitalization is calculated as the number of shares outstand-
ing times price per share (in $Mio).
CRSP
BM The book-to-market ratio is calculated following Davis, Fama, and
French (2000). The book-to-market ratio in year t is the total book
value at the end of fiscal year ending in year t − 1 divided by total
market capitalization on the last trading day of the calendar year
t−1, as reported by CRSP. The total book value is the book value of
stockholders’ equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment
tax credit minus the book value of preferred stock. To estimate the
book value of preferred stock, we use the redemption, liquidation , or
par value, in this order (depending on data availability).
CRSP/Compustat
Turn The monthly turnover ratio averaged over past quarter. CRSP
IO Aggregate institutional ownership from 13-F fillings. Being reported
once per quarter, insitutional ownership is assumed to be constant
over three-month period prior to the next report.
13F
Illiq The Amihud (2002)) illiquidity ratio calculated using one year of daily
data.
CRSP
Acoverage Number of analysts making firm’s earnings forecasts. IBES
D convert A convertible debt dummy is equal to 1 if the company has convertible
debt outstanding.
Compustat
D sp500 An S&P 500 index membership dummy is 1 for stocks included to
the S&P 500 index.
CRSP
D nasdaq A NASDAQ dummy is equal to 1 if the stock is listed on NASDAQ. CRSP
D nyse A NYSE dummy is equal to 1 if the stock is listed on NYSE. CRSP
Continued on next page
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Table A2.1 – Continued from previous page
Variable: Description: Source:
Sent An orthogonalized version of the Baker and Wurgler (2006) senti-
ment index that is constructed as the first principal component of six
sentiment proxies that have been orthogonalized to macroeconomic
factors that capture business cycle component.
Authors
RetMISP Monthly returns of equally-weighted long-short strategy based on the
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) misprcing score. The strategy is
long in stocks from decile with the most underpriced stocks according
to the misprcing score and is short in stocks from decile with the most
overpriced stocks.
CRSP/Authors
SMISP The spread between abnormal short interest ratios for the short side
and for the long side of the mispricing anomaly calculated at quarterly
frequency.
Compustat
AUMMN Aggregate assets under management of equity market neutral hedge
funds.
Barclay Hedge
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Figure A2.1:
Abnormal Short Interest Over Size Deciles
This figure shows the dynamics of abnormal short interest over size deciles. Abnormal short interest for a given
decile is estimated as the coefficient on the corresponding decile dummy from the following panel regression:
SRi,t = T imet + Stocki + β
MISP ′DMISPit−1 + β
BM′DBMit−1 + β
Size′DSizeit−1 + γ
′xit−1 + εi,t,
This specification includes both time and stock fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by stock
and date. The 95% confidence intervals are shown.
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Figure A2.2:
Abnormal Short Interest Over Book-To-Market Ratio Deciles
This figure shows the dynamics of abnormal short interest over book-to-market deciles. Abnormal short interest
for a given decile is estimated as the coefficient on the corresponding decile dummy from the following panel
regression:
SRi,t = T imet + Stocki + β
MISP ′DMISPit−1 + β
BM′DBMit−1 + β
Size′DSizeit−1 + γ
′xit−1 + εi,t,
This specification includes both time and stock fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by stock
and date. The 95% confidence intervals are shown.
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Figure A2.3: Wald Test for a Structural Break in Mispricing Strategy Quarterly Returns
This figure displays the test statistic of Wald test for a structural break in mispricing strategy returns at an
unknown break date as a function of a quarter.
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Table A2.2:
Structural Break in Anomaly Returns and Anomaly Relationship
This table presents the results of Wald tests on structural breaks with unknown date for anomalies that are
included in the construction of the mispricing score. Panel A publication contains an anomaly publication year.
Panel B contains an estimated year of structural break for anomaly returns, change in average anomaly returns
and the statistic of the t-test on its significance. Panel C contains an estimated year of structural break for the
relationship between anomaly returns and spread in the abnormal short interest, difference in the coefficients on
the short interest spread and the corresponding t-statistic.
A: Publication Year B: Structural Break in Returns C: Structural Break in Relationship
Anomaly Published Break Year ∆ Ret t-stat Break Year ∆S t-stat
MISP 2012 2002 -0.035 -4.05 2008 0.075 2.84
NI 1991 1987 -0.022 -3.89 2002 0.023 1.81
CEI 2006 1998 0.015 1.70 2008 0.047 2.66
ACC 1996 2000 -0.017 -2.50 2008 0.025 0.88
NOA 2004 1999 -0.020 -2.20 1998 0.003 0.15
AG 2008 2000 -0.013 -1.71 1986 0.009 0.24
ITA 2004 1999 -0.021 -2.56 2008 0.009 0.38
FD 2008 1986 -0.048 -3.16 2007 0.029 1.90
OS 1980 1985 -0.033 -3.20 1997 0.023 1.80
MOM 1993 2008 -0.062 -2.63 2001 0.010 0.53
GPP 2010 1990 -0.028 -2.97 1998 0.019 1.17
ROA 2006 1986 -0.052 -4.31 1999 0.022 1.55
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Surprise in Short Interest
3.1 Introduction
Short selling has become an essential feature of arbitrageurs’ trading strategies. The average
level of shares shorted has rapidly increased over recent years. This phenomenon has been
related to an increase in capital devoted to arbitrage strategies but also to the expanded use of
short selling for market making and hedging activities. An increase in supply of lendable stocks
is driven by the growth of institutional ownership (Lewellen, 2011).
This paper studies the informational role of short sellers in the equity market. Many recent
studies have examined the ability of short sellers to detect deviations of stock prices from fun-
damentals and to arbitrage them away. Although most of these studies find evidence that to
suggest that there is informed trading by short sellers, there are three major concerns. First, the
key measure of short sellers’ positions employed in the literature is the level of short interest ra-
tio (i.e., shares shorted relative to shares outstanding). However, as argued by Asquith, Pathak,
and Ritter (2005)), for instance, the negative relation between short interest ratio and future
stock returns is also consistent with Miller’s (1977) view that short-sale constraints impede the
trades of investors with negative beliefs, causing stocks to be overvalued. In other words, stocks
that are already heavily shorted are the most difficult to short and are consequently overvalued.
Overpricing, in turn, mechanically leads to future negative returns. Second, even if the short
interest ratio does reflect arbitrageurs’ view on stock prospects, profits from following this view
might be captured by high lending fees (Drechsler and Drechsler, 2016). Finally, using similar
arguments to those used in the literature on institutional trading (e.g., Bennett, Sias, and Starks,
2003), if short sellers can forecast returns, then cross-sectional variation in future returns should
be related to changes in the short interest ratio as a proxy for informed short selling. However,
previous research provides at best inconclusive evidence on the predictive power of changes in
the short interest ratio for stock returns after controlling for the level of short interest ratio
(Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan, 2010).
This paper proposes a new measure of informed short selling (or short covering). The simple
intuition behind the proxy is based on the distribution of the short interest ratio in the cross
section of stocks. Namely, two prevalent two main features become apparent when analyzing
the short interest ratio. First, the level of the short interest ratio differs dramatically across
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firms and it is highly persistent over time. As a consequence, informed short-selling in response
to (short-term) mispricing is difficult to capture by the cross section of the short interest ratio.
Second, certain companies exhibit a greater time-series variation in the share of shorted stocks
than others. Therefore, even when the short interest ratio deviates from the expected or usual
level of short selling, this may not be sufficient to pick out informed trading from the noise
of the short interest ratio. Namely, if two stocks exhibit the same increase in short interest
ratio relative to their previous levels, we expect that an increase for a stock whose level of short
interest is normally stable will be more informative than a one for a stock that typically has a far
higher level of variation in short selling. These distribution differences may arise because certain
stocks are ideal for market making or hedging while others primarily attract arbitrageurs (Desai
et al., 2002; Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009). In this paper, we account for these differences
between stocks and offer a novel proxy for informed short selling: the standardized unexpected
short interest ratio (SUSIR), or simply surprise in short interest.
Using surprise in short interest as a proxy for informed short selling, we provide several new
insights. First, we show that the information from short-interest reports is not incorporated
into stock prices instantly after public announcements. Stocks with top (bottom) 30 percent
surprises in short interest experience a strong price drift of around -0.25% (+0.27%) within 30
days of the dissemination. Second, we construct a measure that is updated on a monthly basis
to capture this price drift. A portfolio strategy that involves buying stocks with the 10 percent
lowest surprise in short interest (unexpectedly high short covering) and sells stocks with the 10
percent highest surprise in short interest (unexpectedly high short selling) yields a statistically
significant risk-adjusted return of around 4 to 6 percent p.a. over the next month. This return
spread is statistically and economically significant for both the equal- and value-weighted long-
short portfolios. Most notably, the effect is present on both the long and short side of the
portfolio. The predictive ability of SUSIR is not captured by standard risk factors, mispricing-
related anomalies, or other proxies of informed short selling and short-selling impediments.
Third, we find that the return predictability stems from the ability of short sellers to predict
changes in a company’s fundamental value. In particular, positive surprises in short interest are
predictive of lower unexpected earnings and lower cumulative abnormal returns around earnings
announcements. Moreover, the profitability of the long-short strategy based on the surprises is
particularly strong around earnings announcements when valuation-relevant news is released and
this fundamental news is incorporated into prices. These findings suggest that short sellers trade
on mispricing that arises from biased beliefs in the overall market about company fundamentals.
Finally, our final analysis provides evidence that the persistence of mispricing and, as a
consequence, the return predictability are partially explained by Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997)
limits-to-arbitrage argument. That is, general trading impediments such as illiquidity and id-
iosyncratic volatility are positively associated with the magnitude of the predicted returns.
Interestingly, a low supply of stocks to borrow – a common proxy for short-sale constraints
(Nagel, 2005) – is essentially unrelated to the predictive power of the surprise in short interest,
suggesting that SUSIR captures short sellers’ informed trading rather than purely overpricing
due to short-sale constraints.
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The findings of this paper contribute to the literature in several important ways. First, by
employing the surprise in short interest, we provide new evidence on informed trading by short
sellers. Previous studies relate short selling to future negative stock returns (e.g., Desai et al.,
2002; Cohen, Diether, and Malloy, 2007; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008; Diether, Lee, and
Werner, 2009) and future changes in fundamentals (e.g., Hirshleifer, Teoh, and Yu, 2011; Akbas,
Boehmer, et al., 2013). Rapach, Ringgenberg, and Zhou (2016) find similar results for aggregate
short interest. In particular, they show that detrended aggregate short interest predicts market
returns and that this predictability stems from the cash flow channel. Although it has been
shown that the level of short selling predicts both stock returns and company fundamentals,
this predictability might have different interpretations. Namely, stocks with a high level of
short interest tend to be more difficult to short, which automatically leads to predictability due
to short-sale constraints (e.g., Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter, 2005). Moreover, even if a high
level of short selling is an indicator of bearish views, it is associated with a high risk of short
selling (Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg, 2018) and high lending fees (Drechsler and Drechsler,
2016) casting doubt on the risk-adjusted net profitability of strategies based on the level of short
interest ratio. If short sellers are informed investors, who are smart about how they enter and
cover short positions, we should also expect that an increase (decrease) in short interest is also
related to future negative (positive) returns. Interestingly, while changes in short interest ratio
have been shown to predict future fundamentals (Deshmukh, Gamble, and Howe, 2015), to the
best of our knowledge there has been little or no convincing evidence of their incremental ability
to predict stock returns (Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan, 2010). In this paper we first put forward
the surprise in short interest as a novel and intuitive proxy for informed short selling. Second, we
show that this proxy predicts both stock returns and changes in fundamentals beyond the level
of short interest and other standard determinants. Lastly, this predictability is not explained
by common proxies for short-sale constraints.
We also contribute to the literature on market efficiency. In contrast to the extensive litera-
ture on earnings reports (e.g., Ball and Brown, 1968; Jones and Litzenberger, 1970; Bernard and
Thomas, 1990; Mendenhall, 2004), to our knowledge, Senchack and Starks (1993) is the only
paper that considers market reaction to short-interest reports. The authors document negative
market returns around announcement periods for stocks with a reported large increase in short
interest. Our results extend this picture. We show that not only are large increases in short
interest associated with abnormal returns but so too are large decreases, as captured by the
surprise in short interest. More importantly, we observe that there is a price drift for longer
than 30 days after the public announcement of short interest.
In a related paper, Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) employ a detailed proprietary data set
on lending activity at a daily frequency and show that shorting demand, which reflects intended
changes of arbitrageurs’ short positions, is a strong predictor of future stock returns. The data
from that study is not publicly available and therefore could not be observed and processed by
investors. In contrast, the data used in our study is published by stock exchanges on regular
basis and is available to all market participants. If we take this fact into account, the return
predictability documented in our study calls into question the market’s ability to incorporate
88
3.2 Data
information from short-sale reports efficiently into stock prices.
Finally, a recent strand of literature studies the existence and source of capital asset pricing
anomalies (Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2012; Engelberg, Mclean, and Pontiff, 2018; Stambaugh,
Yu, and Yuan, 2015; Stambaugh and Yuan, 2017; McLean and Pontiff, 2016). These anomalies
may arise due to behavioral biases as a result of mispricing combined with limits to arbitrage
(Nagel, 2013; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Although it has been shown in the literature that arbi-
trageurs, in particular short sellers, exploit well-known and profitable capital market anomalies
(Hanson and Sunderam, 2014; Akbas, Armstrong, et al., 2015; Akbas, Armstrong, et al., 2016;
Jank and Smajlbegovic, 2016), we find that returns from informed short selling, as proxied
by the surprise in short interest, cannot be entirely explained by trading on these anomalies.
Therefore, we contribute to this stream of the literature by revealing a previously undocumented
anomaly based on the informed trading by short sellers.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data set,
introduces the proxy for informed short selling, and provides initial descriptive statistics of the
variables. Section 3.3 presents evidence of informed trading by short sellers, focusing particularly
on analyses on short sellers’ ability to predict future stock returns and changes in company
fundamentals. Section summarizes the key findings and suggests a number of avenues for future
research.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Data sources
In our study, we use standard data sources. Equity market data on the stock level are obtained
from CRSP, whereas accounting data come from the Compustat annual file. Information about
the number of shares shorted is drawn from the Compustat supplementary short interest file.
Short interest ratio (SR) is defined as the mid-month short interest over the number of shares
outstanding.1 Other short-interest-based control variables are days-to-cover ratio (Hong et al.,
2016) and short interest over institutional ownership (Drechsler and Drechsler, 2016). Days to
cover (DTC) is defined as short interest ratio over average daily turnover in the same month. To
calculate short interest over institutional ownership (SRIO), we divide the short interest ratio
by the institutional ownership ratio. We retrieve institutional ownership in individual stocks
from Thomson Reuters institutional (13F) holdings. Residual institutional ownership (RIO) is
calculated as a residual in the cross-sectional regression of the logit-transformed institutional
ownership ratio on log size and log size squared, following Nagel (2005). We obtain the Corwin
and Schultz (2012) spread – the bid-ask spread estimator calculated using daily high and low
prices (HLSPREAD) – directly from the authors.2. Idiosyncratic volatility (IV OLA) is the
standard deviation of residuals over past month in the daily regression of excess return on Fama
and French (1993) three factors, as in Ang et al. (2006). Various pricing factors are obtained
either from the corresponding authors’ websites or calculated based on publicly available data.
1Starting from 2007 the short interest data is reported bimonthly. For consistency, we use only mid-month
figures.
2We thank Shane Corwin for providing these data.
89
Chapter 3
For instance, the underpriced minus overpriced (UMO) factor is calculated following Stambaugh
and Yuan (2017) using the mispricing score (MISP ) from Robert Stambaugh’s website. Analyst
data including forecasts and observed earnings are collected from IBES. Market beta (MBETA)
is the slope coefficient in the regression of daily excess stock returns on the market factor, based
on the daily data over the past year. Return on assets (ROA) is income before extraordinary
items divided by total assets. Investment (INV ) is the asset growth measure used by Cooper,
Gulen, and Schill (2008). Other standard control variables, such as log size, log book-to-market
ratio, momentum and short-term reversal, are defined as is common in the literature. A more
detailed description of variables is given in the Appendix, in Table A3.1. Our sample period
is from March 1980 to December 2013. The starting date of our sample is determined by the
availability of reliable data on the 13F filings, an essential ingredient in one of our important
control variables. To construct our universe of the U.S. equity market, we apply a number of
filters. In particular, we include in our analyses stocks with share codes 10 and 11. We consider
all AMEX, NYSE and NASDAQ stocks. The NASDAQ sample, however, starts in June 2003,
and is limited by the availability of short-interest data in Compustat. To ensure that our results
are economically meaningful and not driven by penny stocks, we exclude stocks with a previous
month’s price below 5$ and stocks below the 5th NYSE market capitalization percentile. Finally,
we ensure that our sample stocks have a non-missing mispricing score, which is an important
control variable in our study.
3.2.2 Surprise in short interest
We introduce a new measure of arbitrageurs’ opinions about stock misvaluation: the surprise
in short interest. This measure has two important ingredients. The first is based on the obser-
vation that the short interest ratio is persistent over time. There are a few potential reasons
for such persistence. On the demand side, it could be driven by market-making and hedging
activities involving equity short selling. On the supply side, the rise of institutional investors,
and especially exchange-traded funds, boosts short selling by pushing lending fees down. Such
a persistent component in the short interest ratio does not necessary reflect investors’ views
about stock future performance. We extract an unexpected component of short interest ratio
by subtracting a twelve-month moving window mean from the short interest ratio.3 An implicit
assumption is that investors rely on a twelve-month window to form their expectations about
the level of shorting activity. The second ingredient is based on the observation that the short
interest ratio is volatile and this volatility varies across stocks. Thus, an unexpected change
in the short interest ratio could be small but significant relative to the volatility level of the
ratio. Inversely, a large and unexpected change in the short interest ratio could be negligible
if compared to volatility. To address this issue, we divide the unexpected change in the short
interest ratio by the volatility of the ratio. In particular, we use past twelve-month moving
window standard deviation of the short interest ratio. Formally, for stock i and month t, the
3We also use different window lengths and alternative procedures – for example, autoregressive models – to
estimate the unexpected component of the short interest ratio. The results remain qualitatively similar.
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surprise in short interest is defined as:
SUSIRi,t =
SRi,t − SRi,t−1,t−12
σSRi,t−1,t−12
, (3.1)
where SRi,t−1,t−12 is the twelve months moving window mean of short interest ratio and σSRi,t−1,t−12
is the volatility of short interest ratio over past 12 months.4 This proxy serves as our main vari-
able of interest.
3.2.3 Summary statistics
We start our analysis with descriptive statistics, and these are presented in Table 3.1. Panel A
reports the mean, standard deviation, and the 1st, 10th, 50th, 90th and 99th percentiles of the
variables. All variables are winsorized at the 0.1% and 99.9% levels. Surprise in short interest
has a mean of 0.332 and a median of 0.006, with a standard deviation of 2.069. Thus it is slightly
skewed towards positive surprises. This result can be explained by the fact that short interest is
limited by zero from below. Slight positive skewness is also observed for the short interest ratio,
days to cover, and short interest over institutional ownership. The mean and median for these
variables are 0.035 and 0.016, 6.085 and 3.721, and 0.067 and 0.033 respectively. The average
market beta is around 1. Firm size is highly skewed, its median value being 826 $Mio and its
mean around 4,498 $Mio. For this reason, we apply log transformation to this variable. The
mispricing score ranges by construction from 0 to 100. A mispricing score close to 0 indicates
strong underpricing of a stock, whereas a score of 100 indicates strong overpricing. The bid-ask
spread varies from 0.2% for the 1st percentile to 2.5% for the 99th percentile. Mean institutional
ownership ratio is 56.1% and increases to 100% for the top 1% of stocks. Other summary results
are consistent with the literature.
[Insert Table 3.1]
Panel B shows Spearman correlations between variables. As expected, the SUSIR is related
to measures based on short interest. Its correlation coefficients with SR, DTC and SRIO are
equal to 0.22, 0.26 and 0.26 respectively. It is of great importance to control for these variables
in order to test for the incremental effect of SUSIR on our dependent variables. Drechsler and
Drechsler (2016) show that SRIO serves as a good proxy for lending fees. Thus, SUSIR tends
to be only weakly correlated with shorting costs. Moreover, it is not correlated with proxies
for limits to arbitrage, such as size, idiosyncratic volatility, bid-ask spread and institutional
ownership ratio. In contrast, the other short interest-based variables clearly are related in some
way to SUSIR. For instance, the correlation coefficients for these variables with HLSPREAD
and IO are 0.27, 0.13 and 0.31, and 0.55, 0.22 and 0.24 respectively. The results for the
mispricing score go in a similar direction. The score’s correlation coefficient with SUSIR is
0.02. In comparison, the correlation coefficients with SR, DTC and SRIO are 0.13, 0.13 and
4This definition is somewhat similar to the definition of standardized unexpected earnings surprises (SUE)
that serves as a proxy for earnings surprises in the accounting and finance literature (see, for example, Foster,
Olsen, and Shevlin (1984)). Such similarity in the definitions explains the similarity in the names.
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0.19 respectively. Thus, our measure is less related to the aggregate mispricing score than
existing short-interest-based measures.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Surprise in short interest, short interest announcements, and stock
returns
As a first step, we strive to understand how stock prices react to surprises in short interest.
In particular, we take a closer look at the announcement period and investigate how fast this
unexpected information on short interest is incorporated into prices. To conduct this analysis,
we use the announcement dates of short- interest data for stocks traded primarily on the NYSE
from 1995 to the end of our sample period. This sample choice is defined by the availability of
historical short-interest dissemination dates. It is worth noting that there is a significant time gap
of several days between the settlement date (when the short interest data is measured), which is
always in the middle of the month, and the dissemination date (when the information is published
by the NYSE), which usually scheduled for the last week of that same month. This time gap
varies over the years. It is possible that some information is diffused before the exchange’s
official dissemination date. Therefore, the NYSE dissemination date is the last possible date on
which the surprise in short selling may become available to the market. Consequently, we define
the seven trading days prior to the NYSE’s publication as the dissemination period. To test the
price effects of the surprise in short interest, we calculate our surprise measure for each individual
stock and month using the short interest data measured in the middle of the month. Then, at
each NYSE dissemination date, we define one portfolio that consists of stocks with the top 30
percent surprises in short interest and one portfolio with the lowest 30 percent surprises. In
the next step, for each announcement day, we calculate the abnormal and cumulative abnormal
returns of the two portfolios around the announcement period using the equal-weighted market
return as a benchmark. Finally, we calculate the cumulative average abnormal return across all
events for each of the portfolios.
[ Insert Figure 3.1 ]
Figures 3.1(a) and 3.1(b) display the cumulative average abnormal returns of the two port-
folios from 10 trading days before the NYSE dissemination day to 30 days afterwards. Several
important findings emerge. First, stocks with a high/positive surprise in short interest went
through a significant price increase before the dissemination period, whereas stocks with a
low/negative surprise in short interest decreased significantly in price before the dissemination
period. Second, during the dissemination period, prices of stocks with high and low surprises
start to revert to their previous level. Stocks with high surprises in short interest start to de-
crease in value whereas those with low short interest start to increase in value. Third and most
interestingly, these negative and positive price reactions continue even after the publication of
short interest data. In economic terms, stocks with high values of SUSIR decrease in value by
0.25% within 30 trading days of the NYSE dissemination day, whereas those with low SUSIR
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increase in value by 0.27% over that period. These values are not just economically meaningful
but also statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, we observe a strong price drift, but only a
weak reaction, if any, to the short interest report on the day of the public announcement. There
are a few possible explanations for this finding. First, some market participants might obtain the
short-sale data before the NYSE’s public announcement – for instance, from commercial data
providers. As a result, reaction to the new information is incorporated into prices on different
days within the dissemination period. Second, limits to arbitrage might prevent the information
from being incorporated instantly. The drift might be a result of investors avoiding stocks that
are more difficult to trade or that are prone to noise trader risk (De Long et al., 1990; Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997). However, the fact that we observe a positive price drift even for stocks where
the short interest surprise is low suggests that short-sale constraints are unlikely to play a cru-
cial role. These stocks are also associated with a weak announcement effect, and an investment
strategy that exploits this drift does not involve any of the costs or risks associated with short
selling. Finally, our measure is constructed using a time series of 13F figures on short interest
per stock and this type of calculation might represent significant signal extraction costs for many
market participants. This explanation would be in line with Rapach, Ringgenberg, and Zhou’s
(2016) interpretation of market return predictability using detrended aggregate short interest.
In sum, the results of positive surprises in short interest are consistent with the findings of
Senchack and Starks (1993), who analyze the reaction of stock prices to large increases in short
interest. However, the positive price reaction after negative surprises is novel and contributes
to a better understanding of the role of short-selling information in financial markets. More
importantly, we document a long-run price drift following announcements of surprises in short
interest. In the next part of our analysis we focus our analysis on this price drift and study the
predictive power of SUSIR on a monthly basis. We explore whether the return predictability
can be explained by well-known risk factors or common anomalies. In further analyses we
investigate whether this return predictability reflects mispricing and a delayed price response to
fundamental news. Lastly, we study the role of limits to arbitrage in explaining the existence of
this return predictability.
3.3.2 Portfolio sorts and long-short strategies
In this part of the paper, we employ the portfolio approach on a monthly basis to test whether
the surprise in short interest predicts future returns in the cross section of U.S. stocks. In
particular, each month we sort the stocks into deciles according to the standardized unexpected
short interest ratio, which is measured in the middle of the previous month and announced at
the end of that month. If SUSIR captures long-lived information about stock performance,
we expect that stocks with a positive surprise in short interest associated with lower abnormal
returns in the next month than stocks with a negative surprise in short interest.
[ Insert Table 3.2 ]
Table 3.2 reports the average excess returns of the individual deciles and risk-adjusted re-
turns across different factor models. Panel A shows the returns of equal-weighted portfolio,
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whereas Panel B shows the corresponding returns if stocks are weighted according to their mar-
ket capitalization within the portfolios. As evident from Column (1), we find that stocks in
the highest decile earn on average lower future returns compared to stocks in the lowest decile.
Consistent with our expectation that SUSIR captures informed trading by short sellers, the
difference between the two extreme equal-weighted portfolios amounts to 0.44%. This result is
of meaningful economic magnitude and statistically significant at any conventional level. More-
over, the relation between the surprise in short interest and return is not only reflected in the
extreme portfolios. Namely, the average return decreases almost monotonically in the surprise in
short interest, with a minor exception only for the ninth and tenth portfolios. A similar return
pattern emerges for the value-weighted portfolios in Panel B, though slightly more noisily in
economic and statistical terms.
Next, to ensure that the difference in return observed above is not explained by standard risk
or mispricing-related factors, we regress the time series of the long-short portfolio returns on a
number of factors. We first employ the following risk-based factor models: the seminal Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), the Fama and French (1993)
three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, the Carhart (1997) model with the
Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor, and the two more recent models, namely Fama
and French (2015) and Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2014). The results are reported in Columns (2)
to (7). Most importantly, the risk-adjusted returns are positive and statistically different from
zero across all the factor models, suggesting that classical risk -factors are unable to explain the
predictive power of SUSIR.
Moreover, to ensure that the surprises in short interest do not simply mimic the arbitrageurs’
trading on well-known mispricing factors, we also account for factors that have been recently
related to misvaluation rather than to traditional explanations of risk. Namely, in Column (8) we
employ the Carhart (1997) model, and include two additional factors: quality minus junk (QMJ)
(Asness, Frazzini, and Pedersen, 2018) and betting against beta (BAB) (Frazzini and Pedersen,
2014). We choose these factors because, first, Jank and Smajlbegovic (2016) document that they
are associated with the actual trading of short sellers, and, second, Harvey and Liu (2018)show
that they, especially QMJ, are of great importance in explaining the cross section of stock returns
when returns are value-weighted. The alpha in Column (8) suggests that the surprise in short
interest does not simply capture trading on these two prominent mispricing factors. In the last
specification, we control for the mispricing factor recently proposed by Stambaugh and Yuan
(2017), who combine 11 different anomalies into one score reflected in the factor underpriced
minus overpriced (UMO). Although the adjusted return of the value-weighted long-short SUSIR
portfolio decreases slightly relative to the raw portfolio return, it remains economically large
and statistically significant.
As a robustness check, we form a more conservative long-short portfolio using the top and
bottom 30 percent of stocks instead of deciles. This sorting exercise largely reduces the difference
between the average surprise in short interest of the two extreme portfolios and thereby makes it
more difficult to identify a significant difference in returns. Nonetheless, the average returns of
the portfolio across all models are positive and statistically significant. This result demonstrates
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that the predictive relation between surprise in short interest and stock returns is not driven by
extreme observations.
[ Insert Table 3.3 ]
Next we explore whether the return spread between stocks with low and high surprise in
short interest can be explained by other measures related to short-sale constraints. Namely,
previous empirical research finds that the level of short interest predicts future negative abnormal
returns (Desai et al., 2002; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008; Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009;
Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter, 2005). This predictive relationship has been associated with two
mutually non-exclusive explanations.: On the one hand, the predictability suggests there is
informed trading by short sellers; on the other hand, the effect might also stem from the fact
that stocks with a high level of short interest are more difficult to short, resulting in overpricing
and predictability of negative future returns. To address the concern that SUSIR captures
solely the level effect of short interest, we now add the return of the long-short portfolio based
on the two extreme short interest ratio deciles to the Carhart (1997) model (Column (1)) to a
still statistically significant return of around 0.255 percent for the equal-weighted portfolio and
0.288 percent for the value-weighted portfolio.
In a recent study, Hong et al. (2016) show that days to cover (DTC), the ratio of short interest
to trading volume, measures the costliness of exiting crowded trades such that arbitrageurs
require a premium for trading stocks with high DTC. In Column (3) we analyze whether this
premium can explain the return spread that arises from the surprise in short interest. We
document a positive relation between our portfolio and the DTC long-short portfolio. Also,
more importantly for our study, this relation does not entirely explain the return based on
surprise in short interest.
Lastly, Drechsler and Drechsler (2016) find that the ratio between short interest (demand for
shorting) and shares held by institutional investors (lending supply) negatively predicts the cross
section of stock returns. The authors justify this predictability as a premium that compensates
short sellers for their limited risk-bearing capacity. Including a long-short portfolio based on
this ratio in our time-series regression in Column (4), we find that shorting premium does not
entirely explain the effect of surprise in short interest.
Finally, in the last specification, we add all three of the short-interest-related factors previ-
ously discussed to the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. We observe that the effect of informed
short selling, as proxied by the surprise in short interest, remains economically and statistically
significant even in the full specification.
3.3.3 The cross section of individual stock returns
So far, the results of the portfolio sorting suggest there is a negative relation between surprise
in short interest and future stock returns. In this part of the paper we employ the returns
of individual U.S. stocks and conduct a regression analysis along the lines of Fama and Mac-
Beth (1973), with monthly excess returns as the dependent variable. Compared to the portfolio
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approach, this stock-specific approach allows us to account more easily for other firm charac-
teristics and rule out other possible explanations for the effect of SUSIR. Formally, we run a
cross-sectional regression for each month t:
Reti,t = αt + βtSUSIRi,t−1 + x′i,t−1bt + εi,t, (3.2)
where SUSIRi,t−1 denotes the stock-specific surprise in short interest as defined in Equa-
tion (3.1) and xi represents a vector of control variables depending on the specification. All
the explanatory variables are standardized with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of
one. We then calculate the time-series average of each estimated regression coefficient and its
t-statistic. To account for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the error terms, we use
the Newey and West (1987) correction with twelve lags. If a positive surprise in short interest
reflects informed short selling and has predictive power for stock returns, we expect there to be
a significant negative estimate for β. We report the estimation results for different specifications
of Equation (3.2) in Table 3.4.
[ Insert Table 3.4 ]
The first specification in Column (1) of Table 3.4 considers only SUSIR considers only
SUSIR and the standard control variables as explanatory variables. Using this simple design,
we find that the surprise in short interest negatively predicts individual stock returns. The
regression coefficient associated with the proxy is 0.114, with a corresponding t-value of 5.73.
Therefore, the average return spread between a stock that is one standard deviation below the
mean of SUSIR and a stock that is one standard deviation above the mean is around 0.23%.
This result is consistent with the portfolio sort findings in Table 3.2 using the top and bottom
30 percent SUSIR in the cross section of stocks.
Next, we account for the level of short interest ratio and proxies of short-sale constraints in
the regression framework. In Columns (2) to (4), we add the level of short interest, days to cover,
and the ratio between short interest and shares held by institutional investors respectively. As
is evident from the table, for all three specifications the coefficient of surprise in short interest
decreases slightly but remains economically and statistically significant. Moreover, in line with
the existing studies, we find that all three control variables negatively predict the cross section
of future stock returns.
We then test whether the two recent prominent factors, investment and profitability (Fama
and French, 2015; Hou, Xue, and Zhang, 2014), affect the predictive power of SUSIR. In
Column (5) we observe that the coefficients of both variables have the expected signs, but the
effect of surprise in short interest is essentially unchanged relative to our benchmark specification
in Column (1).
Our next step is to account for the possibility that surprise in short interest simply reflects
the trading of short sellers on well-known mispricing factors. Similar to the portfolios sorts, we
rely on the mispricing score of Stambaugh and Yuan (2017). A high score indicates that a stock
is overpriced, whereas a low score suggests underpricing. We therefore expect the coefficient
to the mispricing score to be negative. As is evident in Column (6), we find that the proxy of
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Stambaugh and Yuan (2017) negatively predicts stock returns. More important for this study,
we observe that the surprise in short interest remains a significant cross-sectional predictor of
future stock returns.
In Column (7) we include the idiosyncratic volatility of the individual stock to control for the
low-volatility anomaly. Most notably, it does not affect our SUSIR result. However, consistent
with previous research (e.g., Ang et al., 2006), we document that high idiosyncratic volatility is
associated with lower future returns. Lastly, in Column (8), we include all previously introduced
variables in one specification and find that the surprise in short interest is still a meaningful and
important predictor of the cross section of future stock returns.
Both the portfolio approach and the analysis of the level of individual stock returns suggest
that SUSIR captures the informed trading by short sellers. In the remaining part of this paper,
we strive to better understand the source and channels of this return predictability.
3.3.4 The time-series dimension of return predictability
To understand the source of return predictability, we turn to the time-series properties of the
SUSIR long-short strategy. We check the stability of monthly returns delivered by the strategy
over time. In particular, we calculate and then analyze the cumulative returns. Severe crashes
in returns would be consistent with a risk-based explanation of the strategy’s abnormal profits.
Momentum (Daniel and Moskowitz, 2016) and days-to-cover (Hong et al., 2016) strategies are
well-known examples of risky strategies that experienced severe crashes, in particular, around
the 2008 financial crisis. Second, we look at the performance of the SUSIR long-short portfolio
up to 24 months after portfolio formation. The main purpose of this exercise is to rule out
the possibility that the negative relation between SUSIR and future stock returns is the result
of temporary price changes due to short-sellers’ overreaction or uninformed demand shocks. If
these explanations were to apply, we would expect a reversal in the strategy’s return in the long
run.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the overall performance of the SUSIR long-short strategy over time.
We plot the logarithmic cumulative raw returns to ensure comparability between performance
at different time periods. The plot indicates that the strategy does not exhibit strong negative
returns or crashes over the sample period. This finding serves as the first evidence that supports
the mispricing-based explanation of the strategy’s profits.5
[ Insert Figure 3.2 ]
Is the profitability of the SUSIR long-short strategy the result of temporary or permanent
price changes? To answer this question we analyze the long-run performance of the SUSIR buy-
and-hold portfolio. First, we form decile portfolios based on SUSIR in every month t. Next, we
calculate equal- and value-weighted raw excess returns of the first minus tenth decile portfolios
in month t + k, where k ∈ {1, ..., 24}. Finally, we run the following time-series regression for
5In unreported results we examine the impact of Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) investor sentiment index on the
returns of SUSIR-based long-short strategy. Our results reveal no significant relation.
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each holding period month k:
LS SUSIRt+k = αk + βMKTRF,kMKTRFt+k + βSMB,kSMBt+k+
+ βHML,kHMLt+k + βUMD,kUMDt+k + εk,t+k,
(3.3)
where LS SUSIRt+k is the raw excess return in month t+ k of the long-short portfolio formed
in month t, and MKTRFt+k, SMBt+k, HMLt+k, UMDt+k are the returns on the four factors
of the Carhart (1997) model in month t+ k. The intercept of the regression (αk) is the alpha of
the buy-and-hold strategy k months after portfolio formation.
[ Insert Figure 3.3 ]
Figure 3.3 presents equal-weighted and value-weighted average holding period alpha ob-
tained by accumulating over the months of the holding period the four-factor alphas from Equa-
tion (3.3). The figure reveals a pattern that is consistent with SUSIR predicting permanent
price changes. The long-short portfolio delivers abnormal returns up to 18 months after portfolio
formation and the returns do not revert to previous levels, as it would be the case for temporary
price changes. Surprisingly, the performance of the equal-weighted and value-weighted portfo-
lios are very similar until month 8. After this point, the cumulative alpha of the value-weighted
portfolio hovers around 2%, whereas the equal-weighted portfolio continues to deliver abnormal
performance until month 18, when it reaches 3.6%. Thus, the ability of surprise in short interest
to predict stock returns is not limited to the first months and is not associated with price reversal
in the long run.
3.3.5 Surprise in short interest, biased expectations and fundamental news
In this section we ask whether the ability of surprise in short interest to predict the cross section
of stock returns is the manifestation of risk or mispricing. Return predictability might arise if
market participants have biased expectations. However, when the information becomes available
to the market, the firm’s value should converge to its fundamental level. To be consistent with
this type of mispricing-based explanation, SUSIR should satisfy the following two conditions.
First, it should predict future changes in fundamentals (cash-flow news). Second, the ability
to predict stock returns should be stronger on the days when such valuation-relevant news is
released. We use quarterly earnings announcements to test our two hypotheses. Companies’
quarterly earnings reports contain valuable information about firm fundamentals. We use earn-
ings surprises as a proxy for fundamental news in these reports. Market participants update
their expectations when reports are released. Consequently, these changes in expectations are
reflected in equity prices.
To test our first hypothesis, we check whether surprises in short interest can predict future
surprises in announced earnings. Using data on 196,719 earnings announcements, we run a panel
regression of earnings surprises on the most recent SUSIR measure and other controls including
month-fixed effects:
Earnings Surprisei,t = αt + βtSUSIRi,t−1 + x′i,t−1bt + εi,t, (3.4)
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where SUSIRi,t−1 is the stock-specific surprise in short interest in month t− 1 and xi,t−1 is a
vector of control variables depending on the specification.
We use three measures of earnings surprises. The first measure is standardized unanticipated
earnings based on past earnings (SUEPE). This measure is equal to the difference between cur-
rent earnings per share and earnings per share reported four quarters previously, divided by the
standard deviation of this difference over the past eight quarters. It is derived on the assumption
that earnings follow a seasonal random walk and it performs well in terms of capturing earnings
news (Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin, 1984). The second measure is standardized unanticipated
earnings based on analyst forecasts (SUEAF ), also known as analyst forecast errors. In con-
trast to SUEPE , this measure uses analyst forecasts as a proxy for the market expectation of
EPS. It is defined as an actual EPS net of the most recent mean analyst forecasts over the
standard deviation of analyst forecasts. This measure is obtained directly from IBES. Finally,
the third measure, CAR, is the cumulative market-adjusted return over the earnings announce-
ment window [−1, 1]. The CRSP value-weighted portfolio is used as a benchmark index. In
some specifications we control for two measures of stock misevaluation: short interest ratio and
mispricing score. There are two reasons to include short interest ratio. First, the short interest
ratio predicts stock returns and its predictive power might also come from the fundamental news
channel (Akbas, Boehmer, et al., 2013). Second, SUSIR is derived using information from the
short interest ratio. We also control for mispricing score that aggregates misvaluation-related
information (Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2015; Stambaugh and Yuan, 2017). If surprise in short
interest is not simply loading on known factors, it should have significant predictive power on
top of these factors. The explanatory variables are standardized to have zero mean and unit
standard deviation to ensure the comparability of coefficients.
Regression results are reported in Table 3.5. The sample period starts in May 1985 for
SUEPE , in May 1992 for SUEAF , and in May 1980 for CAR. The sample period is limited by
data availability. All earnings surprise variables are multiplied by 100 to improve the readability
of the table. All earnings surprise measures are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The
standard errors are double-clustered by month and stock. The standard control variables are
market beta, log size, log book-to-market ratio, momentum and short-term reversal. The left
panel of the table reports results for SUEPE . The coefficient on SUSIR in the specification that
includes only month-fixed effects is -0.0302 with a t-statistic of -3.51. The negative sign of the
coefficient means that an increase in surprise in short interest predicts lower earnings surprises,
all else being equal. The inclusion of standard controls makes the predictive power of SUSIR
even stronger (Column (2)). Controlling for MISP and SR slightly decreases the significance
of SUSIR (Columns (3) and (4)). As expected, SR and MISP are also significant predictors
of earnings surprises. Coefficients on other control variables are in line with the literature.
Regression results for SUEAF are presented in the middle panel. Two additional controls
are added: number of analysts producing the forecast (NUMEST ) and standard deviation
of forecasts (STDEV ). The coefficients on the variables are qualitatively similar to those for
SUEPE . Regression with CAR as the dependent variable produces statistically weaker but
nevertheless significant results. They are reported in the right panel. Regression coefficient
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allows easy interpretation of the economic importance of SUSIR. In the specification with
solely month-fixed effects, the coefficient -0.0515 (t-stat -3.08) means that, all other things being
equal, an increase of two standard deviations in SUSIR results in announcement returns that
are 10.3 basis points lower. Accounting for MISP and SR slightly decreases this number to 7.3
basis points. The statistical significance of SUSIR stays above the 95% confidence level in all
the specifications that we considered. Interestingly, the predictive power of SR is much stronger
when using CAR as a measure of earnings surprises. It has more than double the predictive
power of SUSIR and is even stronger than for MISP . Overall, the tests show that surprise in
short interest is a statistically and economically significant predictor of earnings surprises. This
result is in line with our first hypothesis.
[ Insert Table 3.5 ]
To test the second hypothesis, we turn to a daily frequency and adopt the methodology of
Engelberg, Mclean, and Pontiff (2018). The sample contains 12,552,943 day-stock observations.
The earnings announcement dates are from the Compustat quarterly file. Our goal is to compare
the predictive power of short interest surprise on announcement days to non-announcement days.
We first define an earnings announcement period dummy (EAP ) equal to 1 for the days that
are within the three-day window around the earnings announcement. We run a panel regression
of raw daily stock returns on EAP , the most recent SUSIR, the interaction between them
(SUSIR× EAP ) and other control variables:
Reti,t = αt + β1,tEAPi,t + β2,tSUSIRi,t−1 + β3,tSUSIRi,t−1 × EAPi,t + x′i,t−1bt + εi,t, (3.5)
The coefficient on SUSIRi,t−1 reflects the average predictive power of SUSIR on non-announcement
days. The coefficient on the interaction variable shows an additional predictive power of SUSIR
upon earnings announcements. The mispricing-based explanation commands a significant neg-
ative coefficient on this variable.
We report the estimation results in Table 3.6. In all specifications, standard errors are clus-
tered by month. The regression specification in Column (1) includes only EAP , SUSIR and the
interaction between them as explanatory variables, together with day-fixed effects. The signifi-
cantly positive coefficient on EAP is the manifestation of an earnings announcement premium
first discovered by Beaver (1968). SUSIR is a significant predictor of stock returns on both
announcement and non-announcement days. However, the predictability is almost five times
stronger upon announcements days. The introduction of four lags of return, return squared and
daily turnover has no significant impact (Column (2)). Controlling for mispricing and short
interest ratio slightly weakens the results but does not change the implications (Column (3)).
Consistent with the mispricing-related nature of the short interest ratio (Akbas, Boehmer, et al.,
2013) and mispricing score (Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2015), the interaction coefficients of these
variables with EAP are also significant and imply around 3.5 times stronger return predictability
upon news arrival. Further specifications address some possible risk-based explanations of the
effect. Savor and Wilson (2016) argue that firms that are making announcements have higher
exposure to fundamental risk than firms that are not doing so. To control for this risk hetero-
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geneity, we include day-EAP fixed effects. As is evident from Column (4), the announcement
risk premium does not drive our results. In Column (5), we analyze whether the increase in
exposure to systematic risk for earnings announcers documented by Patton and Verardo (2012)
might influence our inference. That is, we test whether stocks with more negative surprises in
short interest (associated with higher future returns) experience a larger increase in market beta
around earnings announcements. For that, we introduce market return, proxied by the CRSP
value-weighted index (MKT ), to our baseline specification from Column (2). We interact MKT
with EAP and SUSIR and add triple interaction of these variables. The coefficient on MKT
confirms that average market beta is around 1. The coefficient on MKT × EAP reveals the
average effect of earnings announcements on market beta to be positive but statistically in-
significant (t-stat of 0.54). The insignificant coefficient on MKT ×SUSIR of -0.00567 (t-stat of
-1.27) suggests that market exposure is not significantly correlated with SUSIR. Surprisingly,
the coefficient on triple interaction is positive and significant, meaning that high SUSIR stocks
experience an increase in market beta on announcement days, while low stocks experience a
decrease. Given that SUSIR is normalized to have zero mean and unit standard deviation, the
coefficient of 0.0204 means that a stock whose SUSIR is one standard deviation above (or be-
low) its average experiences an increase (or decrease) in its market beta by 0.02 around earnings
announcements. A SUSIR long-short strategy is long in low-SUSIR stocks and short in high-
SUSIR stocks, meaning that the market exposure of this strategy actually decreases on days
when announcements are made. Thus, if anything, the strategy gets less risky on these days. All
in all, our tests show that SUSIR’s predictive ability is economically and statistically stronger
on earnings announcement days. This effect is not explained by an earnings announcement
premium or an increase in exposure to market risk.
[ Insert Table 3.6 ]
To conclude, in this subsection we find that information contained in SUSIR is relevant
for identifying misvalued stocks. We formulate two hypotheses that are consistent with the
informational advantage of arbitrageurs. The first hypothesis states that return predictability
stems from biased expectations, which are corrected when news arrives. The second hypothesis
states that if biased expectations are the main channel of return predictability, then return
predictability should be stronger on days when new valuation-relevant information is released.
We find support for both hypotheses. First, we show that stocks with higher SUSIR experience
lower earnings surprises, while those with lower SUSIR experience higher earnings surprises.
This conclusion holds for various measures of earnings surprises. Second, we find that the
ability of SUSIR to predict stock returns becomes almost five-fold stronger around earnings
announcements. Moreover, this effect is not explained by an increase in systematic risk. Our
results are thus consistent with the mispricing-based explanation of SUSIR’s ability to predict
stock returns.
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3.3.6 Limits to arbitrage
Our results so far indicate that SUSIR reflects information on misvaluation. This naturally
prompts the question: Why do investors not arbitrage away this misvaluation? Certain limits
to arbitrage might sustain short-term deviations of stock prices from fundamental values. The
seminal work of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provides an important framework and justification
for the persistence of mispricing and predictability of stock returns. These authors argue that
arbitrage opportunities should vanish immediately as a large number of investors take positions
against the mispricing, driving the stock price back to its fundamental value. However, in
reality, due to noise trading, the stock price might diverge in short-run even further from the
fundamental value, inducing losses to the arbitrageur. This fact could prevent the investors from
trading on mispricing in the first place and could set certain limits to arbitrage.
To test whether the predictability arises, at least in part, from these limits to arbitrage
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), we define variables that have been related in previous research
to trading impediments. Then, for each of the variables, we sort the stocks into quintiles.
Finally, we include dummy variables for each quintile, except the first one, and incorporate their
interactions with SUSIR into a Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression framework:
Reti,t = αt + β1SUSIRi,t−1 +
5∑
k=2
βkMQuintile=k,i,t−1+
+
5∑
k=2
γkSUSIRi,t−1 ×MQuintile=k,i,t−1 + x′ib + εi,t,
(3.6)
where MQuintile=k denotes the dummy variable equal to one if the limits-to-arbitrage variable
M is in the kth quintile. The coefficients γ2 to γ5 are of most interest in this subsection. In
particular, we expect that the negative predictability associated with SUSIR is the strongest
in the quintile with the highest limits to arbitrage. Also, note that the estimate β1 denotes
the effect of SUSIR in the lowest quintile of variable M . We now consider three different
variables that are closely related to the mechanism of limits to arbitrage and commonly used
in the literature: The spread estimator of Corwin and Schultz (2012) as a proxy for illiquidity,
idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy for arbitrage risk (Pontiff, 2006; Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan,
2015), and residual institutional ownership as a proxy for short-sale constraints (Nagel, 2005). If
limits to arbitrage are important for the persistence of mispricing, we expect that predictability
is the strongest (more negative) for stocks with high illiquidity, high idiosyncratic volatility, or
lower residual institutional ownership.
[ Insert Table 3.7 ]
Column (1) of Table 3.7 shows the time-series average of the cross-sectional regression coef-
ficients employing the standard control variables, surprise in short interest, dummy variable for
each quintile of illiquidity (except the first one), and the interaction terms of SUSIR with the
dummy variables. In line with our prediction, we find that the predictive power of surprise in
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short interest is strongest for the highest quintile of illiquidity. In terms of economic magnitude,
the return spread associated with surprise in short interest is around three times larger for the
most illiquid stocks than for the most liquid. Also, except for the second quintile, this effect
of illiquidity is monotonic across the quintiles. The intuition behind this finding is that the
more illiquid the stock, the slower and more costly it will be to trade on the market. These
additional costs could prevent investors from fully exploiting arbitrage opportunities and from
taking advantage of the return predictability.
Next, we examine the role of idiosyncratic volatility for predictability of returns. In the
framework of Shleifer and Vishny (1997), stocks with greater volatility are less attractive to
arbitrageurs and exhibit larger predictable returns than stocks with less volatility. Column (2)
shows results that are in line with this hypothesis. The predictability in the quintile with the
most volatile stocks is five times higher than that of the least volatile stocks. Interestingly, this
relation is monotonic, and the predictability using SUSIR is statistically significant across four
of the five volatility quintiles.
Lastly, we employ the residual of institutional ownership as a proxy for limits to arbitrage.
More specifically, Nagel (2005) suggests that this variable serves as a meaningful proxy for
the supply of stocks to borrow in the lending market. In the case of low supply, arbitrageurs
face higher impediments to short the stock, resulting in stronger predictability in the event of
overpricing. In Column (3), we do not find any evidence of stronger return predictability for
stocks with low lending supply. The effect is essentially the same across all five rio quintiles.
There are two mutually non-exclusive possible explanations for this non-finding. First, the
supply of stocks to borrow is particularly important for anomalies that are driven by the short
leg. Given that the strategy based on SUSIR yields profitable returns on both the long and
the short leg, short-sale constraints cannot represent the ultimate explanation in the first place.
Second, the construction of the surprise in short interest is based on abnormal changes of short
interest compared to the usual variation in the past. Consequently, an extreme negative or
positive change in the level of short interest implies that this particular stock is most probably
not short-sale-constrained.6
Overall, in line with Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) limits-to-arbitrage argument, we find ev-
idence that general trading impediments (Gromb and Vayanos, 2010), such as illiquidity and
idiosyncratic volatility, are positively related to the strength of predictability. However, we also
document that short-sale constraints cannot explain the effect of SUSIR. Therefore, the pre-
dictive ability of SUSIR is unlikely to be due to a low supply of lendable shares or high lending
fees (Drechsler and Drechsler, 2016).
3.4 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion of the impact of short sellers on the informa-
tional efficiency of capital markets. We introduce a new measure of informed trading, surprise
6In untabulated tests we find similar results for other short-sale constraint proxies such as the level of short
interest ratio (Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter, 2005) or the short interest relative to institutional shares (Drechsler
and Drechsler, 2016)
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in short interest, that incorporates two regular features of the short interest data: strong per-
sistence in the levels of short interest ratio and large cross-sectional differences in volatility.
The long-short strategy based on this measure delivers up to 6% in annualized risk-adjusted
returns that are not explained by standard stock characteristics, by other known short interest-
based strategies or short-sale constraints. Evidence suggests that our measure identifies market
mispricing that stems from biased beliefs of market participants and persists due to trading
impediments, such as illiquidity and idiosyncratic volatility. Thus, surprise in short interest
represents a mispricing-related anomaly that is not identified in the prior literature.
Our findings have wide-reaching implications for future studies on the informational role
of short sellers. For instance, one important question remains: What is the source of arbi-
trageurs’ informational advantage? Therefore, an interesting avenue for future research is to
study the relation between the surprise in short interest and future corporate events and news
(e.g., Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg, 2012), insider trades, and capital market anomalies.
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Figure 3.1:
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Around Short Interest Announcement
This figure displays the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) of two portfolios based on the surprise
in short interest. The benchmark is the market return and the time window is 10 days before and 30 days after
the NYSE’s short interest dissemination day. Figure 3.1(a) plots the CAAR for stocks with the highest 30% of
surprises in short interest at each event day, whereas Figure 3.1(b) plots the CAAR for stocks with the lowest 30%
of surprises in short interest at each event day. The dashed lines represent the upper and lower 90% confidence
intervals. The sample starts in January 1995 and contains stocks traded on the NYSE.
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Figure 3.2:
Cumulative Logarithmic Raw Returns
This figure shows the monthly cumulative sums of log raw returns for equal-weighted and value-weighted SUSIR
long-short strategies over the period from March 1980 to December 2013.
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Figure 3.3:
Holding Period Performance of SUSIR Long-Short Strategy
This figure plots the average cumulative Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha of long-short portfolios over the
holding period. We first construct the long-short portfolio each month according to SUSIR and calcu-
late monthly returns in the month t + k, where k ∈ {1, ..., 24}. Second, we run a time-series regres-
sion for each holding period month k of the SUSIR long-short strategy on four factors. The corre-
sponding strategy average four-factor alpha at month k is the intercept (αk) in the following regression:
LS SUSIRt+k = αk + βMKTRF,kMKTRFt+k + βSMB,kSMBt+k+
+ βHML,kHMLt+k + βUMD,kUMDt+k + k,t+k.
In the final step, the alphas are accumulated over months in the holding period . The sample period is from
March 1980 to December 2013.
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Table 3.1:
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of this table reports univariate summary statistics (mean, standard deviation and 1st, 10th, 50th, 90th,
99th percentiles) of the variables used in this study. The first set of variables in Panel A is based on short interest
data. Standardized unexpected short interest ratio (SUSIR) is the short interest ratio net of its 12-month moving
average over its 12-month moving standard deviation. Short interest ratio (SR) is the short interest over shares
outstanding. The days-to-cover measure (DTC) is equal to short interest divided by daily turnover. SRIO
is short interest ratio over institutional ownership ratio. The second set of variables in Panel A is the set of
stock characteristics known to predict stock returns. Market beta (MBETA) is calculated using 12 months of
daily data. Size (SIZE) and book-to-market ratio (BM) are constructed as in Fama and French (1992). Return
reversal (RET RV ) is the return over the month t−1. Return momentum (RET MOM) is the cumulative return
from month t− 12 to t− 2. Investment (INV ) is the asset growth measure of Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008).
Return on assets (ROA) is equal to income before extraordinary items over assets. MISP is the mispricing score
of Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015). The third set of variables in Panel A is the set of proxies for the limits
to arbitrage. Idiosyncratic volatility (IV OLA) is constructed using 12 months of daily data as in Ang et al.
(2006). HLSPREAD is the bid-ask spread of Corwin and Schultz (2012). Institutional ownership ratio (IO) is
the proportion of shares outstanding owned by institutional investors. All variables are winsorized at the 0.1%
and 0.99% levels. Panel B of this table reports Spearman correlations of variables.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Percentiles
Variable Mean SD 1st 10th Median 90th 99th
SUSIR 0.332 2.069 -2.935 -1.484 0.006 2.338 6.452
SR 0.035 0.049 0.000 0.001 0.016 0.091 0.239
DTC 6.085 7.509 0.015 0.496 3.721 13.951 37.831
SRIO 0.067 0.122 0.000 0.003 0.033 0.153 0.498
MBETA 1.042 0.452 0.018 0.505 1.018 1.607 2.283
SIZE 4498.113 17182.012 33.312 126.298 826.032 8202.445 69739.656
BM 0.643 0.528 0.000 0.190 0.545 1.169 2.338
RET RV 0.012 0.113 -0.291 -0.113 0.009 0.138 0.342
RET MOM 0.196 0.518 -0.606 -0.280 0.121 0.688 2.126
INV 0.158 0.397 -0.327 -0.065 0.081 0.399 1.722
ROA 0.049 0.117 -0.386 -0.015 0.048 0.143 0.326
MISP 48.934 12.735 22.150 32.830 48.360 65.880 79.990
IV OLA 0.019 0.012 0.005 0.008 0.016 0.032 0.061
HLSPREAD 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.014 0.025
IO 0.561 0.261 0.026 0.184 0.578 0.903 1.000
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Table 3.3:
Abnormal Returns of SUSIR Long-Short Strategy
The returns of the SUSIR-based long-short strategy are regressed on the four factors from Carhart (1997) model
and long-short strategies based on SR, DTC and SRIO. All strategies are long in stocks from the lowest decile of
the corresponding variable and are short in stocks from the highest decile of the corresponding variable. In Panel
A (Panel B) the returns of all strategies are calculated using an equal-weighting (value-weighting) procedure. The
t-statistics are adjusted for autocorrelation following Newey and West (1987) with the lag of twelve months. ***,
** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Strategy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CONS 0.489*** 0.255*** 0.330*** 0.279*** 0.242***
(5.70) (2.74) (3.82) (3.10) (2.63)
LS SR 0.267*** 0.242***
(4.76) (3.33)
LS DTC 0.183*** 0.0330
(3.02) (0.56)
LS SRIO 0.214*** 0.00699
(4.19) (0.13)
MKTRF -0.0562** 0.0572** -0.0331 0.00761 0.0527**
(-2.23) (2.22) (-1.54) (0.38) (1.97)
SMB 0.00318 0.0489 0.00466 0.0526 0.0464
(0.08) (1.36) (0.14) (1.30) (1.23)
HML -0.0400 -0.0584** -0.0330 -0.0489* -0.0557*
(-1.17) (-1.99) (-1.08) (-1.68) (-1.93)
UMD -0.0179 -0.0438 -0.0236 -0.0356 -0.0430
(-0.43) (-1.35) (-0.60) (-0.89) (-1.31)
N 404 404 404 404 404
Panel B: Value-Weighted Strategy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CONS 0.368*** 0.288** 0.328*** 0.251** 0.254**
(3.13) (2.36) (2.69) (2.11) (2.02)
LS SR 0.166** 0.0362
(2.48) (0.58)
LS DTC 0.183*** 0.100
(2.62) (1.55)
LS SRIO 0.201*** 0.128**
(2.86) (2.00)
MKTRF -0.0358 0.0319 -0.0352 0.0204 0.0152
(-0.81) (0.82) (-0.85) (0.52) (0.38)
SMB 0.0379 0.0623 0.00938 0.0654 0.0452
(0.81) (1.15) (0.21) (1.25) (0.82)
HML -0.150** -0.162** -0.162*** -0.158** -0.165***
(-2.17) (-2.50) (-2.66) (-2.54) (-2.72)
UMD 0.0684 0.0602 0.0710 0.0538 0.0587
(1.12) (1.08) (1.25) (0.96) (1.08)
N 404 404 404 404 404
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Tables and Figures
Table 3.6:
Anomaly Returns on Earnings Announcement Days
This table reports the results of the panel regression of raw stock returns on the SUSIR measure, the earnings
announcement period (EAP ) dummy and the interaction between them. Column (1) includes day-fixed effects.
Column (2) adds four lags of stock return, return squared and turnover (Controls), coefficients are not displayed.
In Column (3) SR and MISP and their interactions with EAP are included. In Column (4) day-fixed effects
are replaced with more restrictive day-EAP fixed effects. In Column (5) the return of the CRSP value-weighted
index (MKT ), its interaction with SUSIR and EAP and their triple interaction are added but day-fixed effects
are removed. The standard errors are clustered by month. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EAP 0.0633*** 0.0611*** 0.0612*** 0.0460***
(9.26) (8.93) (9.00) (4.71)
SUSIR -0.00441*** -0.00500*** -0.00361*** -0.00507*** -0.00410*
(-3.79) (-4.36) (-3.21) (-4.41) (-1.90)
SUSIR× EAP -0.0174*** -0.0180*** -0.0141** -0.0151*** -0.0172***
(-2.99) (-3.11) (-2.47) (-2.68) (-2.70)
MISP -0.0109***
(-5.29)
MISP × EAP -0.0264***
(-3.84)
SR -0.0109***
(-3.43)
SR× EAP -0.0292***
(-3.14)
MKT 1.005***
(105.04)
MKT × EAP 0.00793
(0.54)
MKT × SUSIR -0.00567
(-1.27)
MKT × SUSIR× EAP 0.0204**
(2.35)
Controls None Yes Yes Yes Yes
FixedEffects Day Day Day Day*EAP None
R2 0.207 0.208 0.208 0.210 0.181
N 12552943 12537383 12537383 12537348 12537383
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Chapter 3
Table 3.7:
Analysis of Limits to Arbitrage
This table reports the estimation results for the Fama-MacBeth regression of monthly stock returns on the SUSIR
measure and its interactions with variables that proxy for limits to arbitrage. These proxies are the Corwin and
Schultz (2012) spread (HLSPREAD), idiosyncratic volatility (IV OLA) and the residual institutional ownership
ratio (RIO). The interaction variables are sorted into quintiles. SUSIR is normalized to have zero mean and
unit standard deviation. It is interacted with the quintile dummies of the interaction variable. Dummies for the
lowest quintile of the interaction variable are omitted. Additional control variables are market beta, log size, log
book-to-market ratio, momentum and short-term reversal (coefficients are not displayed). The t-statistics are
Newey and West (1987) adjusted. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
M = HLSPREAD M = IV OLA M = RIO
(1) (2) (3)
SUSIR -0.0816** -0.0352 -0.0893***
(-2.49) (-1.06) (-2.84)
SUSIR×MQuintile=2 0.0339 -0.0618* -0.0164
(0.87) (-1.74) (-0.35)
SUSIR×MQuintile=3 -0.0287 -0.0837* -0.0267
(-0.57) (-1.79) (-0.58)
SUSIR×MQuintile=4 -0.0545 -0.0928* -0.0687
(-1.16) (-1.87) (-1.35)
SUSIR×MQuintile=5 -0.154*** -0.141** -0.0209
(-3.07) (-2.38) (-0.32)
MQuintile=2 0.0348 0.0551 0.260***
(0.75) (0.92) (4.77)
MQuintile=3 0.0120 -0.00641 0.205***
(0.26) (-0.08) (2.91)
MQuintile=4 0.00578 -0.0927 0.254***
(0.08) (-0.91) (3.10)
MQuintile=5 -0.298** -0.641*** 0.189*
(-2.55) (-3.81) (1.83)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0684 0.0719 0.0689
N 577088 576894 575995
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Table A3.1:
Definitions of Variables
Variable: Description: Source:
SR Short interest ratio is the mid-month reported short interest divided
by shares outstanding. To aggregate on PERMNO level, we sum
short interest over global issue key. We use the version of short inter-
est variable from Compustat supplementary file that is not adjusted
for stock splits. Short interest for NASDAQ stocks is available start-
ing June 2003.
CRSP/Compustat
SUSIR Standardized unanticipated short interest ratio is defined as
SRt−SRt−1,t−12
σSRt−1,t−12
, where SRt−1,t−12 is a 12-month moving window
mean and σSRt−1,t−12 is a 12-month moving window standard devia-
tion of short interest ratio. SUSIR is set to missing if fewer than
five observations of short interest ratio are available.
CRSP/Compustat
DTC Days-to-cover equals to short interest divided by daily turnover. CRSP/Compustat
SRIO Short interest over institutional ownership equals to short interest
ratio over institutional ownership ratio.
Compustat/13F
MBETA Market beta is a slope coefficient in the time series regression of the
stock’s return on the market excess return (MKTRF), with a rolling
window of 252 trading days.
CRSP
LN SIZE Log market capitalization is calculated as the number of shares out-
standing times the price per share (in $Mio).
CRSP
LN BM Log book-to-market ratio is calculated following Davis, Fama, and
French (2000). The book-to-market ratio in year t is the total book
value at the end of the fiscal year ending in year t−1 divided by total
market capitalization on the last trading day of the calendar year
t−1, as reported by CRSP. The total book value is the book value of
stockholders’ equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment
tax credit minus the book value of preferred stock. To estimate the
book value of preferred stock, we use the redemption, liquidation, or
par value, in this order (depending on data availability).
CRSP/Compustat
RET MOM Return momentum is the cumulative return from month t − 12 to
t− 2.
CRSP
RET REV Return reversal is the return over the month t− 1. CRSP
ROA Return on assets equals to to income before extraordinary items over
assets.
Compustat
INV Assets growth is defined as TAt−1−TAt−2TAt−2 following Cooper, Gulen,
and Schill (2008).
Compustat
Continued on next page
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Table A3.1 – Continued from previous page
Variable: Description: Source:
IV OLA Idiosyncratic volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the
recent month’s daily residuals obtained in the regression of the excess
stock returns on Fama-French 3-factors, with a rolling window of 252
trading days.
Compustat
HLSPREAD The bid-ask spread of Corwin and Schultz (2012). Authors
RIO Residual institutional ownership is the residual from the follow-
ing monthly cross-sectional regression: ln(
IOi,t
1−IOi,t ) = αt + β1,t ×
ln(SIZEi,t) + β2,t × ln(SIZEi,t)2 + i,t. Being reported once per
quarter, insitutional ownership is assumed to be constant over three-
month period prior to the next report.
CRSP/13F
SUEPE Standardized unanticipated earnings surprises are defined as a fore-
cast error in quarter t divided by the volatility of forecast error over
last eight quarters. Forecast error is calculated as the difference be-
tween the EPS announced at t and the EPS four quarters prior to
that. Thus, SUEPE = EPSt−EPSt−4
σ∆EPSt−1,t−8
.
IBES
SUEAF Earnings forecasts error is equal to EPS announced at month t net
of the most recent mean analyst forecast divided by the standard
deviation of the most recent analyst forecasts.
IBES
CAR Cumulative abnormal return over 3-day earnings announcement win-
dow is defined as
∑1
t=−1(rett −MKTt), where MKTt is the CRSP
value-weighted portfolio.
CRSP/Compustat
NUMEST Number of analyst forecasts used to calculate the mean forecast. IBES
STDEV Dispersion in analyst earnings estimates. IBES
EAP Earnings announcement period dummy is equal to one for a 3-day
window around earnings announcement.
Compustat
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